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Personal study plan
Name: Sarah Holroyd 
Date: 22nd November 1996 
Date of Registration: April 1996 
Registration number: 3519228
Academic Dossier
Title and description of proposed reviews.
1. Solution-focused Brief Therapy: a critical review
Solution-focused therapy is an approach which derives from systemic models of brief 
therapy. It has been applied in a wide variety of therapeutic settings and appears to be 
regarded as a simple but powerful method of change. This essay will critically review 
the literature on solution-focused therapy, with particular reference to its application in 
mental health and its relevance to clinical psychology.
2. Cognitive-behavioural therapy and schizophrenia: current status and applications 
to early intervention 
Treatments for schizophrenia have traditionally rested within the domain of 
pharmacotherapy. Cognitive-behavioural therapy has recently been applied to this 
severe disorder, with promising results. Research has now turned to the possibilités for 
treatment in the early stages of schizophrenia. This review wiU look at the current 
status of theories of schizophrenia and early intervention in general, and will then 
explore the contribution of cognitive-behavioural theory and practice to the early 
treatment of this illness.
Professional Dossier
Professional practice, training and development
This part of the dossier will outline my achievements and demonstrate continued 
professional development since qualification. It will include a CV which summarises my 
professional practice since qualifying, followed by a summary of training and service 
developments. I will include reflections on my professional career and my hopes for 
continuing development in the future.
Developing a family therapy service in adult mental health: a review and preliminary 
audit o f the first two years
The second part of this dossier will describe the development of a new family therapy 
service, and the role of clinical psychology in setting up and evaluating the service.
Research Dossier
Title: Perfectionism, guilt and responsibility in obsessive-compulsive disorder: an 
investigation o f  cognitive and emotional styles
Research supervisor: Professor Sarah Hampson
Background
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a severe and disabling condition and is 
considered to be one of the most treatment resistant of the anxiety disorders. 
Behavioural models developed in the 1960s led to interventions which greatly 
improved the prognosis for OCD sufferers, and treatments such as exposure and 
response prevention are now treatments of choice. However, as a theory of etiology, 
the behavioural model has its limitations, and in recent years cognitive models of OCD
have been proposed which claim that patients display certain cognitive traits or thinking 
styles which predispose them to obsessionality.
Perfectionism and an excessive sense of responsibility have both been linked clinically 
to OCD, while guilt, as an affective trait, has also been hypothesised to play a key role 
in the condition. However much of the research in this field utilises normal populations 
or fails to include comparison groups. In addition, few empirical studies have addressed 
the question of how these styles and traits might relate to each other in OCD.
The proposed study will measure perfectionism, responsibility and guilt in patients with 
OCD compared to patients with other anxiety disorders. It is hypothesised that OCD 
patients will show significantly higher levels of these traits.
ACADEMIC DOSSIER
Solution-focused Brief Therapy: a critical review
Introduction
Clinical psychology as a mental health profession places strong emphasis on its 
scientific heritage. Its academic base rests upon carefully designed research, with the 
randomised case-controlled study held as a benchmark of good methodology. In 
practice, clinical psychology generally adheres, in terms of training at least, to the 
principles of the scientist-practitioner model and evidence-based practice. Indeed the 
latter is now considered a key requirement for all types of psychological therapy in the 
health services ( NHS Executive, 1996).
Clinical psychologists working ‘in the field’ however are likely to encounter a range of 
new therapeutic models and ideas, either through their multi-disciplinary colleagues or 
via the multitude of courses and workshops available to the helping professions. To 
what extent these new ideas are adopted by clinical psychologists is unclear, although 
it is generally acknowledged that practising psychologists rarely adhere strictly to the 
theoretical firamework that most are trained in, that is cognitive behavioural theory 
(Pilgrim, 1997).
One model which is becoming increasingly popular in both health and social services is 
Solution-focused Brief Therapy (SFBT), an approach developed by Steve de Shazer 
and his colleagues at the Brief Family Therapy Center in Milwaukee (Molnar and de 
Shazer, 1987). This approach is applied to individuals, families and groups and focuses 
not on clients’ problems or pathology but on what clients are doing that ‘works’, 
utilising specific questions and techniques to reinforce and amplify these strengths. 
SFBT, primarily through firequent workshops and training courses but ofi;en through 
word of mouth, has attracted the interest of many health professionals including clinical 
psychologists (Valinejad et al., 1996). The reasons for this interest are varied but a 
number of factors seem pertinent. The notion of a brief therapy, in these times of
jSnancial restraint and long waiting lists, is an attractive proposition to clients, clinicians 
and health care purchasers alike. SFBT offers an average of 4.6 sessions (Johnson and 
Miller, 1994), and even single-session SFBT is promoted by its originator as an 
effective treatment (Talmon, 1990), though this is based on anecdotal evidence only. 
Training too is brief, relatively low cost and open to both public and professionals. The 
model itself is intrinsically appealing with its emphasis on non-pathologising, 
empowering techniques which are easy to leam. Courses and publications are offered 
in the UK which apply SFBT to couples, families, adolescents, older adults, abuse, 
crisis intervention, substance misuse, male violence, schizophrenia, child protection, 
school problems, and social work.
SFBT has its roots in systems theory and, in more recent forms, eschews an empirical 
or positivistic view of knowledge. Consequently it has developed and been evaluated 
within a different context compared to mainstream psychological theory. However, 
given the increasing impact of this approach on clinical practice, it is timely to attempt 
an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of de Shazer’s ideas. This review will 
begin by a brief description of the main features of SFBT. It will then consider the 
theory and philosophy underlying SFBT and how this might relate to other models of 
therapy, including cognitive behaviour therapy. The evidence for the effectiveness of 
SFBT will be addressed, and lastly some ethical and professional issues raised by the 
use of SFBT in clinical practice will be highlighted.
Solution-focused brief therapy in practice
SFBT has been summed up by three ‘rules’ as follows;
“(1) If it ain’t broke, DON’T FIX IT!
(2) Once you know what works, DO MORE OF IT!
(3) If it doesn’t work, then don’t do it again, DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT!’ 
(Carpenter, 1997, p. 117)
This ‘common sense’ philosophy suggests a simple, easy to leam technique and indeed 
SFBT ‘how-to’ books and training courses also present SFBT as a relatively 
straightforward set of questions and tasks. George et al., (1990) describe eight basic 
steps to be taken in the first session which also serve as a blueprint for all subsequent 
sessions.
1. Problem-firee talk: building rapport and locating strengths.
2. Statement of the problem pattern.
3. Exploration of solution patterns i.e. exceptions to the mles of the complaint.
4. Establishing goals for therapy. Asking the ‘miracle question’ (what would life look 
like if a miracle occurred and the problem no longer existed).
5. Definition of potential solutions: use of scaling questions to assess small changes.
6. Consultation break (with a team or alone).
7. Feedback (positive only: compliments).
8. Task setting. (adapted fi*om George et al., 1990, p. 7)
The SFBT approach rests on a large number of assumptions and prescriptions which 
do not necessarily relate logically to one another. Essentially this reflects the diverse 
models and theories fi*om which solution-focused therapists have drawn their 
inspiration. This will be addressed in the next section. There are some core 
assumptions however which are characteristic of SFBT including the following;
• Change is always occurring.
• Changes in one part of a system can result m changes elsewhere in that system.
• Focusing on exceptions/solutions to problems wHl make it more likely that 
exceptions will outweigh problems.
• Focusing on the problem and history of the problem is unhelpful.
• The client’s own beliefs, rules, language define the reality of the therapeutic 
conversation, vnthout reference to external or ‘objective’ concepts such as normal 
or correct behaviours/beliefs.
• The client sets the goals and identifies when they have been met and when therapy 
should stop.
• The therapist is a collaborative facilitator, not an ‘expert’.
Training in SFBT typically involves 2 or 4 day workshops which focus almost entirely 
on technique, and make little reference to the sources of various solution-focused 
ideas. The training approach is explicitly practical and prescriptive (Shilts and Gordon, 
1996) which sits uneasily with some of the fi-ameworks used (for example the relativist 
assumptions about reality mentioned above), and is certainly far removed firom 
traditional clinical psychology training with its emphasis on a theory-driven scientific 
basis for any therapeutic technique, and its reference to complex variables which may 
need to be taken into account in understanding cause and effect. SFBT training is 
certainly a challenge to this tradition as participants are exposed to aspects of 
Ericksonian hypnosis, behavioural analysis, systemic models and even Eastern 
philosophy (George et al., 1990) along the way.
Theory in solution-focused brief therapy
Tracking the theoretical development of SFBT is a challenging task. The approach 
draws upon a variety of theoretical perspectives and even different scientific 
paradigms. As Cade and O’Hanlon comment in their Brief Guide to Brief Therapy 
(1993) “brief therapists are identified more by how they act than by their theoretical 
formulations.”(p.lO). Elowever, SFBT is presented by its proponents as a distinctive 
therapy using specific techniques for specific purposes, and as such it is reasonable to 
‘unpick’ SFBT to assess its theoretical status. For the purposes of this review a theory 
is taken to be a set of propositions which form a deductive system. That is, “there must 
be a logical connection between the propositions and between at least some 
propositions and the world of experience” (Klein and White, 1996, p. 14). This assumes
of course an empiricist view of knowledge and science which is itself challenged by 
some SFBT therapists.
De Shazer'first explored solution-focused ideas in the early 1980’s while working as a 
family therapist at the Brief Family Therapy Center. He departed fi*om the tradition of 
strategic ‘problem solving’ therapy practised by Brief therapists at the time by 
proposing that there should be “a clinical focus on solutions rather than problems” 
(Molnar and de Shazer, 1987). de Shazer, in considering a conceptual basis for 
solution-focused tasks, at first suggested that the interventions could be explained fi-om 
a number of different theoretical perspectives. He drew upon systemic theory in 
general, the work of Milton Erickson and, interestingly, cognitive and behavioural 
theory. In an early paper, for example, Molnar and de Shazer (1987) state:
“the work of Mahoney (1974), Beck (1967) and Ellis (1962), who have emphasised 
the significance of thoughts in changing feelings and behaviour, might, for example, 
lead to therapeutic practices which closely resemble solution-focused tasks.” (p. 351).
Other writers too have noted conceptual similarities between cognitive theory and 
SFBT, Johnson and Millar (1994) describe SFBT as combining a number of techniques 
including the focus on meaning of cognitive therapy and the goal orientation of 
behaviour therapy. Cade and O’Hanlon, key therapists and trainers in the field of SFBT 
state that:
“Brief therapy is essentially concerned with observable phenomena, is pragmatic and 
related to the belief that problems are produced and maintained
1. by the constructs through which difSculties are viewed,... and
2. by repetitive behavioural sequences” (1993 p.5)
Cade and O’Hanlon do not acknowledge this resemblance to cognitive behavioural 
theory themselves, but use a mix of empirical studies drawn fi*om experimental, 
perceptual and social psychology to support their description of the basis of brief
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therapy and SFBT. For example the chapter entitled “What is it that happens between 
the ears?” makes brief reference to construct theory, experimenter bias, gestalt theory, 
interpersonal theory, along with biology and neuroscience, combining these to arrive at 
what they describe as “the most parsimonious frameworks for understanding mental 
processes” (p.29). The links proposed are tenuous and the evidence presented 
idiosyncratic, but the authors’ attempts to generate a model of therapy are further 
undermined by later chapters in which they take an anti-empiricist stance which of 
course cannot be reconciled with the empirically based evidence relied upon earlier.
Cognitive and behavioural elements are clearly evident m the techniques of SFBT and 
feature in the conceptual accounts referred to above. However SFBT could not be 
regarded as a cognitive behavioural theory, essentially because other propositions in 
SFBT derive from very different theoretical frameworks. SFBT was first developed 
within and by a community of brief family therapists and draws on systemic strategic 
models in both technique and in terms of theoretical orientation. Systems theory in 
general has been subject to criticism, not least the charge that it is not a theory m any 
scientific (i.e. hypothetico-deductive) sense but a model or “flow-chart approach”. 
(Klein and White, 1996). Other criticisms include the problem that many ideas in 
systems theory are too vague and abstract to be meaningful, and the assertion that 
family therapists tend to reify the idea of a system, that is they attribute reality to a 
heuristic model for understanding. In so far as SFBT has some of its origins in systems 
theory these criticisms might equally apply to the approach being discussed here.
It is outside the scope of this review to describe or critique systems theory in general, 
but in any case a fimdamental paradigm shift m systems theory and hence family 
therapy in recent years neatly side-steps criticisms made from an empirical standpoint 
regardless of the detail. Constructivist paradigms have emerged in family therapy 
which draw on post-modern ideas from the fields of philosophy, sociology, the arts and 
politics. Social constructivism brings into question the notion of an objective reality 
that can be observed and measured, instead proposing that aU knowledge is socially 
constructed through the ideas, meanings and linguistic rules that a particular group or
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society chooses to adopt. Thus there are no scientific facts or value-free absolute 
truths but rather ways of viewing the world that are socially defined and that can 
change according to who is in a position of power to define and describe those 
‘truths’. Madness, disease, dysfunction, normality are socially constructed concepts 
defined through the discourses of science, medicine, law and so on. These ideas have 
been taken on and developed by a number of different family therapists and in the 
process quite different ‘versions’ of constructivist thinking have emerged. Some 
practitioners have allied themselves with the ideas of the social and political 
philosopher Michel Foucault (1965), and developed what is termed narrative therapy 
(White and Epston, 1990; Monk et al., 1997). In this approach, clients’ problems are 
seen as stories or narratives shaped by the social, cultural and political context. Clients 
are helped to deconstruct these dominant stories and through recognising exceptions 
or unique outcomes (for example occasions where they were able to cope better), are 
able to buüd alternative, more hopeful narratives about their strengths and possibilities 
for change.
De Shazer, in contrast to his earliest writings, has in recent years placed his own 
version of the constructivist paradigm at the heart of SFBT, and presents his 
“theoretical analysis” in his book Putting Difference to Work (1991). Given that de 
Shazer is still regarded as the main influence in SFBT it is important to look at his 
ideas in some detail. While some of the narrative therapy ideas are also found in SFBT 
(the premise that ‘exceptions’ are a way of underniLnmg a problem-dominated story for 
example), de Shazer departs fi*om narrative’s affinity with Foucault and instead cites 
the philosophers Wittgenstein and Derrida as key influences on his thinking about 
SFBT. The constructivist ideas about power, politics and knowledge are noticeable by 
their absence, and in their place is selected aspects of both Wittgenstein and Derrida’s 
constructivist linguistic philosophy. De Shazer makes the point at the beginning of 
Putting Difference to Work that his analysis is;
“certainly not a Theory with a capital T; rather, the analysis leads away fi-om such a 
grand design, emphasizing instead the variability of the clinical situation and the people
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involved (both clients and therapists), the variability of events, and the variability of 
problems and solutions.” (p. 10).
This position raises a number of issues. Firstly de Shazer explicitly rejects the idea of 
SFBT being a theory in any formal sense. This is not a surprising position to have 
taken of course, but it leads to considerable difficulties when considering attempts of 
de Shazer and his colleagues to define, measure and evaluate the effectiveness of his 
approach. This will be addressed in the next section.
De Shazer’s comments about variability relate to a constructivist paradigm and in 
particular Wittgenstein’s ideas about language. De Shazer applies the concept of 
language-games to the therapeutic conversations which take place in SFBT. In 
essence Wittgenstein argued against private mental states, processes or independent 
rules lying behind language, but saw language as a host of different activities such as 
describing, giving orders, questioning, warning etc. which have their meaning only in 
terms of the use they are put to, no more. These socially constructed activities he 
called language-games and since the rules of language rest on the agreed practices of a 
community they are their own justification, with no objective world or set of facts 
governing their use. De Shazer applies these ideas to SFBT in the following way;
“The therapeutic relationship is a negotiated, consensual, and cooperative endeavor in 
which the solution-focused therapist and client jointly produce various language games 
focused on (a) exceptions, (b) goals, and (c) solutions.” ( de Shazer, 1988).
As many authors have noted, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is extremely difficult and 
complex, being described as “cryptic, elliptical and dogmatic” (Flew, 1979). His later 
work, which de Shazer draws most heavily on, is elaborate, vague and metaphorical. 
Critics have argued that on closer scrutiny his ideas about language and meaning are 
problematic (for example his ideas require him to argue fi-om a position of cognitive 
relativism which is generally regarded as untenable), and conclude that his later 
philosophy is “not as it stands persuasive.” (Grayling, 1988). de Shazer does not
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address these difficulties, and his versions of Wittgenstein’s ideas bear only a 
superficial resemblance to the philosophical -works he draws upon. Similar criticism can 
be made of de Shazer’s use of Derrida’s most complex ideas about words which are 
appropriated for the purposes of underpinning with philosophical foundations 
manoeuvres fike looking for exceptions.
In summary, de Shazer’s ideas can indeed be said to be ambitious, with de Shazer 
described as “trying (too hard) to provide a (pseudo) philosophical overlay in pursuit 
of respectability which his thinking and previous work do not require.” (Jenkins, 
1993). The word ‘overlay’ is significant here, for de Shazer’s philosophical analysis 
appears to be post hoc, with all the weaknesses that that implies. His suggestions about 
what his therapy is may have changed radically since his earlier references to 
behavioural theory, but he has not yet offered us a coherent framework in their place.
The claim to be working within a constructivist paradigm made by both narrative and 
SFBT approaches is itself open to criticism. Gibney (1996) argues that these therapies 
are simply versions of strategic family therapy and accuses them of reconstructing the 
wheel! He states that;
“ Clearly, both these practitioners have valuable practice methods to offer, but is the 
family therapy community best served by their attempts to locate themselves in French 
poststructuralist philosophy, as opposed to their more obvious connections with 
American pragmatic therapy?” ( p. 99)
Other authors too have questioned the validity of SBFT’s claim to be constructivist or 
poststructural. Atwood (1995) claims that SFBT is in fact modernist in that it operates 
from a position of certainty that families without problems have solutions and that the 
therapy of choice is to focus only on those solutions. Hence there is an implicit 
definition of competency behind the technique. Furthermore, the emphasis in SFBT on 
prescriptive technique and word play where a therapy session is a “self-contained 
linguistic system” (de Shazer and Berg, 1992), is a far cry firom a ‘deconstruction’ of
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the sociocultural construction and constraints of meaning and language in the spirit of 
Foucault.
Before concluding this overview of theory in SFBT it is worth mentioning a few 
further strands to the debate. Milton Erikson was a key influence on the community of 
Brief family therapists. He was regarded as a great strategic therapist whose innovative 
ways of helping people to change, including his hypnotic techniques, are adapted and 
applied in SFBT (Cade and O’Hanlon, 1993). Some of his hypnotic approaches, for 
example, were incorporated into an SFBT workshop on therapy with victims of abuse 
as coping techniques for dealing with dissociation. How his persuasive and directive 
techniques relate to a constructivist view of SFBT is not clarified in the literature. This 
highlights again the uneasy alliance between the different elements of the solution- 
focused approach.
Some therapists have argued that strategic therapy can be construed as an insight- 
oriented approach (Duncan and Solovey, 1989), and that therapist-ascribed meanings 
(such as refi-amdng exceptions as solutions) share features with psycho dynamic 
interpretation, an interesting view given that psychodynamic theory is an anathema to 
de Shazer’s constructivist position. Whether or not this analogy holds in terms of 
formal psychotherapy, it raises valid questions about the impact of the therapist and 
the therapeutic relationship in SFBT which are not adequately addressed in the 
literature. Several authors have noted the lack of attention paid to emotion, 
transference and so on, and have argued cogently for a synthesis of strategic and 
psychodynamic theory (Flaskas, 1996). This mirrors in some ways the development in 
recent years of new models of cognitive behaviour theory and therapy, where greater 
emphasis is being placed on the therapeutic relationship in helping people change 
(Coon, 1994).
In summary, SFBT is not one coherent model of human behaviour or of therapeutic 
change. As reviewed m detail here, it incorporates many diverse features culled firom 
other models and theories, some of which stem fi-om competing philosophical
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paradigms. Its coherence derives mainly from an identified collection of techniques 
commonly quoted in the SFBT literature, underpinned by a value system which 
challenges current orthodoxy in therapeutic practice, particularly pathological 
categories and linear or ‘cause and effect’ aspects of many scientific models of mental 
ill-health. SFBT is far from achieving the status of a theory in any formal or scientific 
sense. Fundamentally it lacks any explanatory power. This is something de Shazer 
would happily agree with. He states of SFBT that “ one cannot know how it works, 
one can only know that it does work.” (de Shazer, 1991, p. xvii). However, his 
remarks seem disingenuous, especially given the promotion of SFBT as a powerful 
and effective therapy. Whether in the form of a scientific enquiry or philosophical 
debate, therapists need to make explicit their ideas, values and biases regarding why 
SFBT works, and thus allow the approach to be evaluated in a systematic fashion.
Studies in Solution-focused brief therapy
SFBT proponents claim that their approach helps people solve problems quickly and 
effectively. Unfortunately there has been little in the way of systematic research to 
support this contention. From the start family therapy has developed outside of the 
mainstream scientific communities of psychiatry and clinical psychology, and 
historically did not foUow the tradition of employing formal quantitative research to 
explore its effectiveness, though in recent years a number of case-controlled studies 
have been published (Crisp et al., 1991). SFBT, regarded at times as a maverick 
approach even within the family therapy field, has had even less of a presence in the 
scientific literature.
There are a number of issues which make it difficult to evaluate SFBT. Firstly, since 
SFBT is claimed to spring from a constructivist paradigm which is explicitly anti- 
empirical then it becomes ‘immune’ to positivist methods of enquiry. Related to this 
point is the description of SFBT as non-normative, (de Shazer, 1991) which effectively 
rules out any external validation of its claims of success. Secondly, even if SFBT is
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conceptualised within an empirical framework there are serious obstacles to its study. 
The fact that it is not a theory has already been discussed above, but what we are left 
with is a disparate collection of ideas with no agreed definition of what solution-, 
focused therapy is in operational terms. Different therapists appear to have different 
and quite personal views of what constitutes SFBT. Despite the assertions made by 
some practitioners that SFBT is evidence-based, the evidence presented for its efScacy 
remains largely outside the ‘scientific’ approach.
Published studies on SFBT are few. Some take the form of simple case examples, 
(Lignon, 1996; Shilts and Gordon, 1996), while others are more general audits of the 
use of the approach in practice. Mason et al (1995) applied SFBT in an addictions 
treatment clinic and make some important points about how SFBT helped them 
challenge overly rigid, client-blaming practices. Mason et al used their approach with 
five clients two of whom did not improve, but client and therapist satisfaction were 
reported as high. Thus, in empirical terms this study says little, but the authors are 
enthusiastic about SFBT nonetheless and write of their intention to adopt this 
framework in their clinic. From an evidence-based perspective, and in terms of good 
clinical practice, it might be considered inappropriate to adopt an approach which may 
be popular but as yet unproven. The issue of client satisfaction will be returned to later.
The constructivist perspective of the solution-focused approach perhaps lends itself 
more readily to qualitative analysis. Franklin (1996) chose to explore the change 
processes in SFBT using Recursive Dialectic Analysis. However, once again a different 
form of SFBT was used where standardised assessment forms were administered both 
as outcome measures but also as a way to “normalize behaviour, reframe cognitive 
appraisals concerning problems, and reinforce changes” (p. 34). This represents quite a 
shift from de Shazer’s view of non-normative language games. The case presented was 
also not typical of SFBT. The couple concerned were still being seen after 40 sessions 
over 17 months, which is hardly brief, and the treatment included focusing on past 
family of origin issues. In terms of results, statistics are not presented and the 
qualitative analysis is not described in sufScient detail to allow an evaluation. Metcalf
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and Thomas (1994) published a qualitative study which is interesting because it 
assessed six therapists and their clients’ views of solution-focused therapy carried out 
at the Brief family Therapy Center, where de Shazer developed SFBT. One might 
expect the therapists here to apply a fairly ‘pure’ version of the therapy. Using a simple 
coding system to identify themes in structured interviews, the researchers found that 
descriptions of what the therapist did differed greatly, with clients regarding their 
therapists as more active and directive than the therapists judged themselves. 
Furthermore they conclude; “the therapists’ use of pathological terminology deviate 
from the philosophy of solution focused brief therapy philosophy stated in de Shazer’s 
descriptions” (p. 59). Regardless of the validity of the qualitative analysis, fundamental 
concerns are once again raised about the nature and definition of SFBT. Johnson and 
Miller (1994) present a paper on treating depression in which they combine Seligman’s 
cognitive model of the disorder with SFBT and present a case example to illustrate 
their approach. The authors propose that cognitive-behaviour therapy takes too long 
to achieve results and that SFBT helps clients more quickly. They state that the 
‘theory’ seems to yield “very good results in the majority of cases” (p. 251). If shown 
to be the case this would indeed be a challenging finding for clinical psychology, where 
cognitive-behaviour therapy is the treatment of choice for depression. Unfortunately 
Johnson and Müler do not present any supporting evidence for such a grand claim. 
They do point out that SFBT is particularly reliant on client reports of outcome and 
that this is inadequate for research of a new technique. They suggest standardised 
assessment tools and two year foUow-up to address the significant problem of 
monitoring relapse.
In general, research evidence, qualitative or quantitative, has been noticeable by its 
absence, and in response to this the Journal of Family Therapy devoted a whole 
volume in 1997 to research in SFBT. The editorial (Carpenter, 1997) notes that the 
extravagant claims made in the literature are no longer sufficient, and that simple 
success measures on clients who complete do not establish effectiveness or efficacy. It 
argues that control groups and standardised pre and post treatment measures are 
required to properly evaluate the approach. This is uncontroversial from an empirical
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perspective, the paradox comes when de Shazer and Berg then introduce the volume 
in question by arguing that since they and his colleagues were always trying something 
then seeing if it worked, “ the approach can be described as experimental and research 
orientated from the beginning.... we saw what we were doing was sufScient in itself as 
a research endeavour.” (de Shazer and Berg, 1997 p. 121). This claim is quite startling 
given de Shazer’s explicit rejection of empiricism and scientific enquiry in earlier 
works. They suggest that research has been nfrnirnal since SFBT was developed in 
1982 because they and their clients were “busy inventing a rather radical approach to 
‘therapy’ ” (p.l21). Regardless of scientific orientation, the suggestion that a therapist 
might be too busy to research the effects upon their clients of a new therapy approach 
is open to serious criticism from an ethical standpoint.
The papers presented in the special issue are an eclectic mix of approaches. 
Zimmerman et al compared pre and post test changes in a couples therapy treatment 
group and a no-treatment group. Standardised assessment tools were used. However 
because of significant bias in the recruitment procedures (treatment couples were self­
selected) the researchers did not compare pre and post scores between groups and 
neither did they present data on changes over time in the no-treatment group. 
Effectively therefore, there was no comparison group and we are left with an 
uncontrolled study showing only that the treatment group improved over time. A 
further crucial weakness is that the SFBT described here omits characteristic, and 
arguably necessary, features of the approach such as the Miracle question and scaling 
procedures. The only other paper to include a comparison group also used an 
idiosyncratic variation of SFBT. Eakes et al piloted a solution-focused model of 
working with “schizophrenic individuals” (a term that according to constructivist 
theory would be rejected as a socially constructed concept to exert social control). The 
study treated five volunteer families with five SFBT sessions and compared them with 
five families receiving standard care. The authors give little information about the 
treatment procedure or its aims, and used only the Family Environment Scale (Moos 
and Moos, 1994) to evaluate the results. The authors reported that the experimental 
families increased in expressiveness and congruence, although it is unclear what these
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changes represented in clinical or practical terms. As the authors point out themselves, 
there is an urgent need for more thorough investigations of this approach.
Beyebach and Carranza (1997) present a detailed analysis of relational communication 
in solution-focused therapy. While it is difficult to judge the merits of the complex 
procedures used, the study does address the issue of dropout in SFBT, a topic which is 
often ignored because, since the client decides when to finish therapy, there is logically 
no such thing as premature or inappropriate cessation of treatment. As the authors 
point out, this is not a satisfactory way of addressing what is a significant clinical and 
ethical issue.
In summary, while there is a welcome move, in family therapy if not in clinical 
psychology, to research more carefully the theory and practice of SFBT, the task is 
fraught with difficulty. Conflicting models, lack of an operational definition and 
minimal empirical evidence require that conclusions about the merits of this approach 
must at best be tentative. De Shazer and Berg’s pronouncement that SFBT is 
“consistently successful” (1997, p. 122) is extravagant in the extreme.
Ethics and professional issues in Solution-focused Brief Therapy
Clinical psychology, as with other clinical professions, is constantly developing in 
terms of both theory and practice. It is important that the profession continues to adapt 
to increasing knowledge and changing socio-political perspectives. SFBT is one of 
many approaches that may offer new insights and ideas to clinicians. However, new 
approaches need to be adopted within an ethical framework which addresses issues 
such as effectiveness versus possible harm to clients, competence of the therapist to 
practice and availability of adequate training and supervision. Given the theoretical 
confusion, lack of evidence and difficulties in assessing standards of training 
workshops offered in the field of SFBT, clinical psychologists should be cautious in 
applying these ideas.
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SFBT, taken at face value, is an attractive proposition for many therapists. The fact 
that it is easy and relatively cheap to become trained in the approach has already been 
mentioned. SFBT also claims to be empowering, and less pathologising and 
stigmatising than traditional psychotherapeutic models of care. This certainly appeals 
to many clinical psychologists who quite rightly wish to challenge “the mythology of 
the personal inadequacy of patients and the competence of the expert.” (Moorey and 
Markman, 1998: p. 19), and wish to encompass social and cultural issues in their work. 
Unfortunately SFBT writers and practitioners on the whole have not addressed these 
issues in any sophisticated manner, and moreover have no evidence that SFBT clients 
feel any more empowered or destigmatised than clients of other therapies. For 
example, the literature on SFBT has not confronted the issue of therapists’ power. It is 
claimed that SFBT is consensual and non-authoritarian (George et al., 1990), and yet 
the approach is explicitly directive and strategic. Metcalf and Thomas (1994), in their 
analysis of process in SFBT sessions found that several clients felt disappointed that 
the therapist had terminated the therapy prematurely, even when the therapists 
themselves thought they were following SFBT principles and accepting the clients’ 
statements of satisfaction as the deciding factor in terminating. This hints at the 
problems with a naïve assumption that therapy can be truly consensual and egalitarian 
(as well as possible evidence of harmful outcome which is not taken up by the 
authors). Of course other therapies, including supposedly ‘collaborative’ cognitive- 
behaviour therapy, can and have been criticised for failing to pay attention to power 
and disadvantage in their practice. This is beginning to be addressed in clinical 
psychology (Small, 1995). Ironically, given its purported links with constructivist 
thinking which critiques power in institutions, SFBT has yet to properly consider these 
issues.
Solution-focused approaches may have a useful contribution to make to therapeutic 
practice - for example practitioners in the field appear to find SFBT techniques helpful 
in engaging and motivating clients. The approach certainly shares some positive 
common ground with cognitive-behavioural therapy in its emphasis on collaboration
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with clients, normalising of pathology, and reinforcement of things that clients find 
helpful The constructivist theme too is one partly shared by cognitive-behavioural 
theory whereby therapists accept a client’s ‘reality’ and help them to make changes 
within their personal context. Thus, there may be aspects of SFBT which would repay 
further exploration and research by psychologists. Clinical psychologists are perhaps in 
a good position, by virtue of their training, to evaluate the merits of SFBT. As Smail 
(1995) suggests, most clinical psychologists have a commitment to evidence and 
critical appraisal in their work. These concepts need to be applied most carefully when 
considering the use of solution-focused brief therapy with our clients.
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Cognitive-behavioural therapy and schizophrenia: Current status and 
applications to early intervention
Introduction
Schizophrenia is a serious mental health problem with significant consequences in 
terms of distress and disability for the individual, and social and economic costs of the 
illness. Since schizophrenia was described by Kraepelin 100 years ago, a mass of 
research on theories and treatments of the disorder has accumulated. This has tended 
to be based on a medical model of schizophrenia as a biological disease (Bentall, 
1990a). Recently, medical research has focused on understanding in more detail the 
development of schizophrenia, its stages, and opportunities for treating it early in its 
course to prevent or delay the illness (early intervention).
Psychological theory and therapy has played little part in traditional accounts of 
schizophrenia. Some researchers have argued that this stems from several 
misconceptions about the disease including the idea that it is a biological disorder thus 
offering no role for psychological interventions, that it is adequately treated by 
medication, and that it is too severe for psychological approaches. (Birchwood and 
Shepherd, 1992). However, in the last 10 years, evidence has been accumulating for 
the usefulness of psychological models and treatments, and a great deal of optimism 
has accompanied these developments. Most recently psychologists have turned their 
attention to therapy earlier on in the disorder. Early intervention and psychological 
treatments are both in their infancy as new developments. This critique looks at how 
they have been synthesised and researched.
Schizophrenia is complex not just m its pathology but in its relationship to cultural, 
social and political issues. An account of psychological approaches needs to begin with 
an appreciation of these issues and how they relate to clinical psychology practice in 
this field. This essay will begin with a brief outline of the concept of schizophrenia and 
the controversy surrounding diagnosis and models of aetiology. The natural history of 
the disease will be outlined, followed by a look at the recent interest within psychiatry
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in early intervention in schizophrenia. The application of psychological theory and 
interventions to schizophrenia in recent years will then be addressed with particular 
focus on cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT). Recent developments in applying CBT 
in early stages of the disorder will be addressed with a review of the research in this 
area and an assessment of the ethical and professional issues it raises.
Conceptual issues in schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is characterised by a range of symptoms including auditory 
hallucinations, bizarre and irrational beliefs (delusions), disordered thinking, poverty of 
affect and impaired social functioning. Definitions such as those in DSM-IV 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual) provide apparently clear criteria for the diagnosis 
of schizophrenia and the term is widely accepted in psychiatry and psychology as 
representing a recognised illness with its own distinctive course and outcome. 
However, alongside this orthodoxy there exists considerable philosophical and 
scientific controversy surrounding the concept of a schizophrenic disorder. Challenges 
have been made most notably by R.D. Laing (1967), who located the problem of 
schizophrenia not in the patient but within family and society, and criticised psychiatry 
for its treatment of psychotic distress as simply medical symptoms. Another important 
critique of psychiatry came from the psychiatrist Szasz (1964), who claimed that 
mental illness was a socially constucted myth, and also from within the domain of 
social constructivism particularly through the -writings of Michel Foucault, who argued 
that definitions of abnormal behaviour are culturally constructed and applied by those 
in power in order to exert social control over those who deviate from social norms 
(Fillingham 1993). Foucault’s work has had profound influence in many disciplines 
such as philosophy and sociology, but is notable by its absence from mainstream 
psychiatric or psychological discourse on schizophrenia.
Whilst steering clear from questioning the reality of mental illness per se, other writers 
have challenged the very narrow construction of schizophrenia as a purely biologically 
driven disease. Warner for example acknowledges the existence of an illness called 
schizophrenia but presents convincing evidence for the powerful effects of social
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factors, notably economic conditions and employment opportunities, on the course and 
outcome of the illness (Warner, 1994). Bentall (1990), a psychologist, has also argued 
strongly against the prevailing paradigm which he describes as “the ideology of 
biological reductionism”, and through his detailed critiques of the research concludes 
that an exclusively biological explanation of schizophrenia cannot be defended on 
either scientific or logical grounds. More recently, within academic psychiatry itself, 
there has been debate about the coherence and logic of the DSM-IV definition of 
schizophrenia which has been criticised for its lack of “an underlying paradigm” (Maj, 
1998).
These challenges to the medical orthodoxy are seldom debated head on in the 
literature, but it is increasingly acknowledged that social, psychological and cultural 
factors must be given due attention in any understanding of schizophrenia. Whilst the 
existence of a schizophrenic genotype is rarely disputed in psychiatry or psychology 
research the field is increasingly receptive to a vunerability model of the disease in 
which both genetic vulnerability and stressful environment are necessary precursors to 
the onset of psychosis (McGlashan and Johannessen, 1996). This is certainly the 
predominant framework used in clinical psychology research and most of the 
developments in psychological treatments of schizophrenia have used this essentially 
reductionist model to underpin the research and are not therefore as ‘revolutionary’or 
non-medical as they might first appear. Birchwood and Shepherd (1992) welcome the 
vulnerability model as having potential to “drive clinical formulations and interventions 
that operate on a number of dimensions”,and suggest that it offers a rapprochement 
between different models of mental illness. Certainly it has allowed pyschological 
perspectives to enter the psychiatric mainstream in terms of research into 
schizophrenia.
Despite the enormous amount of research into schizophrenia no clear etiological 
theory has emerged. Numerous factors have been implicated in causing the disease 
such as genetic endowment (Van Os et al, 1997), brain abnormalities (Crow 1998), 
maternal stress (Van Os and Selten,1998), season of birth and viral agents (Crow 
1984). There are almost as many theories about the etiology of schizophrenia as there
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are theories of psychopathology in general, but there is little evidence to substantiate 
any one school of thought. The most favoured model is, as mentioned above, the 
stress-diathesis or vunerability model of “a psychological disturbance mediating 
genetic and environmental effects on the causal pathway to the illness” (Malmberg et 
al, 1998). However, the lack of concensus on etiology only adds to confusion about 
the model or conceptualisation of schizophrenia that underpins current research in this 
area.
This brief appraisal of some of the criticisms of the concept of schizophrenia provides a 
backdrop against which to assess the contributions of pychology, in particular clinical 
psychology. The strong empirical and research traditions in psychology have shaped 
the recent developments in pyschological theories of schizophrenia. Whether this body 
of work has challenged current concepts of serious mental illness, or added to the 
debates outlined above remains to be shown. This issue will be returned to later in this 
review.
The nature of schizophrenia
Diagnosis
It is now widely acknowledged that there is no discreet diagnostic category of 
schizophrenia as originally envisaged by Kraepelin, but rather a psychosis continuum 
best described by several symptom dimensions (Van Os et al, 1997). Boundaries 
between disorders are, it is argued, necessarily arbitrary to some extent based on the 
different sets of criteria used throughout the history of schizophrenia research (Crow, 
1998). Definitions that use symptoms alone have poor validity but the major diagnostic 
classifications of DSM-UI-R and ICD-10 do appear to have high predictive validity 
and are claimed to provide relatively stable diagnoses (Mason et al, 1997). In contrast 
to this optimistic conclusion, others such as Bentall (1990) have argued that 
schizophrenia is a ‘catch-all’ category covering such a heterogenous mix of cases that 
it can predict neither outcome or response to treatment, and hence the classification
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should be abandoned in favour of a dimensonal model of mental disorder. This has 
already had some impact on psychological research in the shift towards studying 
individual symptoms within a framework of normal cognitive psychology. However, 
most researchers, whatever their discipline, continue to refer to standard classifications 
of schizophrenia m their work and so conclusions about treatment and other clinical 
implications tend to follow in the tradition of psychiatric models of illness.
Course and outcome
The clinical course of schizophrenia is much more varied than had been supposed by 
the earliest accounts of this illness (Bentall, 1988). For some sufferers the first 
psychotic episode is followed by complete recovery whilst in others life-long decline is 
apparent. For the majority, episodes of psychosis alternate with periods of remission 
over many years followed by partial or complete recovery. It has been estimated that 
as many as a quarter of patients may completely recover and 40 to 45 per cent will 
‘socially recover’, that is, achieve economic and residential independence (Warner, 
1985; Bentall, 1990). A further finding which has to be taken into account in 
longitudinal research studies is that, whilst deterioration occurs in both treated and 
untreated psychosis, it usually stabilises between two and five years and may even 
relent among those who deteriorate most (Jackson and Birchwood, 1996). However, 
studies of outcome are difficult to compare or aggregate because of wide variations in 
diagnosis, sampling techniques and definitions of recovery and only broad 
generalisations are possible.
Numerous factors have been shown to influence the course and outcome in 
schizophrenia. Males tend to demonstrate earlier onset of psychosis and poorer 
functioning, whilst patients with insidious onset also have a poorer prognosis ( Larsen 
et al, 1996). Stress factors which have a significant impact on the course of the disease 
include life events, finances, housing, employment, social supports and family 
relationships (Falloon et al, 1996; Salokangas 1997). On a broader level of analysis, 
urbanisation, cultural origin, and socioeconomics have been shown to exert significant
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effects on the way schizophrenia develops and is expressed (Craig et al, 1997; Takei et 
al, 1998: Varma et al, 1997). Indeed there is evidence to suggest that social indicators 
of functioning are more powerful predictors of outcome than clinical symptoms (Craig 
et al 1997; Jackson and Birchwood 1996). This desynchrony between social factors 
and clinical symptomatology must be considered when looking at research into 
treatment outcome studies in psychiatry and psychology which often rely on clinical 
measures to assess change. A purely individualistic, biological model cannot 
adequately account for these social influences.
Stages in Schizophrenia
According to most writers, schizophrenia progresses through a series of stages and the 
early course consists of three phases: the premorbid period, the prodromal period and 
the acute psychosis. Following on from this an individual may experience a number of 
remissions and relapses with the latter signaled by frirther prodromal phases (relapse 
prodromes). Whilst these stages are referred to widely in the literature, and indeed a 
prodrome is included in the DSM-IV description of schizophrenia, they are by no 
means well-defined or easily detected phenomena. The prodrome phase, for example, 
is defined by a nonspecific set of symptoms (such as depressed mood, sleep 
disturbance and anxiety) and can be the early phase of a number of other psychiatric 
illnesses. Researchers also claim that the length of the phase can vary from days to 
many years. There is huge individual variation in a patient’s experience of 
schizophrenia, with some people missing out the prodromal or onset stages all together 
(McGlashan and Johannessen, 1996). In spite of this astonishing heterogeneity, the 
prodome is still widely accepted as a valid construct in psychiatric studies.
Of course a major problem with research into the early stages of schizophrenia is that 
the studies have been wholly retrospective, relying on patient or carer accounts of the 
emergence of a breakdovm. As Yung and McGorry (1996) point out, a prodrome is a 
retrospective concept, diagnosed only after the development of definitive psychotic 
symptoms. Analogies have been drawn between the better-studied early warning signs 
just before a relapse and the initial prodrome in order to arrive at models of the onset
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of schizophrenia, but such a comparison is beset with weaknesses as the two types of 
pro dome are likely to be qualitatively different (Vaglum, 1996). Even the more well 
established pattern of remission and relapse later on in the illness is open to challenge, 
with some authors within psychology stating that a stage model is not adequate to 
conceptualise the changes in symptomatology and that a multi-dimensional aspect 
needs to be incorporated (Drury 1994).
Early Intervention
New developments in the early treatment of schizophrenia, including psychological 
approaches, are largely based on an acceptance of a stage model of schizophrenia. 
Such confidence in constructs like premorbidity and prodome seems unwarranted in 
the light of the serious shortcomings outlined above. However, within psychiatry there 
has been an increasing emphasis on targeting the early stages of schizophrenia in order 
to develop treatments which might ameliorate or even prevent further deterioration. 
Psychiatrists acknowledge that despite modem neuroleptics and improved care, 
schizophrenia remains a severe and chronic disorder for many sufferers, with 
treatments offering only palliative results. (McGlashan and Johannessen, 1996), and 
the search for earlier and better interventions is being pursued with great optimism 
(McGlashan, 1996). Some of the developments in research psychiatry are outlined 
below in order to place in context the psychological research on early intervention to 
be described later in this essay.
Early intervention is a loosely defined concept variously applied to; identifying and 
treating premorbid or prodromal individuals, early treatment once psychotic, or even 
treatments applied to try to forestall a relapse. This range of definitions makes it 
difficult to compare studies and weakens the theoretical bases on which early 
intervention rests. However, studies of first-episode psychosis have shown that many 
schizophrenia sufferers have signs of psychosis for months or years before they present 
for treatment. This phase of early psychosis is termed duration of untreated illness 
(DUP), and a long DUP is strongly correlated with poorer outcome in a number of
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domains (Larsen et al, 1996). This finding is a cornerstone of the argument that earlier 
treatment will result in better prognosis. Several studies do lend support to this 
proposal. There appears, for example, to be a link between earlier medication and 
better outcome (Sheitman et al, 1997). Other more ambitious programmes have tested 
a comprehensive early screening process followed by an integrated intervention 
package of education, family work and neuoroleptic medication (Falloon et al 1996). 
The authors conclude that such a programme was effective in detecting and treating 
the early phases of schizophrenia.
In spite of the enthusiasm for early intervention in psychiatry there is still a paucity of 
empirical evidence to support such treatments. Several methodological problems exist, 
for example, most studies of DUP are retrospective and the association between DUP 
and outcome remains correlational rather than causal. Also some studies define their 
target population by a mix of prodomal and early-episode criteria which confuses two 
supposedly different stages in the disease (Falloon et al, 1996). Finally, prospective 
studies of early treatment have regarded the wo«-appearance of full blown psychosis in 
their at risk samples as a successful outcome, and have used historical cohorts or 
epidemiological data to compare rates with. This method of analysis considerably 
weakens the confidence with which we can conclude that early intervention alters the 
course of schizophrenia. Indeed, a recent British Journal of Psychiatry supplement 
devoted to early intervention emphasised that these “exciting possibilities must be 
based upon sound evidence which can only arise fi*om well-conducted clinical 
research” (McGorry, 1998, p. 1).
Cognitive-behavioural therapy and schizophrenia
Cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) is a well established treatment model for a wide 
variety of psychological disorders, originating of course from Beck's seminal work on 
depression and his development of cognitive therapy for the neuroses (Alford and 
Beck, 1994). However CBT has, until recent years, made little impact on the treatment
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of psychotic disorders. As more evidence builds to show that schizophrenia is 
fundamentally shaped by and interacts with psychosocial factors, cognitive-behavioural 
psychologists have developed an impressive body of work in this field. Indeed, Alford 
and Beck (1994) argue that cognitive therapy should have a special role in 
schizophrenia given that thought disturbances and delusional beliefs, the ‘bread and 
butter’ of CBT, are central to the psychotic disorders. There follows a brief overview 
of some of the developments in CBT, using studies of delusional beliefs to illustrate 
some of the theoretical and methodological issues pertinent to this field.
The range of psychological approaches used in the treatment of psychotic symptoms is 
diverse but most incorporate some cognitive-behavioural element. Stress management, 
social skills training, problem-solving/coping strategies, self-esteem work and family 
management have aU been found to be useful components of care packages for 
individuals with schizophrenia (Sellwood et al, 1994; Barrowclough and Tarrier, 
1994). Perhaps the area which has progressed most in terms of theory-based cognitive- 
behavioural treatments is the study of the psychotic symptoms of hallucinations and 
delusions. Several psychologists have argued that schizophrenia is best understood by 
detailed study of such component symptoms within the context of a developmental 
cognitive model (Bentall et al, 1988; Claridge, 1990). Research in the last ten years or 
so has started to identify cognitive ‘errors’ which characteristically underpin 
disturbances as hallucinations and delusions, and corresponding CBT techniques have 
been proposed which might improve or at least compensate for these errors of 
thinking. This approach is not entirely new. Meichenbaum used cognitive techniques to 
attempt to alter specific thinking errors of schizophrenic patients twenty-five years ago 
(Meichenbaum and Cameron, 1973), but recent randomised case-controlled studies, 
such as those conducted by Kuipers and her colleagues (Kuipers et al, 1997) have 
added considerable weight to the evidence in favour of these CBT approaches. Many 
authors are enthusiastic about the potential for CBT and recommend that such 
treatments should be made available now for people with schizophrenia (Bentall, 
1990a)
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According to the DSM-IV, a delusional belief is one that, in the person’s culture, 
would be regarded as totally implausible, for example, thought broadcasting (DSM-IV, 
1994). Within a cognitive framework, delusions have been defined as “maladaptive 
cognitive constructions of internal or external phenomena” (Alford and Beck, 1994). 
Questionnaires designed to measure delusions in a standardised fashion have been 
developed, such as the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (Wessely et al, 
1993) and treatment usually consists of helping clients to review the evidence for their 
beliefs, gentle challenging, reality-testing and the presentation of possible alternative 
explanations. Early research has relied mostly on single case studies to assesss the 
merits of CBT for delusions (Fowler and Morley, 1989). Chadwick and Lowe (1994) 
used a multiple-baseline design to study the effects of cognitive interventions on 12 
patients with a diagnosis of chronic schizophrenia. They reported that 10 participants 
showed reductions in their level of belief conviction as a result of several weeks of 
structured verbal challenging and reality testing. The authors are appropriately 
cautious in their conclusions pointing out methodological weaknesses and issues of 
validity. However, they do state that the weight of evidence indicates that delusions 
can indeed be modified. Unfortunately, the more recent case-controlled studies of CBT 
for psychosis by Kuipers, Garety and colleagues (Garety et al, 1997), which are widely 
quoted in support of the CBT approach, incorporated a variety of cognitive techniques 
and targeted not only delusions but hallucinations, self-esteem, social stigma and 
medication compliance. Therefore it is not clear from these studies which aspects of 
delusional thinking might be modified by which treatment technique.
Of course, Chadwick and Lowe (1994) acknowledge that delusions are 
“multidimensional phenomena” and rarely exist in isolation from other major mental 
health problems. Bentall’s call to researchers to study (and by implication treat) 
individual symptoms rather than disorders (Bentall et al, 1988) is fraught with 
difficulties, and the idea that CBT might be relatively simply translated from one 
domain to another is proving premature. The more delusions are investigated the more 
complex they appear in terms of their pheonomenology and also their relationship to 
other symptoms such as hallucinations and depression. In fact the debate about the 
essential nature of delusions remains unresolved.
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From an epistomological standpoint for example, the defhition of a delusion as a false 
belief has been criticised as illogical and reliant on circular reasoning (Levy, 1996), 
whilst others have pointed out that delusions are not always or necessarily false, they 
are sometimes not belief but judgement (Fulford, 1993), and it is not yet shown how 
they may be reliably distinguished from ‘normal’ beliefs and ideas such as religious 
faith (Jones and Watson, 1997). Berrios (1991) goes further in stating that delusions 
are merely “empty speech acts”, that is, they are simply random fragments of 
information, a stance which certainly precludes a cognitive model of treatment. 
Delusions are not only philosophically troubling but are proving difficult to 
conceptualise in terms of cognitive theories of information processing. Some authors 
argue that the delusions of psychotic individuals reflect rational cognitive processes 
attempting to make sense of abnormal or anomalous perceptual or emotional 
experiences. Research by Maher in particular lends support to this hypothesis (Maher, 
1992) and he remarks that if confirmed, this makes CBT potentially very relevant, 
since the historical notion in psychiatry that delusions are qualitatively abnormal,and 
imprenetrable by reason would no longer stand. Recent studies in cognitive psychology 
have added to this debate by suggesting that delusional individuals do show some 
subtle reasoning biases such as ‘jumping to conclusions’ but that this may be in some 
senses a fimctional process, for example as a way of reducing cognitive demands 
(Dudley et al, 1997), or even as a defence against depression or low self-esteem 
(Bentall et al, 1994). In summary no concensus has been reached regarding either the 
nature, taxonomy or origins of delusions, and treatment studies are very much in their 
infancy.
Research into CBT and hallucinations suffers similar conceptual and methodological 
critisisms to those levelled at delusion studies (Bentall, 1990b). However, many 
psychologists are still confident that CBT approaches are effective and use them 
routinely in their clinical work. Workshops, textbooks and diploma courses, not only 
for psychologists but many other professionals, are widely available. The field is 
developing rapidly, and the latest area of interest is in early psychological 
interventions.
37
CBT and Early Intervention
Most of the original studies in CBT and psychosis used samples of people with 
chronic, medication-resistant schizophrenia. However, in line with the psychiatry-led 
research into early intervention, research psychologists have started to look at the idea 
that the adage “a stitch in time saves nine” might apply to CBT approaches too. This 
interest is not so much theoretically-driven but seems to have been aroused by the 
findings that the early patterns of illness (e.g. duration of untreated illness) predict 
long-term outcome and that earlier treatment with neuroleptic medication improves 
prognosis (Drury et al, 1996). Aside from the serious problems with conceptualising 
and defining early psychosis, an analogy between pharmocological and psychological 
treatments seems an unsatisfactory starting point for developing new models of 
cognitive therapies. Some authors have likened the early phases of a schizophrenic 
breakdown to a “critical period” (Birchwood et al, 1998; Jackson and Birchwood, 
1996), with the suggestion that damaging and maladaptive cognitions would form in 
the early years. There is little empirical evidence to support the idea of a critical period 
in cognitive terms - too little is known about the neurological and cognitive 
deteriorative processes in schizophrenia to arrive at this conclusion. Treatment studies 
in this area form a heterogenous cluster with varying definitions of early intervention 
and different types of CBT applied. No studies have been identified which look at CBT 
in the prodromal stages of schizophrenia. Even in early psychosis most psychosocial 
treatments are of the stress management or coping strategies type rather than the 
formal CBT of interest here. The exception to this is the study by Drury et al (1996), 
which offered individual and group cognitive therapy to a sample of first and second- 
episode pyschotic patients (which is described as early intervention since it concerns 
the acute phase of the illness). Compared to a control group there was a significantly 
greater decline in positive symptoms and delusional conviction at a nine month follow- 
up. The study suffered weaknesses in its small samples, and lack of an adequate 
control treatment consisting of extra leisure activities. Nevertheless this study suggests 
that CBT could play an important role in early intervention.
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Another area of research which addresses acute psychosis is the work of Birchwood 
and colleagues into what they call secondary prevention, that is the early recognition of 
relapse prodromes with the aim of treating to avert or ameliorate the impending 
relapse. Psychological studies have contributed significantly to the understanding of 
relapse prodomes, and the conceptualisation of an individual’s prodrome as a 
personalised relapse signature has prepared the way for thinking about interventions 
during this phase (Birchwood et al, 1989; Birchwood and Macmillan, 1993). However, 
the true predictive significance of these early warning signs and the type of treatments 
which might be appropriate have yet to be established (Birchwood, 1992).
Early intervention may be a ‘hot’ new area for psychological research, but there is an 
urgent need to synthesise the relatively few pieces of work emerging in this field into a 
coherent cognitive framework. Such a theoretical base would need to take account of 
the findings (briefly outlined earlier) firom psychiatric research into stage models of 
early schizophrenia and the various predictors of outcome (for example the strong 
effect of gender) that have been identified. Cognitive models will need to arrive at a 
more sophisticated phenomenology of early psychosis and offer testable hypotheses 
regarding the developmental aspects of these early phases before we can be confident 
that specific early interventions can be recommended. Roberts (1992) points out that 
cognitive models wiU need to address and synthesise the numerous findmgs regarding 
delusions and states that present theory “has yet to account for the antecedents, 
formation, elaboration, and perpetuation of delusion” (1992, p.299), but have focused 
on the pragmatics of cognitive treatment whilst assuming that general cognitive theory 
for example about negative automatic thoughts and dysfunctional beliefs can ‘fit’ 
delusions just as well. Aside firom theoretical considerations of course, as Jackson and 
Birchwood (1996) acknowledge, if the early intervention paradigm has a future it will 
have to be demonstrated that early outcome can actually be improved and much more 
research is needed to achieve this.
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CBT - problems and future directions
Given the complexity of the disorder schizophrenia, it is not sufficient to import 
mainstream cognitive therapy techniques and assumptions into the field of 
schizophrenia research (Birchwood and Chadwick, 1997). There are numerous 
features of the disease which will influence the way in which CBT should be applied, 
for example the impact of general cognitive deficits, negative symptoms and thought 
disturbances need to be considered while the social and cultural aspects of the illness 
will also interact with any psychological processes. Interestingly, one development in 
the application of CBT techniques is an increased emphasis on the therapeutic 
relationship, regarded as crucial to build rapport, keep patients engaged and avoid 
threatening the patient’s self-esteem (Alford and Correia, 1994). Such modifications to 
the mainstream model need empirical verification. Clearly more case-controlled studies 
are needed with attention being paid to the generalisability of the research to typical 
clinical populations. It would also seem important to study in more detail the 
phenomenology of schizophrenic processes fi*om a developmental perspective 
including those individuals who recover well or even avoid relapse. Another theme 
which appears to be very promising is the emphasis on meaning in the symptomology 
of schizophrenia. Many research psychologists have argued that delusional and 
hallucination-related beliefs are not irrational or random, but are systematic attempts to 
make sense of and control psychotic experiences (Kingdon et al, 1994; Birchwood et 
al, 1993; Yusupoff et al, 1996). This mirrors the approaches of such self-help 
organisations as Hearing Voices (Baker, 1997) whose members point out that many 
people hear voices and yet are not schizophrenic, and that what helps them is 
addressing the personal meaning behind the experience then applying various 
(cognitive-behavioural) strategies to manage them.
Taking a user perspective such as Hearing Voices groups is an important area which 
psychologists could develop further. Little in the way of patient satisfaction has been 
addressed in CBT work, and the possibility that sometimes CBT might be detrimental 
or even ‘hazardous’ has not been systematically explored. Birchwood et al, (1993) 
reported that acceptance of illness by patients can, especially in the early stages of
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illness, result in pessimism and lowered self-efficacy. Adjusting to a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia is traumatic for patients and the effect o f CBT, with its emphasis on 
rational challenging, may have negative as well as positive effects. More specifically, if, 
as has been suggested by Maher (1992), delusions are rational strategies which help 
the patient cope with distressing experiences, then one might argue that there are 
inherent risks in challenging these strategies both in terms of distress for the patient 
and the effectiveness of the CBT techniques. Such risks or ‘side-effects’ need to be 
fully addressed in the debate about the usefulness of CBT approaches.
Another issue related to patient satisafaction and ensuring positive outcome is the 
notion of quality of life. Few studies measure this, and yet quality of Kfe (QOL) may 
not necessarily improve simply because delusional beliefs, for example, are held less 
firmly. The World Health Organisation recognises that QOL assesssments are an 
important part of keeping the patient at the centre of inquiry (Orley et al, 1998) and 
this needs to be reflected in fiiture research.
The research into CBT for schizophrenia is not simply an academic or clinical exercise. 
Fundamental ethical issues permeate this field of enquiry. The notion of ‘normalising’ 
therapy which CBT subscribes to (Kingdon et al, 1994; Birchwood and Shepherd, 
1992) is contentious one. Politically this raises a dilemma for those movements such as 
the Schizophrenia Fellowship wishing to emphasise schizophrenia as a biological illness 
with less reference to family or social influences. If  CBT encourages a less ‘medical’ 
view of schizophrenia,and trains a patient to take control o f psychotic symptoms, this 
may unfairly raise expectations of both family and wider society and imply blame or 
responsibility on the part of the individual. There is some evidence that this reaction 
does occur in families (Barrowclough et al, 1994). Considering expectations, ethical 
questions are also raised by the promotion of early intervention programmes which 
recommend “dedicated support for the first two or three years” (Jackson and 
Birchwood, 1996). The cost of setting up such programmes has not been discussed in 
the literature, but it seems premature to expect that such treatments could be financed 
in normal community settings, especially since recent research suggests that
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psychosocial interventions are only effective as long as they are active (Linszen et al, 
1998).
CBT could play an important part in destigmatising schizophrenia through the 
reappraisal of the traditional medical views of madness and a more collaborative, 
respectful approach to patients’ distress. However, a particular ethical concern with 
the move to early intervention is the risk of labelling many young people very early on 
as schizophrenic or marking them out as likely to develop the illness. This has serious 
implications for the individuals concerned, not least for those who may be 
misdiagnosed as false positives. This issue is touched on only briefly in the literature 
despite the acknowledgement by researchers that identifying people at risk is still 
fraught with conceptual and methodological difficulties.
Some psychologists have been keen to assert that psychological treatments like CBT 
offer a different paradigm of care to the traditional medical model which emphasises 
pathology and biological determinism and should be promoted as a priority (Bentall, 
1990). The claim that CBT is an “antidote to the reductionist paradigm” (Birchwood 
and Shepherd, 1992) is unfortunately rather too ambitious. From a social constructivist 
perspective, psychological conceptualisations of illness and therapies like CBT are 
inherently reductionist themselves and can be regarded as powerful modes of social 
control just as much as biomedical approaches (Harper, 1992). For example, the goal 
of many psychosocial programmes is explicitly to enhance medication compliance 
(Kuipers et al, 1997). Regardless of whether this might be good in terms of outcome, 
such goals say something about the philosophical paradigm within which much of the 
psychological research is located. As Small has argued, taking other philosophical 
perspectives into account does not mean psychological approaches are redundant or 
unethical, but given the powerful political issues involved in an analysis of 
schizophrenia, psychologists need to acknowledge these debates in their work.
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In the current climate of evidence-based medicine (Geddes and Harrison, 1997), 
clinical psychologists are well-placed by virtue of their research background to make a 
significant contribution to the development of better treatments for schizophrenia 
through well-designed replicable studies. The shift towards psychosocial accounts of 
schizophrenia is a welcome response to the challenge of improving the quality of life 
for people with the disorder. The empirical evidence for the efficacy of CBT is 
gradually accumulating, although case-controlled studies are still few. Early 
intervention and CBT is so far unsupported by firm empirical evidence and this is 
acknowledged even by those researchers most involved in this area (Birchwood and 
Shepherd, 1992; Birchwood et al, 1998). However, the researchers who advise caution 
in drawing conclusions about CBT and early intervention are some of those who are 
most active in developing training courses and producing practical guides for clinicians 
(for example, Tarrier and Birchwood, 1994). The concern is whether enough is knovm 
not only about the efficacy of CBT and schizophrenia, but also about what skills and 
training would be required to practice such techniques. Issues of professional 
competency are touched upon in the literature (Birchwood, 1992, Sharp, 1997) with 
the assumption being that clinical psychologists are best placed to teach and implement 
these treatments. However, the eagerness with which these approaches are being 
applied clinically (for example group work as described in the professional publication 
Forum by Mills and Whiting, 1997) appears to be premature in the light of the 
empirical status of the research. Clinical psychologists are understandably keen to 
contribute to what has historically been a medically-led domain, but ultimately new 
techniques must be based on what is shown to help the patient. It is not just a question 
of more case-controlled studies, but it is argued that clinical psychology research will 
be all the more valuable to patients if it takes account of the social, political and ethical 
dynamics which inevitably play a part in schizophrenia.
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PROFESSIONAL DOSSIER
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Professional practice, training and development
Professional practice since qualification
1991 -  1992
Psychologist, Waikato Hospital, New Zealand
- assessment and treatment of adult inpatients and outpatients, including general 
mental health, eating disorders, neurological assessment.
- assessment and treatment of child and family outpatients including behavioural 
problems, family dysfunction, learning difficulties.
- group work (self-esteem/ assertiveness).
- staff training.
- liaison psychologist for multi-disciplinary ward team.
1992 -  1994
Lecturer in clinical psychology. Institute of Psychiatry, London
- provision of a clinical service to two child development centres.
- assessment and treatment of children with developmental disorders, chronic illness 
and other special needs.
- clinical psychology representative on multi- disciplinary child development team.
- consultation service to child health professionals.
- liaison psychologist for special needs nursery groups.
- supervision and training of trainees on the M.Sc. Clinical Psychology course.
- teaching on M.Sc. Clinical Psychology course.
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1994 -
Clinical Psychologist, Surrey Oaklands NHS Trust, Surrey
- provision and development of clinical psychology service to Ewell Community 
Health Team including assessment, treatment, consultancy, teaching.
- development and provision of a family therapy clinic (adult mental health).
- supervision of trainees and counsellors and doctors
- clinical audit and quality assurance
Training since qualification
Professional Issues
The Psychologist’s role in influencing organisations (NZ Psychological Society, 1991) 
Ethics in the 1990’s (NZ Psychological Society, 1991)
Supervision Issues (Waikato University, 1992)
Supervision Training (Institute of Psychiatry, 1992)
Supervision Training (University of Surrey, 1995)
The NHS and Community Care Act (Institute of Psychiatry, 1993)
Child Clinical Psychology in the marketplace (SIG Children and Young People, 1992) 
Consultation: a course for psychologists (Tavistock Clinic, 1993)
Outcomes in Professional Practice (DCP-BPS, 1996)
Accountability in professional practice (CPCPD-BPS, 1997)
Clinical Issues
Predicting Dangerousness (Professor Buckmaster NZ, 1992) 
Post-natal depression (Professor Kendall NZ, 1992)
Eating Disorders conference (Institute of Psychiatry, 1993) 
National Family Therapy conference (NZ, 1992)
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Three Workshops with David Epston (NZ, 1992)
The Family Interpreted (Deborah Luepnitz, 1992)
Family Therapy within CMHTs (Institute of Family Therapy, 1995)
Brief therapy for survivors of abuse (Brief Therapy Practice, 1994)
Adult illness and childhood sexual abuse (Surrey Oaklands Trust, 1994)
CBT with psychotic symptoms (Hazel Nelson, 1996)
CBT with Schizophrenia (Prof. Tarrier, 1998)
Introduction to psycho dynamic thinking (Surrey Oaklands Trust, 1996)
Treatment of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Europ. Soc. for Traumatic Stress, 1998) 
BABCP Annual Conference (Canterbury, 1997)
Family Research and Family Therapy (Institute of Psychiatry, 1998)
Service developments
1995 - Development of a Family Therapy Clinic for adult mental health.
1996 - Clinical Psychology input to a strategy group which set up a nurse training
course in sexuality and mental health.
1996 - New service offering supervision of counsellors in primary care.
1997 - CBT supervision and training to all junior doctors in Surrey Oaklands Trust.
1997 - New service offering consultation to Health Visitors on adult mental health.
1998 - Clinical psychology input to Steering Group on documentation and multi-user
file policy.
Reflections on professional development since qualification
In the first years following my training I worked with a range of different services and 
client groups, which allowed me to build up my basic clinical skills and develop my 
ideas about what interested me professionally. My experience with child services gave 
me a good grounding in family therapy approaches and introduced me to thinking
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systemically about individuals and organisations as well as families. This field also 
provided me with valuable experience in multi-agency liaison, as much of the child and 
family work involved careful negotiation with social services and educational 
psychology departments. This fired my enthusiasm for working within a multi­
disciplinary fi*amework. At the same time I had the professional and academic support 
firom being part of the Institute of Psychiatry which allowed me to maintain a strong 
identity as a clinical psychologist. This issue of balancing of professional status with 
team membership has permeated my work ever since. In my current post I am a 
member of a community mental health team, but I am managed by a professional head 
of psychology services. My current post reflects the way in which my interests and 
skills have developed. I have specialised in adult mental health and enjoy a balance of 
community-based work covering the full range of mental health problems, together 
with the opportunity to develop some areas of specialist interest and experience. My 
development has followed three main themes.
Firstly I have maintained and developed skills in cognitive-behavioural therapies 
(CBT). The work by such psychologists as Paul Salkovskis and David Clarke on 
refining cognitive theory in anxiety disorders has informed my clinical practice. I am 
especially interested in treating obsessive-compulsive disorder, and such cases are 
referred on to me by my team colleagues. I have also had some training in CBT with 
psychosis and hope to develop this approach at a local level. In contrast to developing 
these specific cognitive approaches, I have also had much professional satisfaction 
through learning to integrate CBT work with other models. Through my experience 
and training in psychodynamic perspectives I have enhanced my ability to work with 
very troubled clients, such as those with personality disorders or survivors of abuse, 
particularly in terms of engaging and containing clients whilst still addressing cognitive 
issues. My training in brief systemic therapy has also been a valuable addition to my 
repertoire of skills. This approach has many similarities to CBT and provides a valuable 
resource of creative ideas for engaging and motivating clients.
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A fiirther area of interest is in the field of organisational issues, consultation and 
training. The training course at the Tavistock Clinic provided an excellent focus for 
developing these skills and I have had many opportunities to apply them in my work. I 
offer training and consultation to a variety of professional groups. My contributions to 
clinical audit and a policy group also allow me to apply this knowledge at a broader 
organisational level.
Finally my training and experience in family therapy has allowed me to develop a new 
specialist service in adult mental health. However, I also use this knowledge m my 
individual practice since I find it clinically very helpful to work with clients in the 
context of their family life. My consultation service to health visitors reflects this 
integration of adult mental health with a perspective on the importance of family 
factors, for many of our adult clients are of course parents too.
Professionally I hope to steer my clinical career in a number of directions which follow 
on fi*om the interests and skills I have already developed. Firstly, I will continue to 
build upon my clinical skills m CBT work and hope to offer more specialised services 
in the areas of psychosis and obsessive-compulsive disorder. I am also planning with a 
colleague to develop a trauma service within the department as currently no such 
specialism exists locally. An important part of these developments wül be the 
opportunity to carry out research into these specialist areas. Secondly, I hope to gain 
more organisational and management experience, and would want to complement this 
with appropriate training. Lastly, I will continue to co-run the family therapy clinic, and 
again see further formal training and research as key elements in my professional 
development in this field.
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Developing a family therapy service in adult mental health: a review 
and preliminary audit of the first two years
Introduction
In common with many adult mental health services, family therapy was not available 
within the Adult Mental Health directorate of my Trust when I came into my post in 
1994. Part of my role in my current post was to devote some of my sessions to new 
service developments for the clinical psychology service. With this in mind I explored 
the possibility of setting up family therapy services for adults. The head of the, adult 
psychotherapy unit in the Trust also considered family therapy to be an important 
treatment option for adults, and was keen to work coUaboratively with me to develop a 
service. Since we both had some expertise in family therapy approaches, a proposal 
was made to set up and evaluate a new family therapy clinic for adults within our 
Trust.
Many psychologists acknowledge that family factors play an important role in adult 
mental health problems. This view is borne out by the multitude of ways in which 
families, and particularly spouses, have been involved in the psychological treatment of 
adults with problems such as depression, obsessive-compulsive disorder and alcohol 
abuse (Baucom et al., 1998). The substantial research into the concept of ‘expressed 
emotion’ as applied to schizophrenia (Kuipers et al., 1992), but more recently applied 
to several other disorders such as depression and eating disorders, has also contributed 
to the increased awareness of family factors in adult mental health.
Baucom et al’s (1998) review of empirically supported family interventions covers a 
wide range of adult mental heath treatments. However, most of these, including the 
expressed emotion work, are not based on systemic models of family therapy, but faU 
more in the categories of behavioural therapy or psychoeducation. Systemic family 
therapy is now a well-established approach in the field of child and adolescent
58
psychiatry, and is even the treatment of choice with some disorders in these client 
groups, for example anorexia nervosa (Eisler et al., 1997). However, family therapy 
and the systemic approach in general has had little impact on general adult practice 
(Cottrell, 1989), and only a handful of reports of such work appear in the psychiatric or 
psychological literature. There are no case-controlled studies to support the general use 
of (systemic) family therapy with adults, indeed research in this area has tended to 
remain outside the mainstream scientific field.
Bloch et al. (1991) describes an audit of 50 families seen in an adult family therapy 
clinic using a Milan style of therapy, and concludes that they achieved satisfactory 
results using this approach. MacDonald (1994), who advocates using a brief therapy 
model, also found that a ‘good’ outcome was achieved in 70% of families treated in an 
adult psychiatry unit. However, these studies were not empirically robust and the 
authors acknowledge that information is sorely lacking on issues such as; the types of 
patients and presenting problems which might be most suitable for this approach, ways 
of conceptualising psychiatric problems in family-systemic terms, and the outcome of 
treatment.
The studies by Bloch et al. and MacDonald have yielded promising results, and suggest 
that family therapy for adults may be an effective complement to current adult mental 
health treatments. Thus, it was considered worthwhile to set up and evaluate such a 
service in our Trust. A ‘needs assessment’ was not carried out in the form of a survey 
or questionnaire, but through our discussions with colleagues throughout the adult 
mental health services, it was clear that many professionals felt that family factors 
played an important role in their patients’ difiSculties, and they welcomed the idea of a 
family approach. This support, together with our knowledge of the literature and our 
family therapy expertise, allowed us confidence in our view that a family service could 
benefit patients in our Trust. The aim of this review is to give an account of the 
development of the new service, and to report the results of a small preliminary audit of 
the first two years.
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Development of the Family Therapy Clinic 
Context
Planning a new service required careful consideration of the background factors and 
culture which prevailed in the Trust. The psychotherapist and I recognised the 
importance of consultation with colleagues, and considered the potential for tension 
and anxiety in the Trust arising from the prospect of relative newcomers implementing 
change in a complex organisation. No other professionals were offering adult family 
therapy although several, particularly learning disabilities clinical psychologists, had 
received some training. However, we had to work very sensitively with the Child and 
Adolescent services to ameliorate their initial concerns about our competence to move 
into what is traditionally a child and adolescent domain. Overall, most professionals 
and managers were supportive of our plans.
It was also important to recognise the potential for tension over ‘ownership’ of the 
clinic. Whilst I jointly developed and ‘owned’ the service with my colleague, it has 
been organisationally located in the psychotherapy unit, and is therefore seen by many 
staff as the consultant psychotherapist’s clinic. However, the administrative and 
financial support of the psychotherapy unit, and the ‘protection’ afforded by the 
presence of a medical consultant psychotherapist in negotiations was vital in the initial 
development of the clinic. The input of clinical psychology into the service is still 
considerable in terms of time, expertise and service developments.
Therapists ’ background
I have long had an interest in family therapy, having worked in Child and Adolescent 
services for some years where systemic work was the ‘bread and butter’ of clinical 
treatments, and techniques such as using one way screens, reflecting teams and 
systemic consultation were standard practice. My training was largely experiential with 
some excellent supervision over the years by highly regarded practitioners. This was 
supplemented by workshops and conferences, with some particularly influential training
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from the originators of narrative therapy, Michael White and David Epston, whilst I 
worked in New Zealand. Narrative therapies are especially relevant to working with 
adults, both in a family context and individually, and thus I was exposed to the 
possibility of working systemically within my chosen field of adult mental health when I 
took up my latest post in a Surrey NHS Trust.
With a strong psychoanalytic background in group therapy as well as experience of 
structural systemic models, the psychotherapist brought very different strengths to the 
service. These contrasted significantly with my approach which incorporated a 
synthesis of brief and narrative models together with a clinical psychologist’s cognitive- 
behavioural background. The psychotherapist and I spent some sessions discussing 
experiences, training and preferred frameworks, to ensure we had some shared values 
and conceptualisations of how we would work together.
Development Phase 1
The initial consultation and planning process took several months. Meetings with 
managers and professionals to establish support for the new service took much of this 
time. It was also crucial to discuss and clarify with the psychotherapist how we 
conceived the service, how decisions would be made, and our views on conducting 
family therapy. Much work was done on establishing our identity and the 
characteristics of our service. Considerable effort went into the production of 
information leaflets about the new service, as we wanted to be as clear as possible with 
referrers and clients about what we could and could not offer. We specified, for 
example, that where a child or young person in the family was having significant 
emotional or psychological difficulties, the family would be more appropriately seen by 
Child and Adolescent services. Because we had limited time and resources we decided, 
at least initially, to accept referrals only from professionals. Our overall aim was to 
provide family therapy input to families where one or more of the adult members were 
identified as having mental health difficulties, and where the referrer and family felt a 
family approach was relevant to the presenting problems.
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Development Phase 2
We began accepting referrals in September 1995. Initially the psychotherapist and I 
saw families together in a hospital-based consulting room with very limited facilities. 
The clinic operated one morning a week only. Psychiatric colleagues provided the first 
referrals, which often consisted of very complex cases where many other approaches 
had already been tried and failed. It felt as if we were being ‘tested’ and we handled 
these cases as sensitively as possible, wishing to offer help but be clear about what was 
realistic to expect. Fortunately, my links with professionals through my other role as a 
community clinical psychologist meant I could liaise with my colleagues informally as 
well as formally, to encourage good relations within the Trust. We were acutely aware 
of the responsibility we had to work only within our competence and with appropriate 
support. To this end we arranged monthly supervision fi*om a regional adolescent 
family therapy team which has proved invaluable both for the quality of peer 
supervision, and for the connections made with an important neighbouring service.
Development Phase 3
Some months into the service we felt confident enough to develop the consulting 
facilities, and a video link and camera were installed between a clinical psychology 
office and the psychotherapist’s adjacent room. This required the support of the clinical 
psychology management, and was in some ways symbolic of the firm link now 
established between the two departments in the running of this service. We also wished 
to expand the personal resources of our small team, and so recruited a family therapist 
with high level training to join the clinic on a permanent basis. This post was funded 
firom the psychotherapy budget. This arrival of course shifted the dynamics of the 
relationship between the clinic’s two ‘founding members’, and we spent some time as a 
team exploring this to ensure we worked well together. The arrival of trainees and 
registrars on placement fiirther expanded our numbers.
After a year of operation the three team members held an annual review of the service; 
an opportunity to reflect on how the clinic was running but also to talk about how we
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related both within the team and to external agencies. A steady flow of referrals had 
necessitated a waiting list. This was addressed by a review of the communications 
process with referrers and families, improvements to an opt-in questionnaire for all 
families, and better use of clinic time to enable reduced waiting times. We also 
increased the emphasis on liaison with referrers and keyworkers of the index patient 
referred. My work in community-based clinical psychology had given me experience of 
multi-disciplinary working within policy frameworks such as the Care Programme 
Approach. I was therefore in a good position to feed this into the family therapy team 
discussion and encourage clear lines of clinical responsibility in our work with families. 
This was vital given the complex nature of the psychological problems which many of 
the referrals presented and the multitude of agencies involved. In all, the review at this 
stage suggested that the service appeared to be highly valued by our psychiatric 
colleagues, but limitations on resources and session time has meant that even today the 
service continues to operate on only one morning a week. Hopes for community-based 
premises have not been realised, although the current out-patient setting does allow for 
helpfully close links with consultant medical colleagues whose support has been 
crucial. A symbol that we had perhaps been accepted by our peers at this point in our 
development was an invitation to present our work at a regional conference on eating 
disorders, a presentation which was well received.
Models of working
Throughout the short history of the family therapy clinic a recurring theme has been 
how the team members integrate their different training and models of therapy into a 
coherent, workable approach in practice. As commented on earlier, family therapy in 
adult mental health is very much in its infancy and lacks empirical status. Indeed family 
therapy itself is in reality a host of different theories and models, some quite 
contradictory of each other. Given this background it seemed particularly important as 
a clinical psychologist to be clear about the models being used, and to acknowledge the 
many assumptions that have to be made in the face of relatively little direct research
63
evidence. This would challenge the team to justify formulations and interventions used 
and to consider ways of assessing outcome as objectively as possible. The audit 
described below and outcome surveys planned for the future are part of this process of 
evaluation.
Most family therapy teams in clinical practice are multi-disciplinary and so our mix of 
disciplines is not unusual. Family therapy, by its very nature of looking at systems and 
communication patterns, lends itself to an analysis of how the members of a team relate 
to each other. In our team we have debated issues brought about by the status held by 
the different professions, the kudos acquired by formal as opposed to informal training, 
and the influence of gender and culture on team relationships (I am the only female on 
the team and my two colleagues are white males, but we have both male and female 
visiting trainees who have been fiom a variety of different cultures). At times the 
different perspectives of team members are in stark contrast, for example I might take 
a behavioural or perhaps a brief therapy approach to a session whereas my 
psychotherapy colleague might highlight the emotional tone of the interactions and 
interpret analytically. The structure of a family therapy session with the typical break 
for team discussion allows us to think about these contrasts and be guided by what 
seems best to fit with the family being seen, rather than by our own ideologies or 
professional interests. All the members of the team receive some form of external 
supervision which is crucial for ensuring professional standards of clinical practice.
Whilst the training and experience of the team members is quite varied, there are 
several themes and conceptualisations which are of high heuristic value and occur a lot 
in our formulations, aside fi-om the general systems principles which we obviously all 
share. Hayley’s (1980) ideas about the ‘family life cycle’ and transitions in family life 
are often pertinent, for example when working with adults with eating problems. The 
concepts of family scripts and ‘problem-saturated’ narratives (White and Epston 1989) 
have also proved important in our thinking about the nature of pathology and 
psychiatric problems. Attachment theory has also helped us conceptualise family 
conflicts and distress, especially the notion of a secure family base described by Byng-
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Hall (1995). These and other theoretical models or ideas are debated through team 
literature reviews and discussion, as part of a team commitment to continuing 
professional development.
A preliminary audit of the family therapy clinic
Psychology has an important role to play in clinical effectiveness (Baker and Firth- 
Cozens, 1998), and as a clinical psychologist, I was able to bring to the team an 
emphasis on issues of service evaluation, outcome assessment and the trend towards 
evidence-based practice in health services. Audit is a small but important part of this 
process of evaluation and I undertook to design and carry out an evaluation of the 
service. Initially, due to severe time constraints, it was agreed that the audit should 
address basic questions such as who refers what kind of problems and what kind of 
service do we then offer. To this end I reviewed the notes of all the families referred up 
to December 1997 and collated data on a number of different variables. The results are 
presented below.
Method
A retrospective review was conducted of the casenotes of all the families referred to 
the clinic from its inception in September 1995 to December 1997. Using a structured 
protocol, the following information was recorded.
(a) Source of referral
(b) Reason for referral, classified mto three main themes, family relationship issues, 
marital problems, family bereavement. These categories follow convention in other 
audits in the literature, and captured the main themes of interest to our team.
(c) Diagnosis of index patient. This was derived from the referral letter.
(d) Care Programme Approach (CPA) level of index patient, as indicated in the referral 
letter or from medical notes. The CPA system applies to every patient in the psychiatric
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service and ranges from 1 - non-complex cases requiring one or two professionals’ 
input, to 3 - complex cases needing multi-agency involvement.
(e) The course of therapy, including waiting time, number of times seen and reason for 
terniination.
Outcome data was not included in this particular audit. Satisfactory measures of 
outcome have not yet been developed for family therapy. This issue is discussed further 
m the Discussion section.
Results
From September 1995 to December 1997, 69 families were referred to the clinic for 
assessment. The referring agencies are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Referral source
Professional n %
General Psychiatrist 39 57
Community Psychiatric Nurse 12 18
Social Worker 7 10
Clinical Psychologist 6 9
GP 3 4
Psychotherapist 1 1
Occupational Therapist 1 1
The majority of referrals, 35 cases (51%), requested assessment for marital difficulties, 
31(45%) were for various family communication and relationship difficulties, and the 
remaining 3 referrals (4%) specifically related to bereavement issues.
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Diagnosis of Index Patient
In 63 out of the 69 referrals (91%) an index patient with a mental health diagnosis was 
identified by the referrer. 21(33%) were male and 42(67%) were female. The diagnoses 
for those families where an index patient was identified are presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Diagnosis of index patient
Diagnosis n %
Depression 28 45
Anxiety disorders 9 14
Psychosis 7 11
Alcohol abuse 5 8
Eating disorder 4 6
Grief reaction 3 5
Bipolar disorder 2 3
Personality disorder 2 3
Other 3 5
The CPA levels for index patients were as follows. Level 1 - 24(38%) cases. Level 2 
16(25%) cases. Level 3 - 3(5%) cases. In 20(32%) cases no CPA level was identified.
The course of therapy
Of the 69 families referred, 9(13%) were not accepted by the family therapy team. In 
most of these cases child protection concerns disqualified them from our service and 
they were referred elsewhere. Of the 60 families accepted for assessment (87% of 
referrals), 30(50%) declined an appointment, mostly by not responding to the 
questionnaire or follow-up letter.
Waiting times for an assessment appointment varied considerably over the audit period, 
from one to 20 weeks, with the average wait being 6 weeks.
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Seven (23%) of the 30 families assessed were seen only once and not taken on for 
therapy. In 2 cases this was based on a professional decision. In 4 cases the decision 
was by mutual consent, and in one case on the family’s initiative.
Twenty-three families were offered therapy (77% of families assessed). The diagnosis 
of the index patient for these families are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Diagnosis of index patient in families offered therapy
Diagnosis n %
Depression 15 66
Anorexia nervosa 2 9
Anxiety disorder 2 9
Bipolar disorder 1 4
Psychosis 1 4
Personality disorder 1 4
Psychosexual disorder 1 4
Of the 23 families offered therapy, 6 were still being seen when the audit took place. 
For those who had been discharged, the average number of sessions given was 6, with 
a range of 2 to 12 sessions. Overall, 15% of sessions were cancelled and 4% were 
unattended with no notice given.
For the 17 families who were discharged within the audit period, 12 completed therapy 
and were discharged by mutual consent, 4 terminated on the family’s initiative and one 
family was discharged by the therapist. Therapy was judged to have been terminated by 
mutual consent when both the family and the therapist felt the therapy had been 
beneficial and had reached a satisfactory conclusion. However, no objective measures 
of outcome were available to support this chnical judgement.
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Discussion
The principle aim of this audit was to provide the family therapy team with an overview 
of the type of service we were offering, so that we could identify strengths and 
weaknesses, and opportunities for improvement. With this in mind, some key points 
which emerge out of the results will be presented below, followed by a consideration of 
the need for quality standards and further audit.
The majority of referrals came from psychiatrists, which is not surprising given that the 
clinic is located in an out-patient psychiatric department, and that the psychotherapist 
on the team liaises closely with his consultant colleagues. The very few referrals from 
the primary care sector are to be expected as we have not heavily publicised our 
service outside our own specialist Trust. While we would wish to ensure that the 
service is easily accessible to primary care professionals, time and human resources 
constraints limit our ability to respond to an increase in referrals from any source. 
However, we are cognisant of the fact that GPs are key purchasers of mental health 
services, and the new primary care groups will no doubt have an impact on future 
service provision. For example, local GPs may not be familiar with family therapy and 
its application to adult services, regarding it as only applicable to children, or as an 
expensive non-essential service which should not be provided locally. Good 
communication with aU our purchasers, especially GPs, is vital to ensure that we 
inform them of the nature of the service, our audit results and the published evidence 
for the effectiveness of family therapy with adults.
The range of reasons for referral reflected the generic nature of a family therapy 
service, but with an emphasis on requests for couples or marital therapy, often in the 
context of a relationship where one partner had a long-term serious mental health 
problem. Such referrals are appropriate given the emerging research evidence 
supporting the use of systemic work with couples such as that conducted by Julian Leff 
and colleagues at the Institute of Psychiatry which showed good results in the 
treatment of depression (Leff, 1998).
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The diagnosis of the index patients covered a range of serions problems though 
depression predominated, particularly in the couples referrals. Seven patients with a 
psychotic illness had been referred which may reflect the increasing awareness of family 
factors in psychotic illnesses such as psychosis. The significant proportion of patients 
with a serious mental illness was also reflected in the number of cases at CPA levels 2 
and 3 which amounted to 30% of the index patients. This has significant implications 
for the service as such complex cases are more time-consuming and demanding on the 
therapist, and involve liaison with several professionals and agencies.
The audit data on various aspects of the course of therapy raise several issues, not least 
the high attrition rate of referrals pre-assessment. It is obviously not possible firom this 
audit to deduce what caused 50% of families to decline to be seen. It may be that the 
families, and for that matter referrers, were not fully informed about the service or clear 
about the rationale for family therapy. Other family members may not have been fiiUy 
consulted. Further enquiry is clearly needed to address this issue.
An average waiting time of six weeks for an assessment is relatively short compared to 
many psychotherapy waiting lists, and is within the Trust’s quality standard of a 
maximum of eight weeks for an out-patient appointment. However, at times the wait 
was much longer, and the team were concerned that waiting for several weeks is 
stressful for families in need of help. Limited resources and a relatively small team 
mean that it is difficult to absorb fluctuations in referral rates to the clinic, and so this 
problem is unlikely to be resolved in the short term.
Families attended an average of six sessions which is in line with usual family therapy 
practice, but slightly longer than the audit reported by Bloch et al (1991) whose 
average was four sessions. This may reflect the higher proportion of serious mental 
illness seen in our clinic. The cancellation and non-attendance rates are reasonable for a 
psychotherapy service (MacDonald, 1994).
70
The majority of families seen completed their therapy to the satisfaction of both the 
therapist and family. The actual outcome of therapy and the reasons why some families 
terminated prematurely are important issues to address in future audits.
In general, this audit provided some useful preliminary information and pointed to 
some issues which need attention, such as attrition rates and premature termination. 
Audit can be seen as a systemic approach in itself, consisting of a feedback with 
questions posed, information received and changes made in practice (Bruggen and 
Pettle, 1993). The information here is currently being discussed by the team with a 
view to implementing improvements, followed by further auditing to establish whether 
clinical practice has been enhanced by these changes. The following issues are being 
considered.
a) Information given to referrers and families about our service.
b) Quality of liaison with other professionals and agencies
c) Waiting times to assessment
d) Database to allow systematic collection and monitoring of audit data
e) Audit of therapy process and outcome to complement basic audit topics.
In relation to the last point, two types of questionnaire have been devised, one for 
referrers and another for families. These wül assess satisfaction with the service and 
views on outcome. Such satisfaction surveys are commonly used in clinical practice, 
and have the advantage of explicitly involving users in a service, a requirement of good 
practice in the NHS (DoH, 1991). However, the conclusions that can be drawn from 
such self-report surveys are limited, for example in how weU they correlate with other 
measures of outcome. It is inherently difficult to audit outcome of famüy work where 
the goals and experience of the therapy may be different for each famüy menber, and 
where it is problematic to operationalise theoretical (systemic) objectives. Outcome in 
famüy therapy is the source of much recent debate (MacDonald, 1994). However, the 
team recognises that ethical, evidence-based practice demands assessment of outcome. 
With this in mind, the team need to consider how we might begin to operationalise
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what we do and what we aim to achieve, so that we can more objectively judge the 
success or otherwise of family therapy interventions. The audit presented here has 
provided a focus for developing these ideas further, so initiating a process of evaluation 
which will help our practice and allow us to be more accountable to those who use our 
service.
The Family Therapy Clinic: Conclusions and Future directions
The family therapy clinic appears to be weU utilised and received by referrers and 
families alike, and initial evaluations suggest that the service is potentially a worthwhile 
complement to standard adult services. Many of the index patients continued to be seen 
by their psychiatric team within the Trust after jSnishing family therapy, which may of 
course have influenced the feedback given, and thus we need to be cautious about this 
‘approval’. The clinic is not without its problems of course. There is the continual 
pressure of limited resources and time, but perhaps more fundamental is the inevitable 
tension for the organisation as a whole which accompanies the assimilation of systemic 
ideas into traditional psychiatric and psychological practice. Systemic theory and family 
therapy models operate within a different paradigm to the medical model of mental 
iUness. For example, there is no simple cause and effect approach to pathology, and 
disturbance is seen as located within the family rather than an individual. Moreover, 
interventions such as narrative therapies and brief therapies (based on social 
constructivist principles) work with families to challenge the orthodox stories of 
pathology which predominate in psychiatry, and so may be seen by other professionals 
as subverting the framework of psychiatric care within which the clinic is located. 
Family therapists such as Haley (1975) and more recently Lieberman (1995) have 
acknowledged the difficulty of offering family therapy in general psychiatry, and point 
out that one cannot just ‘add on’ this approach or keep the clinic separate from other 
parts of the service. The institution itself has to be encouraged to ‘think’ systemically 
through good liaison at every level of the service including managers. Training is a vital 
part of this process too, and our inclusion of keyworkers, trainees and junior doctors in 
the clinic contributes to better understanding of systemic approaches. While at an
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epistemological level, family therapy approaches might be in opposition to medical 
models, in practice our team has found that we can work within the organisation and 
its psychiatric structures such as the CPA and Mental Health Act procedures. By being 
clear with each other, the referrers and the family about our approach, boundaries and 
responsibilities, we have been able to establish a workable collaboration with our 
colleagues.
Whilst the debate about different paradigms within psychiatry and psychology will 
inevitably continue, there has been a shift to an empirical emphasis in family therapy in 
recent years, particularly as highly respected psychiatrists and psychologists within 
traditional academic institutions have started to research and publish in this field. A 
recent conference at the Institute of Psychiatry in 1998 entitled ‘Family Research and 
Family Therapy’ highlighted the increased interest and respectability that family therapy 
now enjoys. In the current climate of evidence-based practice and clinical effectiveness, 
this more ‘scientific’ profile can only help family therapy make inroads into adult 
mental health. However, the empirical emphasis may also obscure or over-simplify the 
reality of doing systemic work in general psychiatry with the inherent tensions outlined 
above. As a clinical psychologist I have had to struggle with these tensions at an 
individual level, in terms of reconciling my empiricist training with the challenges of 
different philosophies of science which underpin systemic ideas. This informs not only 
my family therapy practice but my adult mental health work too.
The family therapy clinic is now an accepted part of the psychotherapy unit, and in 
fiiture we would hope to be able to expand the service to allow more time to see 
families but also to offer more consultation and training. There are opportunities to 
offer additional specialist services if increased resources were available. For example, 
the psychotherapist is involved in the strategic planning of a new adult eating disorders 
service in the Trust. Family therapy is considered an important part of this. The 
increased attention paid to family factors in schizophrenia has raised the issue of 
whether our clinic should offer family management as developed by Kuipers, Leff and 
colleagues (Kuipers et al., 1992). This approach, which reduces relapse rates m
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sufferers of schizophrenia, is supported by several research studies. However it would 
require a substantial increase in resources and a great deal of collaboration with 
community mental health workers to apply this to local services. The approach is not 
without its critics. Some have questioned the ethics of an intervention which 
emphasises that schizophrenia is biological illness and appears to promote a view of 
mental distress which is stigmatising (Johnstone, 1993). Others have pointed out the 
inherent contradictions between family management (which offers psychoeducation and 
behavioural interventions) and systemic family therapy (Burbach, 1996). These are 
issues which our team must continue to discuss and resolve in terms of how we 
develop our clinic for the future.
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Perfectionism, guilt and responsibility in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder: an investigation of cognitive and emotional styles
Abstract
Recent cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) propose that there 
are specific thinking and appraisal biases evident in sufferers of the disorder. The 
cognitive traits of perfectionism, and responsibility have both been linked to OCD, 
while guilt, an affective trait, has also been hypothesised to play a key role in the 
condition. This study measured perfectionism, responsibility and guilt in 21 patients 
with OCD compared to 26 patients with other anxiety disorders. It was hypothesised 
that OCD patients would show significantly higher levels of these traits. However this 
hypothesis was not wholly supported by the results. OCD patients did not differ from 
anxiety disorder patients in terms of the three traits described. Correlational analyses 
across the two groups suggested that only perfectionism was related to obsessionality 
when the effects of anxiety and depression were partiaUed out. The current status of 
cognitive theories of OCD are discussed in the light of these results.
Introduction
The nature o f obsessive-compulsive disorder
DSM-IV describes the essential features of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) as 
recurrent obsessions or compulsions which are severe enough to be very time- 
consuming or cause significant distress or impairment. Obsessions are defined as 
‘persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced as intrusive and 
inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or distress’, whilst compulsions are 
defined as ‘repetitive behaviours...or mental acts...the goal of which is to prevent or
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reduce anxiety or distress’ (APA, 1994). Clinical accounts of OCD have appeared in 
the literature for well over a hundred years but until relatively recently the condition 
was considered to be an extremely rare illness with a poor prognosis. Epidemiological 
studies in the last few years have indicated that the prevalence of OCD is 
approximately 1% to 2% (Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992; Bebbington, 1998). Thus OCD 
is about as twice as common as schizophrenia though less prevalent than depressive 
disorders.
OCD is classified in DSM-IV as a form of anxiety disorder. Thus, OCD is assumed to 
share common attributes with the other anxiety disorders such as panic disorder and 
generalised anxiety disorder, whilst still demonstrating discriminant validity as a clinical 
category in its own right. Some researchers have challenged this system of 
classification. Enright and Beech (1990) and Enright (1996) have argued that OCD is 
misclassified as an anxiety disorder and is more closely aligned to the schizophrenia 
spectrum of disorders. More recently, Hollander controversially argues that OCD is 
one of a range of related conditions belonging to the ‘obsessive-compulsive spectrum 
disorders’ which includes such diagnostic subgroups as hypochondriasis but also non­
anxiety disorders such as impulse control disorders, autism, tic disorders, eating 
disorders and dissociative disorders (Hollander, 1998). Others have pointed to the 
extensive overlap found in the mood disorders and anxiety disorders and propose a 
more general challenge to the categorical classification within anxiety (Brown, 1996). 
OCD for example shows a marked overlap in symptomatology with depression 
(Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992), and thus the notion of a separate entity called OCD 
properly located within the anxiety disorders is called into question. Problems with 
diagnostic classification have led researchers, particularly in the cognitive-behavioural 
field, to argue for dimensional approaches to classification and this is especially 
pertinent for OCD since much of the cognitive-behavioural research into this disorder 
has looked at dimensions of obsessional-compulsive behaviours across different 
populations rather than the clinical condition per se. There is a great deal of evidence 
that obsessive-compulsive symptoms lie on a continuum in the general population, 
rather than OCD being a qualitatively different experience (Gibbs, 1996). This way of
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conceptualising the symptomatology of OCD underlies much of the psychological 
research into OCD, such that analogue studies using student and other non-clinical 
samples are frequently used and then generalised to a clinical population. This issue is 
important in reviewing theory and research in this field, and wül be returned to again 
later. The point being made here is that, even for such a distinctive illness as OCD, 
much controversy still exists regarding its nature, nosology and its relationship to other 
disorders.
Theories o f  etiology and maintenance in obsessive-compulsive disorder
Some of the first hypotheses about the origins of OCD were psychodynamic theories in 
which obsessions were regarded as defensive psychological responses to unconscious 
impulses (for example, see Jenicke’s [1986] summary of the Freudian position on 
OCD). However, these theories suffer the criticism levelled at psychodynamic theories 
generally, that is, they cannot be falsified and therefore are not open to empirical 
evaluation. In addition, there is no evidence that psycho dynamic treatments work with 
sufferers of OCD (Jenicke, 1986).
Many different biological theories have been proposed which postulate some sort of 
neurological deficit model based on neuroimaging studies, neuropsychological studies 
of cognitive deficits and the effectiveness of serotonergic drugs in the treatment of 
OCD (Pigott et al., 1996; Tallis, 1997; Saxena et al., 1998). However, there is little 
consensus about the nature of the neurological deficit or which part of the brain is 
functioning abnormally. Many of the distinctive symptoms and responses to 
psychological treatments in OCD cannot be accounted for in neurobiological models, 
and neuroanatomical abnormalities are found in only a proportion of the samples 
studied. Normal controls or control samples with other psychopathology have rarely 
been used (Saxena et al., 1998). As Salkovskis (1996) and others have pointed out, all 
behaviours have biological substrates and to this extent will have neurophysiological 
correlates, so the apparent division between biological versus psychological theories of
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etiology are misleading. Indeed recent research is moving towards a synthesis of 
biological and behavioural perspectives and is beginning to address the reciprocal 
relationship between brain and behaviour in OCD, for example looking at the way 
psychological therapies induce changes in cerebral function (Schwartz, 1998). A 
further biological perspective on OCD, that of genetic factors has been researched for 
some years. Genetic studies have on the whole been inconclusive. Pauls et al. (1995) 
concluded from their study of over a hundred probands with OCD and their relatives, 
that the disorder is a heterogeneous condition with some cases being familial, but in 
other cases there was no evidence of a familial relationship.
Behavioural models have been the most influential in terms of theorising about the 
development of OCD, particularly Mowrer’s two-stage theory of fear and avoidance 
(Mowrer, 1960). In the first stage a neutral stimulus acquires anxiety-evoking 
properties through classical conditioning, and in the second stage, behaviours which 
reduce the anxiety associated with the stimulus are reinforced. In OCD these 
behaviours might be both passive avoidance by withdrawing from the stimulus, or 
active avoidance of the anxiety through fear-reducing compulsions and rituals. 
Rachman and his colleagues (1980) conducted several experimental studies to examine 
this model in OCD, and found that elicitation of the obsession resulted in increased 
anxiety, rituals and compulsive behaviours rapidly reduced the levels of anxiety, and if 
the rituals were blocked or delayed then the initial increases in anxiety were followed 
by a slow decrease (spontaneous decay). These studies provided the foundation for 
behavioural treatments such as exposure and response prevention (see Rachman and 
Hodgson, 1980). Behavioural models thus assume that OCD is an anxiety disorder 
which, in common with other anxiety disorders such as phobias, has its origins in 
associative learning or conditioning through which obsessional thoughts or impulses 
have become associated with anxiety.
Behavioural models seem intuitively reasonable, and are weU grounded in empirical 
research. The success of behavioural treatments has provided considerable support for 
behavioural models, though in themselves such studies do not of course directly test
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the etiological aspects of the theory. A recent review of behavioural treatments 
concluded that exposure and response prevention had a “robust effect” on OCD 
(Stanley and Turner, 1995, p. 169), and many other researchers have reached similar 
conclusions ( e.g. Steketee, 1994; de Haan et al., 1997). However, many authors have 
noted limitations of behavioural models, and their status as an explanation of the 
etiology of OCD is open to criticism. A key drawback is that there is little evidence 
that critical traumatic episodes precede the onset of OCD. That is, people with OCD 
rarely recall a particular learning experience which could account for the association 
between a specific stimulus and conditioned anxiety. Tallis (1994) described two case 
summaries where there appeared to be key events in the patients’ past which triggered 
obsessional symptoms. However, a study by Jones and Menzies (1998), which assessed 
retrospectively the onset of OCD in a group of 23 OCD patients, found a low rate of 
associative learning. Only three of the patients could recall a specific event which 
precipitated their obsessional concerns.
Behavioural treatments, whilst greatly improving the prognosis for OCD sufferers, 
work only for a proportion of patients. Indeed, when drop-outs and treatment refusers 
are taken into account, only around 50% of patients could be characterised as 
treatment responders ( Stanley and Turner, 1995), and many responders still suffer 
significant residual impairment in terms of social and occupational functioning. Some 
types of OCD such as obsessional ruminations, are particularly refiractory to 
behavioural treatments (O’Kearney, 1993). Thus, in contrast to treatment outcome for 
other anxiety disorders such as specific phobias or panic disorder, behavioural methods 
in OCD have major limitations. The theoretical and treatment shortcomings 
summarised above have contributed to some dissatisfaction amongst researchers and 
clinicians with purely behavioural models. An increasing emphasis on the cognitive 
aspects of OCD has led to the development of cognitive-behavioural theories of both 
the etiology and the maintenance of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. These theories 
are explored in some detail in the next section.
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Cognitive-behavioural models of obsessive-compulsive disorder
Most obsessive-compulsive behaviour is evoked by intrusive thoughts, images or 
impulses (Parkinson and Rachman, 1981). These are perceived by the sufferer as 
automatic, irrational, unpleasant and ego-dystonic. The key feature of cognitive- 
behavioural models is an emphasis on the appraisals which are triggered by these 
intrusive thoughts; that is, the faulty thinking patterns, beliefs and assumptions which 
are automatically activated and which serve to generate anxiety. Compulsive 
behaviours then develop in an effort to reduce anxiety and prevent further occurrences 
of the unpleasant intrusive thoughts. The assumption is that these appraisal biases are 
learned in early childhood, although there has been little research attention paid to the 
etiology of faulty cognitions in OCD. As Rachman (1997) points out, a complete 
answer to the question of where cognitive biases originate from would require “a better 
grasp on the very nature of human thinking.” (p. 797).
There has been an enormous amount of research in the last few years into the 
phenomenology of obsessions and the particular patterns of faulty thinking that 
distinguishes OCD from other disorders. An important impetus to this research has 
been the now well-established finding that intrusive thoughts are not a pathological 
symptom in themselves but constitute “a universal human phenomenon” (Salkovskis,
1996). A comprehensive review by Gibbs (1996) of studies using non-clinical 
populations concluded that “normal” obsessions are similar in form and content to 
clinical obsessions, but the latter are more enduring, intense, discomforting, and 
difficult to dismiss. The finding that intrusive thoughts are normal has had two distinct 
influences on the research. Firstly, it has been used to justify the use of non-clinical 
populations in a large proportion of the studies, from which extrapolations are made 
about the nature of OCD (e.g. Freeston et al., 1992) and, perhaps because of this, there 
is a relative paucity of cognitive research using OCD patients. Secondly, the question 
of interest has shifted from why intrusive obsessional thoughts occur (since they are 
now regarded as a normal part of the stream of consciousness), to what causes these 
intrusive cognitions to become so distressing and debilitating in some individuals and
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not others. There is evidence from a number of studies that appraisal processes are 
closely associated with the frequency and controllability of intrusive thoughts, and that 
individuals with OCD use different appraisals and cognitive strategies in response to 
intrusions compared to normal controls. (Parkinson and Rachman, 1981, Purdon and 
Clark, 1994). Moreover, it appears that the personal meaning or significance of the 
intrusive thoughts is of crucial importance in obsessional problems and differentiates 
obsessional thoughts from other cognitions such as worry (Clark and Clayboum,
1997).
The burgeoning literature on cognitive processes in OCD reflects the wealth of 
interesting ideas and theories about which dysfrmctional appraisals underlie the 
disorder. However, there is little consensus on what cognitive biases are the most 
important m the development of OCD. Numerous traits, processes and beliefs have 
been implicated in the disorder. In a major review of recent theories of OCD, the 
Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (1997) summarised the belief 
domains they believed to be of most importance in development and maintenance of 
OCD. Six groupings of faulty beliefs and related appraisals were devised. These 
included overestimating the importance of thoughts, excessive concern about the need 
to control thoughts, overestimation of risk and severity of threat, intolerance for 
uncertainty, inflated responsibility for harmful events and lastly, perfectionism. Thus 
the range of cognitive biases purported to be crucial in OCD continues to grow, but the 
development of a cognitive theory of OCD which links aU these factors in a logical 
fashion is noticeable by its absence. Some authors have developed theoretical models 
which emphasise particular cognitive biases and their relationship to obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms, and two of these will be described in more detail since they 
seem to offer coherent, though different, accounts of the possible cognitive foundations 
ofOCD.
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McFall and Wollersheim’s model
McFall and WoUersheim (1979) were some of the earliest writers to offer a specific 
cognitive theory of OCD. Their model proposes that unrealistic threat appraisals are 
the key characteristic of OCD. They draw together a number of ‘primary appraisals’ 
which are hypothesised to increase the likelihood of making unrealistic subjective 
appraisals of danger foUowing an obsessional thought, and thus generate anxiety. 
Examples o f such primary appraisals or beliefs include (1) one must always be 
competent and adequate (perfect) to be worthwhile; (2) failure to live up to these 
expectations will result in punishment; (3) one is powerful enough to initiate or prevent 
the occurrence of disastrous outcomes; and (4) certain thoughts and feelings are 
unacceptable and could lead to a catastrophe. McFall and WoUersheim hypothesised 
that deficits in ‘secondary appraisal processes’ foUow this first appraisal of threat, and 
are characterised by unreasonable beliefs about one’s ability to cope with the threat. 
Such distorted appraisals include beUefs that if something is or may be dangerous, it 
WÜ1 be upsetting; it is easier and more effective to carry out a magical ritual than it is to 
confiront one’s feelings or thoughts directly; and it is intolerable to have feelings of 
uncertainty and loss of control. Although obsessions and compulsions are themselves 
distressing, patients perceive these symptoms as more tolerable than the distress and 
guUt associated with the feared outcomes. As the authors describe it, “symptoms are 
their best option for reducing distress” ( p. 336: italics in original).
McFaU and WoUersheim describe cognitive approaches which would address these 
irrational primary and secondary appraisals, and particularly recommend Rational 
Emotive Therapy (RET). EUis (1994), who created RET, has his own model of OCD 
which holds that people with OCD are bom and reared with cognitive, emotive and 
behavioural deficits. Like McFaU and WoUersheim, EUis proposes that OCD patients 
have primary irrational beUefs relevant to the obsessional thoughts, such as a need for 
certainty and perfectionist beUefs, and that they then also constmct further disturbances 
about their cognitive distortions such as “ If I can’t function better than I do function. 
I ’m a worthless personP (p. 123; itaUcs in original).
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The theory proposed by McFall and WoUersheim has not been subjected to direct 
empirical testing, in that the consteUation of cognitive distortions supposed to co-exist 
in OCD has not been specificaUy investigated. However, as outlined above, much 
pragmatic research has been carried out into cognitive traits and patterns which might 
relate to OCD, and some of this research offers indirect support for McFaU and 
WoUersheim’s ideas. Two particular traits, perfectionism and guUt, which play an 
important part in their theory and have been subject to some empirical study, wiU be 
explored in more detaU.
Perfectionism
Perfectionism has long been associated with psychopathology. Pacht (1984) argues 
that perfectionist thinking underUes a wide variety of psychological disorders, and 
quotes Bums’ (1980) definition of perfectionism which, although not specificaUy 
referring to obsessive-compulsive problems, does encapsulate an obsessional quaUty. 
Bums wrote that perfectionists are:
“those whose standards are high beyond reach or reason, people who strain 
compulsively and unremittingly toward impossible goals and who measure their own 
worth entirely in terms of productivity and accompUshment. For these people the drive 
to excel can only be self-defeating.” (1980, p. 34).
The key features of perfectionism are a desire to achieve the highest standards of 
performance coupled with excessively critical evaluations of one’s performance (Frost 
et al., 1990). However, recent studies have investigated the constmct more precisely, 
and developed multidimensional definitions of perfectionism which have been 
empiricaUy tested. Having thoroughly reviewed the Uterature on perfectionism. Frost et 
al. (1990) hypothesised that the trait is in fact comprised of six dimensions: (1) 
excessive concem over making mistakes, (2) high personal standards, (3) perceived 
high parental expectations, (4) perceived high parental criticism, (5) doubt about the 
quaUty of one’s actions and (6) a preference for order and organisation. The
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multidimensional perfectionism scale (MPS) was then developed on the basis of this 
definition of perfectionism, and the six subscales corresponding to the dimensions 
above are; Concem over Mistakes, Personal Standards, Parental Expectations, Parental 
Criticism, Doubt about Actions and Organisation. Other perfectionism scales have also 
been developed which posit a different factor stmcture and which are also widely used. 
Hewitt and Flett (1991) identified three components of perfectionism: self-oriented, 
other-oriented and socially-prescribed, and also called their scale the Multidimensional 
Perfectionism Scale (MPS-H). There is considerable overlap between these two scales 
(Frost et al., 1993), although some of the dimensions are not related. This allows some 
integration of studies which use one or other of these measures.
Perfectionism, as measured by these scales, has been empirically linked to clinical 
depression and anxiety disorders (Hewitt and Flett, 1991) but rather less research has 
been conducted in the area of OCD, despite the emphasis placed on perfectionism by 
many cognitive theorists. Several studies have reported high levels of perfectionism and 
related traits amongst the parents of OCD patients, which lends support to the model 
of Frost et al. (1994) and its factors of parental criticism and expectations. For 
example, Rasmussen and Tsuang (1986) found that a significant proportion of parents 
of OCD patients had perfectionist traits, while Frost et al. (1994) reported that parental 
perfectionism, rigidity and criticism was associated with obsessive compulsive 
symptoms in their non-clinical sample, but only with regard to fathers. In contrast to 
these findings, Merkel et al. (1993), in their study of 320 OCD patients, found no 
evidence to support the hypothesis that parents are likely to exhibit criticism, high 
expectations and perfectionist traits themselves, and remark that explanations of 
straightforward links between OCD sufferers and parental characteristics are too 
simplistic. Similarly, Vogel et al. (1997) found that a diagnosis of OCD was not related 
to parental rearing practices and comment that it is necessary to take into account the 
contributions of other psychopathology (such as depression) when evaluating 
differences between patients with OCD and healthy controls. They also warn against 
relying solely on subclinical student populations.
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A number of studies have looked directly at the link between perfectionism and 
obsessive-compulsive problems. However, most of these have relied on non-cünical 
populations. Frost and his colleagues (1994), in a study of several personality traits in 
“subclinical” obsessive-compulsive volunteers, found that subclinical obsessive- 
compulsives were more perfectionist than a noncompulsive sample. The study involved 
two separate samples of university undergraduates who were screened and divided into 
subclinical and noncompulsive groups on the basis of scores on three obsessive- 
compulsive measures. The groups differed significantly in terms of total perfectionism 
scores on the MPS. Separate analysis of the two samples revealed that, for the first 
study which had a lower cut-off for obsessive-compulsive group membership, Concem 
over Mistakes, Personal Standards and Doubt about Actions were the only MPS 
subscales significantly higher in the obsessive-compulsive group. In the second 
analysis, involving a higher cut-off with a second sample of students, the obsessive- 
compulsive group scored more highly on all subscales of the MPS, indicating to the 
authors that the relationship between perfectionism and obsessive-compulsive problems 
is “even more apparent at higher levels of compulsivity” ( 1994, p.54). The conclusions 
drawn in this study are limited by the use of relatively smaU samples of students, at 
least in terms of generalising to OCD. But more importantly, no attempt is made to 
measure or control for levels of anxiety or depression, mood states known to correlate 
with measures of perfectionism. It is not possible therefore, fi*om this study to assess 
whether perfectionism was specificaUy related to obsessive-compulsive 
symptomatology rather than other psychopathology which might accompany obsessive- 
compulsive problems (remembering that OCD has high co-morbidity with anxiety and 
depression, [Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992] ).
A fiirther problem with this study relates to use of the MPS with obsessive-compulsive 
populations. Frost and his colleagues, in their development of the MPS (Frost et al, 
1990 and 1991), point out that the Doubt over Actions subscale is composed of items 
taken fi’om the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (MOCI, Hodgson and 
Rachman, 1977). This is a widely used scale designed to measure obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms in both non-clinical and clinical populations. That is, doubt about the quality
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of ones actions is considered by Frost et al. to be a specific dimension in perfectionism 
whilst also constituting a key feature of OCD. Later studies like that done by Frost et 
al. (1994), which utilise the MPS to measure perfectionism in obsessive-compulsive 
samples, encounter a serious problem since the two scales will inevitably overlap 
through the Doubt over Actions subscale. To compound the problem. Frost et al. used 
the MOCI to identify their obsessive-compulsive group. The Doubt over Action 
subscale cannot logically be used to measure perfectionism in OCD samples, and yet 
such an analysis appears in several studies in this field.
Gershuny and Sher (1995) used the MPS in their study of compulsive checkers. 
However, they noted the problem of content overlap with the MOCI, and used only the 
dimensions of Concem over Mistakes, Personal Standards and Parental Expectations 
to arrive at a total score, since they judged these to represent a more general 
expression of the trait of perfectionism. Utilising a population of undergraduates, 
screened using the MOCI checking subscale, they found that checkers were 
significantly more perfectionist than a group of anxious controls and a group of non- 
anxious controls. Since the checking group did not differ from the anxious group on 
measures of state-trait anxiety or depression, the authors argue for a specific 
relationship between perfectionism and obsessive checking. Once again the conclusions 
are limited in their generalisability by the use of a non-clinical population and, in this 
case the inclusion of checking problems only. However, as the authors point out, there 
is evidence that obsessive-compulsive problems lie on a continuum and so they argue 
that non-clinical studies of tightly defined psychological phenomena can lead to a better 
understanding of obsessive-compulsive disorder.
Ferrari (1995) included a clinical sample in his study of perfectionism and obsessions 
and compulsions. Using the Perfectionism Cognitions Inventory (PCI), this study found 
an association between perfectionist thinking and obsessive-compulsive tendencies. 
However, as the author notes, there are several limitations to the research. In 
particular, the clinical sample was self-selected fi-om a support organisation, and there 
was no control for anxiety or depression. As Ferrari points out, the PCI is related to
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anxiety disorders in general, which weakens the evidence for a specific link with 
obsessional problems.
Rhéaume and colleagues (1995) suggested that perfectionism has an important role in 
OCD, noted the lack of empirical evidence, and reported on a study which measured 
several traits including perfectionism and obsessionality in a large sample of nonclinical 
students. The results showed a relationship between MPS scores and obsessional- 
compulsive symptoms measured by the Padua Inventory. The Doubt about Actions and 
Concem over Mistakes MPS subscales were most highly correlated with obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms. The only subscale not correlated with the Padua Inventory was 
Organisation, a subscale ofl;en omitted fi-om MPS research as it does not appear to be a 
core component of perfectionism (accordmg to the scale’s own authors. Frost et al., 
1990). A hierarchical regression analysis was also conducted which suggested that 
even when other variables such as responsibility were partiaUed out, perfectionism stUl 
explained a significant part of the variance of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. In 
common with many other studies, this work used a student sample which weakens its 
generalisability to OCD, and again, no controls for anxiety or depression were 
included. The authors also comment on the limitations of the MPS in some detail. Their 
factor analysis of the scale suggested that it had a more unstable factorial stmcture than 
previously reported. Furthermore, they question the relevance of many of the subscales 
to a definition of perfectionism (for example the developmental nature of the two 
parental subscales) and conclude that multidimensional scales such as the MPS do not 
adequately address the fundamental nature of perfectionism that leads to 
psychopathology that is, a self-referential belief in, and search for, the perfect state. 
This study concluded that perfectionism plays a significant and underestimated role in 
obsessional problems, and the authors assert that perfectionism should be corrected in 
clinical treatments of OCD. However, it also stressed that “perfectionism may not be 
specific to OCD, but may represent a necessary but insufficient trait for development of 
OCD” (Rhéaume et al., 1995, p.793).
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Frost and Steketee (1997) addressed the need for clinical populations and control 
groups in their recent study of perfectionism and OCD. They compared 35 clinically 
diagnosed OCD patients with a group of 14 patients diagnosed with panic disorder 
with agoraphobia (PDA) and a group of 35 community controls. Using a compulsive 
activity checklist and the MPS, this study found that both OCD and PDA patients 
scored higher in perfectionism than community controls but that the two clinical groups 
did not differ from each other in terms of total perfectionism scores. Indeed the only 
MPS subscale which distinguished OCD from PDA patients was Doubt about Actions. 
The authors make minor reference to the confound problem with this particular 
subscale but omit to point out that it consists of MOCI questions, and still suggest that 
it represents some feature of perfectionism that differentiates OCD patients from other 
anxiety disorders. Overall, this study supports only a non-specific relationship between 
OCD and perfectionism, and goes some way to refuting the model of McFall and 
WoUersheim which places perfectionism in such a prominent role in the condition. 
However, the conclusions are limited by smaU sample size and lack of control for mood 
state.
Frost and Steketee’s study is important in being the first to include weU defined clinical 
groups with different disorders for comparison. Antony and coUeagues (1998) also 
compared a range of clinical diagnoses, including OCD, in their study of perfectionism 
across the anxiety disorders. SpecificaUy, patients with social phobia, OCD, panic 
disorder and specific phobia and a nonclinical control group were compared on 
measures of perfectionism and depression. The results repUcated Frost and Steketee’s 
(1997) findings with OCD being associated with higher scores relative to the anxiety 
groups (except for social phobia) on Doubt about Actions. However, when compared 
with the non-patient control group OCD patients differed only on Concem over 
Mistakes and Doubt about Actions. This is in contrast to much of the previous research 
which shows a more robust difference in perfectionism between OCD and normal 
controls. Antony and his co-workers point out that further research is needed to better 
understand the precise relationships between different dimensions of perfectionism and 
the anxiety disorders. The study was limited in that, whUe OCD was diagnosed
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according to DSM-IV, no standardised measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
was administered to the clinical groups. Also, the study measured levels of depression 
and found that the groups differed on this measure, but did not then control for this 
finding. Thus the results are somewhat inconclusive.
The research on OCD and perfectionism suggests that the link between the two is far 
firom simple. Several studies show that people with OCD are more perfectionist than 
the normal population but there is, as yet, no clear evidence for a specific relationship. 
The research in this field suffers many limitations, and so fiirther studies are required to 
properly assess the part perfectionism plays in obsessive-compulsive problems.
Guilt
Guilt is widely viewed as characteristic of patients with obsessive-compulsive 
problems, and it has long been thought that associated traits such as moral rigidity or 
sensitivity underpin a variety of obsessive-compulsive concerns such as safety, 
cleanliness, control of taboo or blasphemous thoughts and so on (Rachman and 
Hodgson, 1980; Rachman, 1993; Steketee et al., 1991). Klass (1987), who has 
researched the emotional trait extensively, defines guilt as;
“an aversive conscious emotion that involves self-reproach and remorse for one’s 
thoughts, feelings, or actions and a sense of wrongdoing, as if one has violated moral 
principle” (1987, p. 36).
Whilst Klass has not researched guilt and OCD directly, she has developed an 
assessment tool for measuring guilt, the Situational Guilt Scale (Klass, 1987), which is 
widely used in cognitive-behavioural research. Guilt is regarded as an affective trait but 
also encompasses cognitive features, such as beliefs about right and wrong. In the 
present study, guilt will subsumed under the heading of a cognitive trait for ease of
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discussion and comparision with the two other traits (perfectionism and responsibility) 
being considered.
McFall and WoUersheim (1979) afford guUt an important part in their cognitive- 
behavioural model of OCD. They posit that primary appraisals made in OCD include 
the belief that certain thoughts and feelings are unacceptable, and should be punished. 
Experiencing these unacceptable impulses then leads to guUt, and compulsions are, at 
least in part, a way of reducing or avoiding the risk of being found culpable for 
potentiaUy catastrophic outcomes. More recently, van Oppen and Amtz (1993) have 
suggested a similar process exists in OCD whereby the sufferer tries to avoid a 
depressive position of feeling guilty, worthless or a failure, by performing rituals.
The importance placed on guUt in OCD is reflected in the inclusion of guUt as an 
‘associated feature’in the DSM-IV description of the disorder (APA, 1994). However, 
there is a paucity of research demonstrating such a relationship. It is weU documented 
that high levels of guUt are associated with other forms of psychopathology, 
particularly depression (Jarrett and Weissenburger, 1990), but the evidence for a link 
with OCD is mixed. Steketee, Grayson and Foa (1987) compared a group of OCD 
patients with a group of anxiety-disordered patients on a number of dimensions 
including guilt. Patients were required to choose applicable adjectives from a list of 
self-descriptors such as ‘inadequate, stupid, guilty’. No standardised measures of guüt 
were used. Whilst the authors claimed that their OCD group showed a greater 
tendency towards guilt and self-blame than the anxiety-disordered group, the results 
are far from conclusive. The groups differed on several important dimensions such as 
depression which was not taken into account in the analysis, and the finding that 
patients with Generalised Anxiety Disorder had higher levels of checking and similar 
levels of guilt compared to the OCD group weakens the conclusions stfll further. 
Steketee, Quay and White (1991) also used clinical populations to investigate religion 
and guüt in OCD patents. Using the Situational Guilt Scale they found that OCD 
patients were not significantly more guilty than other anxious patients. They did, 
however, find that guilt was positively correlated with greater obsessive-compulsive
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symptoms, but not with moodstate, arguing for some specific association between guilt 
and OCD. Unfortunately they did not look at symptom severity and guilt in the anxiety 
group to assess the specificity of the relationship. A final clinical study provides some 
indirect evidence for a link between guilt and OCD. Amir, Cashman and Foa (1997) 
compared patients with OCD with non-patient controls and found that self-punishment 
strategies (an example being T get angry at myseif for having the thought’) were the 
strongest discriminators of OCD patients and controls. Clearly the notion of seif- 
punishment is closely related to guüt, though no direct measures of the trait were used.
Studies using non-clinical populations have provided some supportive evidence for the 
role of guüt m OCD. Nüer and Beck(1989) examined the relationship between 
intrusive thoughts and guüt m a coUege sample. They found that the fi*equency of 
intrusive thoughts, their dismissabüity and levels of distress were best predicted by guüt 
rather than levels of anxiety or depression. Reynolds and Salkovskis (1991) attempted 
to replicate these findings, but their study, using a large sample of students, found that 
guüt did not independently predict intrusive thoughts. Instead, anxiety and depression 
were the strongest predictors. Freeston et al. (1992), in another non-clinical study, 
examined the relationships between several dimensions of cognitive intrusions 
(including guüt), and compulsive, depressive and anxious symptoms. The only 
significant predictor of compulsive activity scores was a factor the authors describe as 
‘Evaluation’. This factor incorporates the dimensions of responsibility, disapproval and 
guüt. FinaUy, Frost et al. (1994) found that ‘subclinical obsessive-compulsive’ students 
(defined by scoring above an arbitrary cut-off on OCD measures) scored significantly 
higher on the Situational Guüt Scale than a noncompulsive sample. This study points to 
an association between guüt and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, but is limited by the 
absence of controls for anxiety and depression and, in common with aU the non-clinical 
studies, its generalisation fi-om student samples to obsessive-compulsive disorder.
In summary, there is a smaU but growing body of research which indicates that there is 
some sort of relationship between guüt and OCD, though the evidence is conflicting. 
These studies, however, are limited by numerous methodological problems, and have
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failed to determine whether guilt is specific to obsessive-compulsive symptoms or if it 
accompanies other anxiety states as well.
Research on perfectionism and guilt lend some support to the hypotheses proposed by 
McFall and WoUersheim in their model of obsessive-compulsive disorder. However, 
both traits need a great deal more investigation before their role in OCD is properly 
understood.
Salkovskis’ responsibility model of obsessive-compulsive disorder
McFall and Wollersheim’s model of OCD has been criticised by Salkovskis, a 
prominent researcher and author in the field of obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Salkovskis (1985) describes this model as an attempt at ‘bridging the gap’ between 
behavioural and psychoanalytic theory. He is critical of what he sees as psychodynamic 
concepts such as the ‘preconscious’ (although McFall and WoUersheim distinguish 
between this and the unconscious of psychoanalytic theory). He also remarks that the 
primary and secondary appraisal processes are not elaborated upon in terms of what 
cognitive or behavioural manifestations the appraisals might predict. Thus, Salkovskis’ 
main criticism is that the model of McFall and WoUersheim does not distinguish 
between OCD and other anxiety disorders. He has proposed and developed his own 
theory which claims to explain the wide range of clinical phenomena associated with 
OCD (Salkovskis, 1985).
Salkovskis (1985, 1996) has proposed a cognitive model of OCD which starts fi-om the 
premise that people suffering from obsessions do so because they make negative 
appraisals of their intrusive thoughts, images or impulses. This part of his model 
derives firom general cognitive models of anxiety whereby a negative emotional 
response to a stimulus (thought, situation or event) results fi-om a person’s negative 
misinterpretation of that stimulus. In particular, Salkovskis proposes that OCD 
sufferers interpret the occurrence and/or content of their intrusions as indicating that
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they are in danger of bringing harm to themselves or others. That is, they believe that 
they are potentially responsible for such harm. Salkovskis uses the term responsibility 
in a specific way in the context of OCD and defines it as follows:
“The belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively 
crucial negative outcomes” (Salkovskis, 1996).
This appraisal of personal responsibility has a number of important effects. Salkovskis 
proposes that it precipitates increased discomfort, anxiety and depression, results in 
efforts to control or suppress the intrusive thoughts and, crucially, leads the person to 
engage in “neutralising” responses in an attempt to avoid or discharge their perceived 
responsibilities. Neutralising includes both overt behaviours such as checking and 
washing, and covert responses such as mental checking and restitution responses (e.g. 
putting things right by repeatedly saying prayers or ‘good thoughts’).Thus Salkovskis 
argues that compulsive behaviours in OCD are neutralising responses which reduce 
discomfort in the short term, but which increase preoccupation and the frequency of 
further intrusive thoughts in the long term. He argues that neutralising causes intrusive 
thoughts to become more salient and frequent, evoking further discomfort and 
prompting even more neutralising efforts.
This ‘responsibility appraisal’ is afforded a crucial role in Salkovskis’ model. It is 
claimed to be a defining characteristic of obsessive-compulsive disorder. The 
responsibility component “distinguishes obsessional cognitions from anxious and 
depressed cognitions” (Salkovskis, 1996, p. 112). The concept has caught the 
imagination of many researchers in the field and is afforded a key position in the OCD 
Cognitions Working Group (1997) document on important beliefs in OCD. A 
pathological sense of responsibility is also included in the DSM-IV description of 
OCD, being considered an associated feature of the disorder (APA, 1994). 
Unfortunately there is little direct evidence that responsibility appraisals do indeed 
characterise obsessive-compulsive problems. Even in a very recent paper which 
presents this model in some detail (Salkovskis, 1998), empirical evidence is noticeable
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by its absence. There are, however, some studies which have addressed the notion of 
inflated or excessive responsibility, and these will be described here in brief.
TaUis (1994), in common with many authors (Rachman, 1993), asserts that clinical 
observations support the significance of responsibility in obsessional phenomena. He 
provides case reports of OCD patients in which inflated responsibility (as well as guilt 
and thought-action fusion) appear to be central themes in the presentation. Purdon and 
Clark (1994) used self-report questionnaires and a student sample to explore the 
relationship between intrusive thoughts, and cognitive appraisals. They found that 
concem that one’s mtmsive negative thought would come tme had a significant 
association with the thought’s controllability and firequency. The authors concluded 
that this supports the role of inflated responsibility in obsessional intrusions, as they 
argue that people’s belief in their capacity to act on an intmsive thought is an important 
and necessary aspect of inflated responsibility. This indirect evidence is weakened by 
the same study’s findings that their measure of responsibility was not an important 
predictor of controllability. The authors suggest that the problem lies in the wording of 
their questionnaire item on responsibility, regard responsibility as a difficult feature to 
assess, and thus conclude that individuals may hold “rather idiosyncratic views on what 
it means to be responsible” (p. 281).
Rhéaume, Ladouceur, Freeston and Letarte (1994) developed a self-report 
questionnaire, using a semi-idiographic design, to explore perceived responsibility in 
personally relevant situations. The development of the responsibility questionnaire (the 
RQ) was an attempt to empirically test the validity of a definition of responsibility 
which closely matches that of Salkovskis. In this case the definition is “the belief that 
one possesses pivotal power to provoke or prevent subjective cmcial negative 
outcomes” (p. 266). Responsibility was measured along a number of domains including 
severity, probability, influence and pivotal influence. Measures of anxiety and 
depression, as well as obsessive-compulsive symptoms, thoughts and beliefs were also 
included. A large sample of student volunteers took part in the study, which found that 
responsibility was most strongly correlated with obsessive-compulsive symptoms but
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only weakly correlated to anxiety and depression. The authors concluded that the RQ 
showed good convergent and discriminant validity, and that the results support 
Salkovskis’ cognitive model of OCD. Some of the results, however, weakened this 
conclusion, as the RQ did not correlate with beliefs about obsessions or compulsive 
activities. The use of a non-clinical sample was justified by the research on analogue 
studies in OCD, but the authors do comment on the inherent difficulty in accessing 
responsibility behefs in non-clinical samples when these beliefs are by definition 
associated with clinical disturbance. A further study by the same authors, utilising the 
same student sample, looked at the RQ in more detail and concluded that pivotal 
influence (one of the RQ domains) was the best predictor of the overall responsibility 
score (Rhéaume et al., 1995). This ‘responsibility schema’, represented by the pivotal 
influence finding, is therefore considered central to OCD. The study is limited again by 
its reliance on a non-clinical sample. The authors comment that these findings need to 
be replicated, especially with a clinical population, to confirm the presence of a 
responsibility schema.
Another study by Rhéaume and his colleagues (Rhéaume et al., 1995) looked at the 
relationship between responsibility, perfectionism and obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
in a sample of 245 students. No controls for mood were included. They found that two 
measures of responsibility were moderately related to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
However, they regard the results as only partially supportive of Salkovskis’ model of 
OCD, since they found perfectionism to be independently important in predicting 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms and this trait does not feature in Salkovskis’ analysis 
ofOCD.
A study by Scarrabelotti and colleagues (Scarrabelotti et al., 1995), which addresses 
responsibility in a slightly different context, looked at the relationship between 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, depression, responsibility (measured using a scale 
developed by the authors for this study) and Eysenckian personality dimensions. Using 
a student sample, the authors found that neuroticism and responsibility each accounted 
for a significant amount of variance in predicting obsessive-compulsive symptoms, over
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and above depression. They also conducted the same study on a small clinical sample 
of 20 patients diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder, with the same results. 
Interestingly, they propose that responsibihty is a dimension of psychoticism (in 
Eysenckian terms) and as such, the two traits should be inversely correlated. The 
studies described here lend some support to this notion, but this conceptualisation of 
responsibility has not been followed up by other researchers in the field. It is difficult to 
draw strong conclusions about the role of responsibility in this study, as the scale used 
here was developed by the authors according to a wider definition than that proposed 
by Salkovskis (1985). The scale includes items relating to beliefs about thought control 
and thought-action fusion as well as responsibihty for harm. However, the study is one 
of the few to measure responsibihty in a clinical population, and thus offers some 
tentative support for Salkovskis’ model.
Lopatka and Rachman (1995) took a different approach to testing the responsibihty 
hypothesis, by direct experimental manipulation of levels of responsibihty in a clinical 
sample. They sought to test a central notion in Salkovskis’ model, that perceived 
responsibihty has a direct effect on compulsive checking (i.e. checking is a form of 
neutralising behaviour initiated in response to responsibihty appraisals about intrusive 
thoughts). Patients were exposed to situations in which they normahy checked or 
cleaned and responsibihty was manipulated by exphcit instructions and a ‘contract’ 
which emphasised that high responsibihty was placed on the patient, or in another 
condition, on the therapist. The study was carefiihy designed with ‘blind’ pre- and 
post-assessments, structured clinical interviews and control conditions. The results 
confirmed that the experimental manipulation produced significant shifts in 
responsibihty in the expected direction, but only when responsibihty was decreased (in 
which case the urge to check went down). Increased responsibihty did not result in an 
increased urge to check. Cleaning compulsions were less influenced by responsibihty 
manipulations overah than checking. The authors suggest that their study provides 
partial support for Salkovskis’ model, but point out that there is a need for a 
dependable measure of responsibihty in future research, which wih clarify the nature of
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responsibility, particularly with regard to whether it is a stable trait or better construed 
as a situation-specific response.
Following on from this study of directly manipulated responsibility, Shafran (1997) 
proposed that a more ‘naturalistic’ manipulation could arise by leaving participant 
alone during exposure conditions (high responsibility) compared to exposure with the 
experimenter present (low responsibility). Her study involved 40 volunteers diagnosed 
with OCD entering both high and low responsibility conditions. Verbal analogue scales 
were used to determine how responsible each participant felt in the exposure situation. 
The results supported Shafran’s hypothesis that perceived responsibility would be 
higher when alone and would lead to greater discomfort and urges to check. The 
author points out however, that other cognitions may have been manipulated in the 
study and could arguably account for the findings. For example, increased estimation of 
probability of risk or danger expectancies may have been confounding variables.
Whilst these studies provide some support for the role of responsibility in OCD, other 
research has challenged this notion. O’Kearney (1993) describes a case report of a 
woman with obsessional thoughts where beliefs about responsibility were not in 
evidence, but fear of losing control of her thoughts was predominant. O’Kearney 
concludes that other psychological factors may be important in the etiology and 
maintenance of OCD, and cautions against placing too much emphasis on 
responsibility. He also argues that the definition of responsibility and its links to 
neutralising require fiirther clarification. Other studies too, have noted complex 
relationships between obsessional thoughts and neutralising responses, which challenge 
Salkovskis’ model. Freeston and Ladouceur (1997) found, in an analysis of strategies 
used by OCD patients in response to their obsessional thoughts, that only a proportion 
of the strategies were attempts to decrease perceived responsibility. The authors argue 
that many types of appraisals are implicated in the development of OCD, for example 
need for control and perfectionism, as well as responsibility. Other researchers have 
made the same point, that there is empirical evidence for other OCD-related appraisals 
which may be just as crucial as responsibility. Rachman et. al., (1995) consider that
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thought-action fusion, as well as guilt and responsibility, are key factors in OCD, whilst 
Jones and Menzies (1997) argue that their more recent study supports a danger-based 
model of OCD. In their research a group of OCD patients were exposed to a 
contamination task and cognitive and behavioural measures were made of the patients’ 
responses to the exposure. Responsibility was assessed by a single question about how 
responsible they would feel if harm befell them or others following ‘contamination’. 
Danger expectancy was the only mediating variable which correlated with increased 
neutralising behaviours. The study was important in its emphasis on experimental 
method and use of robust behavioural measures, but the conclusions are severely 
limited by the way responsibility was measured, and the lack of controls for anxiety and 
depression.
Research on the responsibility model of OCD presents a mixed picture. Clinical 
observations and case reports strongly support the idea of excessive responsibility in 
obsessive-compulsive patients, and there is some empirical evidence to suggest that the 
trait does show a relationship to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. However the 
research is limited by a number of drawbacks. Researchers have used differing 
methodologies, and many of the responsibility measures devised have not been 
standardised. The use of non-clinical samples, lack of control or comparison groups are 
further problems with recent research. Salkovskis claims that inflated responsibility is 
specific to obsessive-compulsive problems, although other writers have questioned this 
view (Jakes, 1989), and yet there is no study which tests this basic assumption by 
comparing perceived responsibility in different disorders. The proposal that 
responsibility is central to the development of OCD is also as yet unproven. As 
outlined above, some studies suggest that other cognitive biases may be equally or 
more important than responsibility in explaining obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
There is clearly an urgent need for empirical research to address this issue.
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Current status of cognitive-behavioural models of OCD
There is a wealth of literature on postulated cognitive deficits or biases in obsessive- 
compulsive disorder, but little consensus on a specific theory which can encompass all 
these findings. The place of responsibility in cognitive-behavioural models of OCD 
remains unclear. Salkovskis is critical of the appraisals proposed by McFall and 
Wollersheim (1979) since he claims they do not distinguish OCD from other disorders, 
and yet his ideas about responsibility overlap considerably with their ‘primary 
appraisals’ in OCD. The primary appraisal that “one is powerful enough to initiate or 
prevent the occurrence of disastrous outcomes” (McFall and Wollersheim, 1979, 
p.335), corresponds closely to Salkovskis’ notion of responsibility being “power which 
is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes” (1997, 
p.212). Jakes (1989), in his own critique of Salkovskis’ cognitive-behavioural 
formulation, comments that one might argue that McFall and Wollersheim did 
anticipate most of Salkovskis’ arguments. However, McFall and Wollersheim proposed 
that there are several cognitive appraisals forming a ‘constellation of unreasonable 
ideas’, which contribute to obsessive-compulsive thinking, whereas Salkovskis places 
primary importance on responsibihty.
The hterature tends to support a multi-factorial model in terms of explaining the variety 
of cognitive processes found to be related to OCD. Whether McFah and WoUersheims’ 
set of appraisal biases is the most parsimonious formulation remains to be estabhshed 
by empirical testing. Their particular model has not been subject to empirical 
evaluation, however, the notion that a set of traits whose inter-relationship might best 
explain the development and maintenance of OCD, is considered by many writers to be 
a useful way of conceptualising the condition. Rhéaume et al. (1995), for example, 
propose that responsibihty and perfectionism are key cognitive biases in OCD, whhst 
Rachman (1997) considers that responsibihty and guilt as weh as other cognitive 
processes such as thought-action fusion, play a role in the condition. The precise ‘mix’ 
of cognitive styles and the relative importance of each factor is far fi*om clear. Such a 
sophisticated analysis requires much empirical research and theory-buhding. However,
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McFall and WoUersheims’ model gives some direction to researchers in that it 
highhghts those appraisals which intuitively seem related, and which have at least some 
empirical support. Thus one would predict that perfectionism, guilt and responsibility, 
which are closely linked to their four primary appraisals, would be related to obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms and should distinguish people with OCD from those with other 
types of disorder. There have been very few studies which, in assessing these traits, 
have included a clinical comparison group to begin to address the question of 
specificity in OCD cognitions. Just as importantly, few studies have consistently 
included measures of anxiety and depression and controUed for these, despite the fact 
that these factors are known to relate to many cognitive traits independently of levels 
of obsessive-compulsive symptomatology (Reynolds and Salkovskis, 1991; 
Scarrabelotti et al., 1995).
The study presented here was conducted in order to compare the levels of 
perfectionism, responsibihty and guilt in two clinical samples. It was predicted that 
these appraisal biases would be present to a greater degree in OCD patients compared 
to patients with other anxiety disorders. The study was also designed to address the 
relationship between these three traits and levels of depression, anxiety and obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms across aU patients, and it was hypothesised that levels of 
perfectionism, responsibihty and guht would be positively related to obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms.
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Method
Participants
Participants in the study were 47 patients who ranged from 19 to 68 years of age. All 
were attending a specialist mental health centre for treatment.
The OCD group contained 9 males and 12 females diagnosed with OCD. Ten patients 
suffered mainly with contamination fears, 8 with checking symptoms and 2 with other 
types of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. The anxiety disorder (AD) group contained 
6 males and 20 females diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. This included 10 patients 
with panic disorder, 8 with generalised anxiety disorder, 6 with specific phobia and 2 
patients with social phobia. A ‘normal’ control group of people without any anxiety 
diagnosis was not included in this study, since the specific focus was on comparing 
different clinical groups to establish whether they differed from each other in the 
expected direction on the traits of interest.
All patients had been assessed and received a diagnosis by the mental health 
professional in charge of their care. To ensure that diagnoses conformed to DSM-IV 
criteria, all patients’ casenotes were reviewed. In addition, the professional keyworker 
involved with each patient was interviewed to confirm that the assessment and 
diagnosis given in the notes fulfilled the relevant DSM-IV criteria. All eligible 
presenting patients were recruited until target numbers were achieved. Patients were 
invited to participate in the study if their main diagnosis was either OCD or one of the 
following anxiety disorders: social phobia, panic disorder (with or without 
agoraphobia), generalised anxiety disorder, or specific phobias. Patients with evidence 
of psychosis, substance misuse or learning difficulties were not included in the study. 
All participating patients gave their consent according to ethical committee guidelines.
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Regarding sample size in this study, a power analysis was performed at the design 
stage to assess the sample size required. For Mest analyses, a total sample of 42 would 
ensure a power value of 0.7, whilst for correlational analyses a minimum total sample 
of 49 would be required to achieve the same degree of power. Because of the clinical 
nature of this research, there were limits on the number of appropriate patients who 
could participate, and therefore the final sample size obtained was 47. Thus, /-test 
analyses were sufficiently powerful, whilst the correlations approached a satisfactory 
level for the purposes of this study.
Measures
Participants were asked to complete the following measures.
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS, Snaith & Zigmond, 1994). The 
HADS is a 14-item questionnaire consisting of two subscales, one measuring 
generalised state anxiety (HAD-A), and one measuring depression (HAD-D), which are 
scored separately. The HADS is quick and easy to complete and has good validity and 
reliability. The scores for each subscale range from 0 to 21, with interpretive categories 
of normal (0 to 7), mild (8 to 10), moderate (11 to 14) and severe (15 to 21).
The Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (MOCI, Hodgson & Rachman, 
1977). This is a 30-item true/false measure of obsessive-compulsive symptoms, widely 
used in OCD research and demonstrating good reliability and validity. A total score 
measuring obsessional-compulsive complaints was analysed. The possible range of 
scores was 0 to 30, with a high score indicating a more severe degree of obsessional- 
compulsive symptoms.
The Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale (MPS, Frost et al., 1990). The MPS 
consists of 29 items which are scored on a five-point scale. A total perfectionism score 
is calculated with a possible range of 29 to 145, with a higher score indicating a higher 
level of perfectionism. As well as a total score, subscores are obtained for the following
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five subscales. Concern over Mistakes reflects negative reactions to mistakes. Personal 
Standards relates to the setting of very high standards and the excessive importance 
placed on these. Parental Expectations reflects the perception that ones’ parents set 
very high standards. Parental Criticism relates to excessive criticism from parents, and 
Doubts about Actions reflects the extent to which people doubt their ability to 
accomplish tasks. It has been noted in several studies that the Doubt Over Actions 
subscale of the MPS has considerable overlap with items on the MOCI, and may reflect 
checking symptoms in OCD ( e.g. Frost and Steketee, 1997; Gershuny and Sher, 
1995). To avoid overlap, and possible statistical problems of multicollinearity, the 
Doubt Over Actions subscale was not included in the total perfectionism score in the 
correlation analyses.
The Situational Guilt Scale (SOS, Klass, 1987). The SGS is a 22 item questionnaire 
which assesses degree of expected guilt feelings in specific, naturally occuring 
situations. It yields scores for total guilt, and for three subscales of guilt over 
interpersonal harmdoing, norm violation and failures of self-control. Total possible 
guilt scores range from 88 to 440, with a higher score indicating higher levels of guilt. 
All three subscales were included here. Validation studies support the reliability and 
validity of the SGS.
Responsibility Questionnaire (RQ, Rhéaume et al., 1994). The RQ consists of a 14- 
page booklet, each page outlining a different OCD-relevant target situation. The 
patient is required to describe a possible negative outcome and then rate this outcome 
on six dimensions: severity, probability, influence, pivotal influence, responsibility and 
relevance. Each dimension is scored on a 9 point scale. The responsibility subscale is 
the dimension of particular interest in the present study, and, in common with other 
studies, the responsibility total score is the only one to be reported here. The range of 
possible scores on this subscale is 14 to 126, with a higher score indicating a higher 
dgree of sense of responsibility. The RQ is a semi-idiographic measure which has 
demonstrated reasonable reliability, and concurrent and discriminant validity.
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Procedure
Participants were given a pack containing the five questionnaires and an information 
sheet, and were asked to complete the measures in their own time. The pack was then 
returned by post or by hand to the researcher. All those patients who were asked to 
participate agreed to complete the measures.
Data Analysis
Reliability analyses for all scales in the study were computed using Chronbach’s alpha 
coefficient. The two samples (OCD group and AD group) were compared in the 
following way. Since gender and medication measures are nominal in nature, 2x2 Chi- 
square tests were used to examine differences between the groups on these variables. 
For the remaining demographic variables, the distribution of scores were examined to 
assess degree of skewtosis and kurtosis and approximation to a normal distribution. 
Age was then analysed using /-tests, while a Mann Whitney U test was applied to 
education and duration, as these variables did not conform to a normal distribution. All 
questionnaire variables were acceptably close to a normal distribution, and so /-tests 
were used to compare samples on anxiety, depression, obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms, perfectionism, responsibility and guilt. Tests of significance were two-tailed 
in all cases.
Associations between anxiety, depression, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, 
perfectionism, responsibility and guilt were analysed across samples using Pearson 
correlation coefficients. To examine further the relationship between obsessionality, 
perfectionism, responsibility and guilt whilst controlling for levels of anxiety and 
depression, partial correlations and a sequential linear regression analysis were 
performed combining patients from both samples.
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Results
Reliability Analysis
A reliability analysis was performed on each of the questionnaires used in the study, 
combining patients from both samples, and Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for each 
measure are reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for all measures
Questionnaire alpha
HAD(total) 0.90
MOCI 0.84
MPS(total) 0.95
SGS(total) 0.97
RQ 0.89
It can be seen from Table 1 that all these alphas are high, indicating that all the scales 
were internally reliable.
Group Data Analysis
Analyses were conducted to check that the two patient groups were equivalent on 
certain demographic and medical history variables. The Chi-square analysis for gender 
is presented in Table 2, and the analysis for medication is shown in Table 3. The two 
groups did not differ significantly in terms of proportions of males and females, or the 
proportion on psychotropic medication (in all cases the medication involved was a form 
of anti-depressant).
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Table 2. Distribution of men and women in each group
OCD
group
AD
group
corrected
X^ * df P
male 9 6 2.09 1.28 1 0.26
female 12 20
Total 21 26
^ —= Correction for continuity when df = 1
Table 3. Proportion of those on medication in each group
OCD
group
AD
group X^
corrected
X^ df P
medication 14 10 3.70 2.66 1 0.10
nomed 7 16
Total 21 26
Table 4 presents means and standard deviations for the two groups for the 
demographic variables of age, education and duration of illness. Age is reported in 
years, education is measured in years of fixU-time education, and duration in months 
since diagnosed with illness.
Table 4. Demographic characteristics of the two groups
Variable OCD group (N =21) 
Mean SD
AD group (N = 26) 
Mean SD
Age 43.1 13.6 36.7 12.8
Education 12.2 2.9 12.3 2.1
Duration 189.5 174.7 105.5 108.1
The two groups were not significantly different in terms of age ( / = 1.64, df 45, 
p <  1.11), education level ( Mann-Whitney U = 240.00, p  < 0.46), or duration of 
illness ( Mann-Whitney U = 193.00, p <  0.09).
Differences between the two groups on the psychological measures were evaluated 
using /-tests. (Whilst several t-tests were performed here, it was not considered 
necessary to use a correction as the number of tests is not excessive, and the 
differences of interest in this study are relatively large). Means, standard deviations and 
/-test results for the questionnaires and their subscales are given in Table 5.
Table 5. Questionnaire results for OCD and Anxiety Disorder groups
Variable OCD
(N = 
Mean
group 
 21) 
SD
AD group 
(N = 26)* 
Mean SD / df P
HAD-A 13.6 3.9 13.2 4.7 0.35 45 0.72
HAD-D 9.5 5.0 7.5 5.5 1.29 45 0.20
MOCI 15,2 5.4 10.4 5.3 3.07 45 0.00
MPS - total 91.1 21.2 82.6 20.2 1.40 45 0.17
Concern over mistakes 27.4 8.6 25.3 7.4 0.91 45 0.37
Personal Standards 22.9 5.9 22.4 4.9 0.33 45 0.74
Parental Expectations 14.2 5.3 12.7 4.6 1.10 45 0.28
Parental Criticism 11.6 4.7 9.6 4.1 1.50 45 0.14
Doubt About Actions 14.8 2.5 12.5 4.1 2.30 45 0.03
SGS - total 316.8 62.5 293.3 65.9 1.24 45 0.21
Interpersonal Harm 128.2 26.1 120.7 25.7 0.99 45 0.34
Norm-violation 78.1 17.0 76.1 18.3 0.50 45 0.62
Self-control failure 82.1 17.9 71.6 20.9 1.83 45 0.07
RQ 79.0 22.4 76.0 20.6 0.47 44 0.64
* N = 25 for the AD group on the RQ scale as one patient omitted an item on this questionnaire.
There were no significant differences in levels of anxiety or depression between the two 
groups. As expected, the OCD group reported significantly more obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms on the MOCI than the Anxiety Disorder group. The two groups did not 
differ on the responsibility scale or any of the guilt subscales. There was no significant 
difference between the groups on total perfectionism scores, but they did differ on one 
perfectionism subscale. Doubt Over Actions.
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To explore the relations among constructs in more depth the two groups were 
combined for the following analyses.
Correlation Analyses
Table 6 presents Pearson correlations between levels of obsessional-compulsive 
symptoms, anxiety, depression, responsibility, perfectionism and guilt. (The Doubt 
Over Actions sub scale is omitted from the MPS total scores reported from now on 
since these items overlap with items on the MOCI. The reliability analysis of the 
revised MPS scores based on 25 items was alpha = 0.94, and the scores approximated 
to a normal distribution).
Table 6. Pearson correlations for the six questionnaire scales
HAD-A HAD-D MOCI MPS SGS
HAD-A
HAD-D 0.66**
MOCI 0.58** 0.49**
MPS 0.32* 0.37* 0.51**
SGS 0.42** 0.29* 0.33* 0.45**
RQ 0.46** 0.38** 0.46** 0.55** 0.58**
N = 47, except for RQ correlations where N = 46 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-taüed)
The correlation matrix reveals that all the scales were significantly positively inter­
correlated. A further correlation analysis presented in Table 7 examined the relationship 
between obsessionality (MOCI) and the three traits of interest; perfectionism (MPS 
total and subscales), guilt (SGS), and responsibility (RQ), with the effects of anxiety 
and depression partialled out. The MPS subscales are included to allow a more detailed 
analysis of the relationship between the particular dimensions of perfectionism and 
obsessionality. The dimensions are Concern over Mistakes (MPS-CM), Personal 
Standards (MPS-PS), Parental Expectations (MPS-PE), Parental Criticism (MPS-PC).
I l l
Table 7. Partial correlation coefficients controlling for HAD-A and HAD-D ( df = 42)
MOCI MPS MPS-CM MPS-PS MPS-PE MPS-PC SGS
MOCI
MPS 0.40**
MPS-CM 0.10 0.85**
MPS-PS 0.40** 0.78** 0.60**
MPS-PE 0.46** 0.86** 0.53** 0.53**
MPS-PC 0.45** 0.81** 0.51** 0.41** 0.86**
SGS 0.10 0.37* 0.36* 0.23 0.29 0.35*
RQ 0.25 0.47** 0.42** 0.28 0.45** 0.40** 0.47**
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
With the effects of anxiety and depression controlled for, obsessionality correlated 
significantly and positively with perfectionism, but not with responsibility or guilt. 
Looking at the subscales of the MPS, obsessionality correlated highly with Personal 
Standards, Parental Expectations and Parental Criticism but was not related to Concern 
over Mistakes.
Sequential Multiple Regression Analysis
Tables 8 and 9 present the results of the regression analysis performed on both groups 
of patients combined. Obsessionality (MOCI) was the dependent variable. As anxiety 
was considered likely to be of greatest theoretical importance in terms of predicting 
obsessionality this was entered as the first independent variable. Depression correlated 
highly with anxiety and so to avoid problems of multicollinearity and reduced power, 
depression was not entered into the regression. At the second point of entry, the 
perfectionism subscales, responsibility and guilt were entered as one block of 
independent variables. Since Parental Expectations and Parental Criticism were highly 
correlated these variables were combined before entry into the analysis. The combined 
is coded as MPS-P. Colinearity and residuals diagnostics indicated no problems with 
outliers or colinearity for the final variables included.
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Table 8. Model summary (Dependent Variable: MOCI)
Model Variables
entered
Adjusted 
R Square
F df Sig.
1
2
HAD-A
MPS-CM
MPS-PS
0.33 23.36 45 0.000
MPS-P
SGS
RQ
0.51 8.70 45 0.000
Table 9. Regression Coefficients for Models in Table 8
Model Standardised
Coefficients
Beta
t sig.
1 HAD-A 0.59 4.83 0.00
2 HAD-A 0.55 4.30 0.00
MPS-CM -0.31 -1.96 0.06
MPS-PS 0.32 2.25 0.03
MPS-P 0.36 2.66 0.01
SGS -0.10 -0.70 0.50
RQ 0.14 0.97 0.34
The first step in the analysis reveals that anxiety was a significant predictor of levels of 
obsessionality, and accounted for a large proportion of the variance as indicated by the 
significant Adjusted R Square value. At the second point of entry in the analysis, two 
perfectionism dimensions (Parental Expectations/Criticism and Personal Standards) 
were the only further variables which made a significant contribution to the prediction 
of obsessionality.
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Discussion
This study explored the role of perfectionism, guilt and responsibility in obsessive- 
compulsive disorder. The findings supported the hypothesis that some aspects of 
perfectionism are related to obsessional symptoms, but the results suggested that guilt 
and responsibility may not be distinctive features of the condition. The three traits will 
be addressed in turn, followed by a discussion of methodological problems, 
implications for cognitive models of OCD, and recommendations for future research.
The results of the present study are consistent with reports in the literature suggesting 
that there is a relationship between OCD and perfectionism. However, this relationship 
is not a straightforward one. When comparing clinical groups, OCD patients did not 
differ significantly from anxiety patients on this trait (the significant difference on the 
one subscale Doubt about Actions is disregarded due to major confound problems 
identified in the introduction). The levels of perfectionism in the two clinical groups are 
very similar to those obtained by Frost and Steketee (1997) in their study of 
perfectionism which also found no differences between an OCD sample and an anxiety 
sample, but much higher levels in both groups compared to community controls. Thus 
the OCD patients here appeared to suffer excessively high levels of perfectionism, but 
so did the patients with other anxiety disorders.
The correlation analyses allowed a closer look at the relationship between traits 
without the problems associated with comparing clinical groups, and found that 
perfectionism was correlated with obsessionality, even after controlling for anxiety and 
depression. The MPS subscales which were related to obsessionality were parental 
criticism, parental expectations and personal standards. The regression analysis 
confirmed that these subscales did indeed account for a significant amount of variance 
in levels of obsessionality. These findings build on previous studies which showed 
similar patterns of relationships (Frost et al., 1994; Gershuny and Sher, 1995; Rhéaume 
et al., 1995). These studies all showed a significant relationship between the MPS 
subscales of parental expectations, criticism and personal standards and measures of
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obsessionality. However, they also found that concern over mistakes was significantly 
related, which was not the case in the present study. Most studies of perfectionism 
utilise non-clinical samples and omit controls for mood state. The present study was 
careful to address these issues, and thus the findings reported here represent a useful 
addition to the evidence for a specific role for perfectionism in OCD.
The results on perfectionism support McFall and WoUerheim's model of OCD which 
emphasises the role of this trait in the development of the disorder. Furthermore, the 
pattern of significant MPS subscales obtained here might reveal clues about the 
particular form which perfectionism may take in obsessive-compulsive problems. 
Rachman (1997) has argued that people with OCD suffer "moral perfectionism" 
whereby a strict and rigidly moralistic upbringing leads to excessively harsh self­
judgement. Tallis et al (1996) use the term "moral sensitivity" in discussing obsessional 
traits which, whilst not exclusively relating to perfectionism, again points to a concern 
for high standards along a moral dimension. Thus perfectionism in OCD might be more 
to do with moral standards than with concern over, say, achievement. The cluster of 
personal standards, parental expectations and parental criticism fits with Rachman's 
observations that people who have developed a “tender conscience”, perhaps through a 
morally strict upbringing, are prone to obsessional experiences (Rachman and 
Hodgson, 1980; Rachman, 1998). There is. of course, only limited evidence to support 
the notion of critical or perfectionist parenting in OCD patients, but these findings 
suggest that this parental influence aspect of perfectionism may be worth further 
exploration. The finding that personal standards rather than concern about mistakes is 
related to obsessionality supports the idea that self-referent as opposed to socially- 
referent perfectionism is of most relevance to OCD. Rhéaume et al. (1995) have 
proposed that it is the evaluation made by oneself that is the ultimate criterion for 
judging one’s actions against one’s perfectionist beliefs. They argue that few measures 
of perfectionism capture this aspect of the construct, although the present study 
suggests that the MPS Personal Standards subscale may tap into this to some degree.
Despite the importance placed on guilt in cognitive models of OCD (Rosen, 1975; 
Rachman, 1993) this trait did not appear to be related to obsessionality in the present
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Study. When considering the two clinical groups, there was no significant difference in 
levels of guilt when comparing OCD patients with anxiety patients. The correlation 
analyses also failed to show an association between scores on the Situational Guilt 
Scale and the MOCI measure of obsessionality. The scores obtained by the OCD 
patients are very close to those reported by Frost et al. (1994) for their group of 
“subclinical obsessive compulsives” and higher than the norms reported in this and 
other papers. However, the anxiety patients, though showing a trend to score lower on 
the SGS, did not differ significantly, and so it seems that this study indicates 
pathological levels of guilt in all patients but no specific relationship with obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms.
As other researchers have noted (Steketee et al., 1991), it is possible that the measure 
of guilt utilised in this study may not have adequately captured the type of guilt 
experienced by OCD sufferers. Obsessional guilt may have a different focus to 
normative guilt, for example it may particularly relate to breaking personal or 
idiosyncratic moral rules. Ellis (1994) and Clark and Clayboum (1997) have both 
commented on the idiosyncratic nature of OCD patients’ constructs relating to 
personal failings. Clark and Clayboum point out that it is the interpretation of 
obsessional thoughts in terms of “what the thought content may mean about one’s 
personal character” that differentiates obsessions from worry (1997, p. 1141). Some 
authors have suggested that a guilt scale by Mosher (1966) might get closer to the type 
of guilt in OCD, since it contains subscales measuring Sex Guilt, Hostile Guilt and 
Morality-Conscience Guilt. However, this scale was not used in this study as it is not 
well validated or widely used. The majority of research into guilt in OCD have utilised 
the SGS which allows comparision across studies. Clearly refinement of guilt 
measurement in obsessive-compulsive problems and a closer analysis of the precise 
characteristics of this trait are urgently needed before conclusions are drawn about the 
role of guilt in OCD.
The findings of this study did not support Salkovskis’ responsibility model. Levels of 
responsibility did not differentiate OCD patients from anxiety patients. Neither did the 
correlation analyses reveal any specific relationship between responsibility and
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obsessionality. Because this study did not include a normal control group it is difficult 
to determine how ‘excessive’ the patients’ responsibility ratings were. Both clinical 
groups scored several points higher than the normal group used by Rhéaume and 
colleagues in their standardisation of the RQ (Rhéaume et al., 1995). This indicates that 
both OCD and anxiety patients may have pathological levels of responsibility, but there 
is still no evidence to support Salkovskis’ proposal that the trait distinguishes OCD 
from other disorders. Indeed, some researchers have proposed that excessive 
responsibility is a feature of some other anxiety problems. For example, Abramowitz 
and Foa (1998) found that the comorbidity of generalised anxiety disorder with OCD 
was associated with higher levels of pathological responsibility than in OCD alone. The 
present study was unable to address this issue of the relationship of responsibility to 
specific anxiety problems, because of the small numbers of particular diagnoses within 
the anxiety disorder group, but there is clearly an urgent need for empirical studies of 
responsibility in a range of clinical problems, not just OCD.
However, there are alternative reasons for the lack of an association between 
responsibility and OCD in this study. Firstly, much of the literature on responsibility in 
OCD is concerned with theoretical ideas and clinical observations. There is little 
research on operationalising the concept of excessive responsibility and its expression 
in obsessive-compulsive problems. There is no one agreed definition of inflated or 
excessive responsibility and no generally accepted standardised measures. Researchers 
have typically used their own variation of Salkovskis’ description of responsibility and 
developed scales accordingly. Thus, some researchers (Purdon and Clark, 1994) have 
argued that in order to truly assess the significance of responsibility in OCD, much 
research is still required to establish the defining characteristics and ways of capturing 
and measuring the trait in both normal and clinical populations. Lopatka and Rachman 
(1995) comment that we need to establish “whether perceived responsibility 
approaches a stable, psychological trait, or whether it is better construed as a 
situationally-specific reaction” (p. 683). The RQ, used in the present study, was the 
best available at the time, with some evidence of reliability and validity and a 
theoretical underpinning which related to Salkovskis’ concept of responsibility. 
However, the questionnaire had many limitations, not least its very limited use in
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published empirical studies and lack of data on clinical samples. The scale is 
cumbersome and was found by some participants to be difficult to understand. This 
suggests that caution is required when considering the interpretation of this scale in the 
present study.
As other commentators have noted, the role of responsibility in OCD is likely to be a 
complex one in which particular forms of the trait interact with other factors such as 
guilt and perfectionism, to form a constellation of cognitive traits. It may be that only 
in combination with other traits does responsibility become a potent factor in 
obsessional problems. Tallis (1995), for example notes that the interplay between 
inflated responsibility, associated guilt and high moral standards may be important in 
cognitive models of OCD. Salkovskis’ apparently simple model, which positions 
responsibility as the central and distinctive feature in OCD, does not seem adequate to 
explain the emerging empirical findings which suggest a more complex and multi­
faceted picture of cognitive biases in this disorder. Clearly, from clinical observations, 
responsibility is a potent factor in the presentation of some patients with OCD. 
However, as O’Kearney has noted; ‘it is important both clinically and theoretically, 
then, that the recent attention paid to “feelings of responsibility”.... do not obscure the 
contribution of other psychological factors to the etiology and maintainance {sic) of 
obsessions.’ (O’Kearney, 1993, p.364).
In considering the present study, there are some general design and methodological 
issues which present limitations to the confidence that can be placed in the findings. 
The study is cross-sectional and as such does not enter the debate about the etiology of 
OCD. More importantly the clinical samples were not formally randomised, and 
participants were not subject to a structured standardised interview to confirm 
diagnosis. However, patients were not simply allocated a diagnosis by self-report, 
which is a weakness of some cognitive studies, but had had at least one independent 
clinical assessment by an experienced professional to ascertain their condition. A key 
difficulty with community clinical studies is access to sufficient numbers of relevant 
patients. In the present study the sample size limits the power of the statistical analyses,
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although the numbers of patients included compares favourably with much published 
research in clinical psychology.
The mainstay of this research was the use of self-report questionnaires, a valid 
quantitative method but not without its drawbacks. Firstly, whilst all the scales used 
here had good face validity and reliability, their construct validity is less certain. Some 
of the questionnaires such as the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale and MOCI 
have been well standardised and show good correlations with other measures of these 
mood states. Others like the Responsibility Questionnaire, have not been analysed with 
regard to construct validity. Thus, one has to be cautious about the extent to which 
these cognitive questionnaires are truly capturing the trait of interest. As Antony et al. 
(1998) point out with regard to perfectionism, there is a need for research into 
behavioural correlates of cognitive traits which would allow us to go beyond self- 
report measures in exploring the way people’s thinking relates to their affect and 
behaviour.
A key limitation in the present study was the heterogeneity inherent in the two clinical 
groups. Heterogeneity limits the generalisability of the results to specific clinical 
populations and reduces power in the analysis. Here, the OCD group contained 
patients with varying profiles of the disorder, including predominantly checkers, 
predominantly washers and some with obsessions only. Some researchers argue that 
these are distinctive subtypes within OCD (Steketee et al. 1984, Rachman, 1993, 1997) 
and that each subtype may differ with respect to their etiology and function (Hodgson 
and Rachman, 1980).Other studies challenge this idea by pointing out the vast amount 
of crossover in OCD symptomology, with the majority of patients showing more than 
one type of obsession. Rasmussen and Tsuang (1986) argue that since many checkers 
become cleaners and vice versa, a common underlying manifestation for these diverse 
symptoms is more likely. This provides support for using a patient sample with mixed 
types of OCD, as in the present study. Looking at responsibility specifically, Salkovskis 
argues that people with checking rituals will tend to suffer high levels of responsibility 
and anxiety whilst washers would tend more to guilt and depression (1997, personal 
communication). The picture is confused since other experts in the field have focused
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more on pure obsessions and appear to apply the responsibility model specifically to 
this subtype (Rachman, 1997, 1998). The possibility that different types of OCD profile 
may display different types of cognitive bias remains unresolved. The research 
published so far does not allow conclusions to be made concerning what sort of OCD 
sample would be most appropriate when examining different cognitive biases. 
However, the heterogenous nature of the OCD in this study does mean that 
associations between specific types of OCD problem and particular appraisal styles may 
have been obscured. It is evident that research with larger samples of OCD patients, 
with careful analysis of particular symptom profiles would contribute greatly to 
clarifying this confusion.
A similar problem of clinical heterogeneity applies to the anxiety disorder sample in the 
present study. A mixture of anxiety diagnoses was included which, whilst mirroring 
much of the other research in this field, is clearly not ideal when trying to tease out 
possible relationships between different styles of thinking which may manifest 
themselves differently in different disorders (Riskind, 1997). The traits studied here 
have all been claimed to be distinctive of OCD and so should still differentiate between 
OCD patients and any other anxiety patients. Of course the clinical assessment of each 
patient, established that no participant in the anxiety disorders group also had a 
diagnosis of OCD. However, there is little research to establish the level of obsessional 
problems which might be found in other anxiety disorders.Whilst the anxiety disorders 
group in this study was significantly less obsessional than the OCD group there were 
clearly some obsessional features reported, since the anxiety disorders group did not 
score zero on the MOCI questionnaire. Differences in cognitive style and their 
relationship to obsessional problems may have been more apparent if homogenous 
groups of anxiety problems were considered separately. This would also allow a more 
detailed analysis of the extent to which different types of anxiety disorder might be 
more strongly linked to particular appraisal biases. From the research literature reviewd 
in this study it is clear that some appraisal biases are found across the whole range of 
anxiety disorders. For example, it is expected that any clincal anxiety group might 
show higher than normal levels of perfectionism. Antony and colleagues (1998), found 
higher levels of perfectionism in patients with social phobia and panic disorder
120
compared to non-anxious controls. Larger groups of homogenous anxiety problems 
would have allowed a closer look at patterns of cognitive bias, and showed more 
clearly the degree to which different types of disorder exhibit the appraisal biases of 
interest here. As a final point on limitations of this study’s design, a ‘normal’ control 
group, whilst not necessary in terms of the specific hypotheses being tested, would 
have provided useful additional information about the severity of symptoms and 
cognitive distortions in the clinical groups as compared to a non-clinical population.
Overall, the present study lends only limited support to a cognitive model of OCD such 
as that of McFall and Wollersheim and provided no evidence to support Salkovskis’ 
model. This mixed picture reflects the general status of research in this field where the 
enthusiasm for cognitive theory is not yet matched by empirical evidence. Intuitively, 
and from clinical observations, styles of thinking in OCD are powerful mediating 
factors in the expression of the disorder. However, there is little consensus in the 
literature about what features are of prime importance in a model of the maintenance of 
the symptoms; rather we have several categories of possible contenders for key 
position, three of which, perfectionism, guilt and responsibility were investigated in the 
present study. There is clearly a pressing need for more empirical research into 
cognitive factors, with more emphasis on the details of the processes and 
phenomenology underlying OCD. Some of the current research, including the present 
study, provides some clues as to what might be future areas to focus in on within the 
field. Certainly researchers are arguing for more emphasis on the meaning attached by 
OCD sufferers to certain concepts like perfectionism, responsibility or guilt, meanings 
which may go beyond the usual definitions ascribed to these terms and used in standard 
questionnaires. Such an analysis might be conceptualised as addressing the difference 
between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ cognitions. Teasdale (1993), in his theory of cognition and 
emotion, distinguishes between specific and more holistic levels of meaning (‘hot’ or 
holistic level meanings are exemplified by our use of poetry and metaphor, and are 
claimed to be of primary importance in emotion production). Whilst Teasdale pays 
particular attention to depression, the model appears equally relevant to OCD, where 
sufferers so commonly complain that they ‘know’ that they are not particularly bad or
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immoral, but their intrusive thoughts lead them to feel evil or malevolent to a most 
profound degree. The theme of moral sensitivity and malevolence repeatedly comes up 
in the literature and is only obliquely captured by traits such as perfectionism, guilt and 
responsibility. The paradox faced by OCD sufferers of a sense of enormous power to 
do harm coupled with an exquisitely sensitive conscience might be a worthwhile focus 
for future research.
As part of the increasing interest in applying cognitive theory to OCD, many authors 
have written on the subject of cognitive treatments for this disorder. As Salkovskis and 
others have pointed out (Salkovskis, 1996; James and Blackburn, 1995), behavioural 
therapy is successfiil for many OCD sufferers but relapse and drop-out rates are high. 
Cognitive therapy was regarded by Salkovskis as a potentially powerful adjunct to 
behaviour therapy which might address these treatment failures and improve the overall 
efficacy of psychological treatments. Several writers have gone on to recommend 
specific cognitive techniques, and dependent on which cognitive biases the writers give 
pre-eminence to, the treatment protocol will emphasis tackling that particular style of 
dysfunctional thinking. So for example, Salkovskis (1998) advises challenging ideas 
about pivotal responsibility, whilst Jones and Menzies (1997a) suggest targeting 
danger-related cognitions. Treatment studies in themselves are not a direct test of 
cognitive theories of OCD, but of course if cognitive techniques were shown to 
enhance the success rates of behavioural treatments of OCD, then this would be 
powerful supporting evidence for the role of cognitive factors in the disorder. 
Unfortunately, there are few controlled studies of cognitive therapy with OCD, and 
these show little evidence of significant improvement when cognitive treatments are 
added to existing behavioural techniques (James and Blackburn, 1995). That is not to 
say that cognitive factors are unimportant in the treatment of OCD, more that well- 
designed studies are urgently needed to address this issue. Thus the value of cognitive 
therapy for OCD still cannot be judged, and the treatment research does not yet offer 
support for cognitive models of OCD.
As this present study confirms, our understanding of cognitive processes in obsessive- 
compulsive disorder is very limited. It is quite clear that much more empirical research
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is urgently needed to explore what cognitive features operate in OCD. However, just 
as importantly, the research in this area needs to be rigorously aligned to good theory- 
building. The rapid rise of cognitive theory in explaining psychological distress has 
been attacked by many scientists for its apparent lack of a sound scientific base. As far 
back as 1978, Wolpe argued that cognitive formulations add little to an understanding 
and treatment of psychological disorders. More contemporary writers have also 
questioned the scientific basis of cognitive theory. Teasdale (1993), in a paper which 
challenges Beck’s cognitive model, quotes Ross (1991) in arguing that cognitive 
therapists employ “neither the researchers’ methods or their principles. What they do
employ is some of the terminology of cognitive psychology Such terms are usually
called on to serve as post hoc rationalisations when ad hoc clinical procedures seem to 
have worked.” (Ross, 1991, p.743). Such challenges have, of course been hotly 
debated and refuted by researchers in the field (Beck, 1979). However, the point being 
made here is that if researchers wish to apply cognitive models to OCD, the search for 
cognitive biases and dysfunctional beliefs needs to be underpinned and driven by 
scientific theory as well as by clinical observation and intuition. The present study made 
a small step towards this by relating the literature and empirical findings to two existing 
models of cognition in OCD. However, for real progress to be made in our 
understanding of this field, further refinement of research, in terms of developing 
hypotheses and better methodology, is required.
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ABSTRACT
THIRTEEN AUTISTIC SUBJECTS WHO WERE ORIGINALLY GIVEN TESTS OF 
FIRST-ORDER AND SECOND-ORDER BELIEF ATTRIBUTION ABILITY IN ORDER 
TO ASSESS THEIR THEORY OF MIND, WERE RE-TESTED IN 1990, SEVEN 
YEARS LATER. THE PURPOSE OF THE FOLLOW-UP WAS TO ESTABLISH IF 
THERE IS ANY DEVELOPMENT IN THEORY OF MIND ABILITY WITH TIME. IN 
ADDITION, INFORMATION ABOUT THE SUBJECTS’ CURRENT COGNITIVE 
FUNCTIONING WAS OBTAINED IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN MENTAL AGE VARIABLES AND A THEORY OF MIND.
THIS STUDY CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF A SEVERE DELAY IN ALL 
SUBJECTS, WITH NO OVERALL IMPROVEMENT IN THEORY OF MIND ABILITY 
OVER SEVEN YEARS. AS FOUND IN 1983, NO SUBJECTS WERE ABLE TO 
MAKE SECOND-ORDER BELIEF ATTRIBUTIONS. CHRONOLOGICAL AGE AND NON­
VERBAL MENTAL AGE WERE NOT RELATED TO ABILITY TO PASS THE THEORY 
OF MIND TESTS, BUT VERBAL MENTAL AGE WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN 
:;AN ABILITY TO MAKE FIRST-ORDER BELIEF ATTRIBUTIONS.
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\INTRODUCTION
The Autistic Syndrome
Since Kanner (1943) first described the characteristics of 
autistic children over forty years ago, there has been a wealth 
of research into the diagnosis, understanding and treatment of 
autism. At the same time, however, there has been much con­
troversy over the issues of validity and definition. While 
some psychiatrists did not accept that autism was a distinctive 
syndrome, others applied the diagnosis far too widely, and yet 
others interpreted Kanner’s summary of the features of this 
syndrome far too narrowly (Wing, 1978). To add to this 
confusion, for many years, there was a continuing debate as to 
how far autism was meaningfully different from such conditions 
as childhood schizophrenia, general mental retardation and 
specific developmental disorders of speech and language 
(Rutter, 1978; Rutter and Gould, 1985). Much of this 
controversy arises from the fact that the abnormalities of 
behaviour and impairment of function that may be seen in autism 
and related conditions are so numerous and so varied that a 
great deal of research was needed to pinpoint those behaviours 
that constitute specific and necessary features of autism.
During the 1970s, considerable progress was made in describing 
the taxonomy of the disorder. Rutter, in his discussion of the 
evidence (Rutter, 1978), concluded that to avoid further 
ambiguity, investigators should adopt the following criteria to 
define autism:-
\1. Onset before the age of 30 months
2. Impaired social development which has a number of special 
characteristics and is out of keeping with the child’s 
intellectual development.
3. Delayed and deviant language development which also has 
certain defined features and which is out of keeping with 
the child’s intellectual level.
4 . Insistence on sameness, as shown by stereotyped play
patterns, abnormal preoccupation or resistance to change.
These diagnostic criteria have been widely adopted and were 
incorporated in the third edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III) published by 
the American Psychiatric Association in 1980, and revised as 
DSM-III-R in 1987. Here autism is classified as an instance of 
a Pervasive Developmental Disorder.
Primary Deficits in Autism
While a clear consensus about the validity of the autistic 
disorder has emerged, and important advances have been made in 
diagnosis, it was still necessary to understand more about the 
underlying pathology of the disorder. Further research was 
needed into the defining characteristics of autism, that is, 
the primary or core deficits which are specific to the 
disorder. Researchers were, of course, also attempting to 
understand the course of the disorder.
As mentioned earlier, there is immense individual variation in 
children diagnosed as autistic. The boundaries are unclear and 
the disorder overlaps with or co-occurs with other handicaps 
(Bishop, 1989). Wing (1988) has argued for the concept of an 
autistic continuum to account for the variation. This concept 
is largely due to the epidemiological studies of Wing and Gould
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(1979), and is based on the empirical finding of a common and 
invariant constellation of three features in autism, regardless 
of additional handicap. This constellation has become known as 
’Wing’s Triad’, and is widely regarded as an accurate 
description of the core features of autism. The Triad 
comprises : -
1. Social impairment
2. Communicative impairment
3. Impairment of imaginative activity, with substitution of
repetitive activity
These core impairments give rise to different kinds of 
behaviour at different ages and at different levels of ability. 
They will be described in more detail here.
Social Impairment
Social disabilities are increasingly recognised as a major 
defining characteristic of autism, and they appear to be 
qualitatively different to social disturbances in other 
disorders.
Social abnormalities are evident early in life with deviant 
gaze behaviour, eye contact and facial recognition, 
inappropriate affectionate behaviour and impaired attachments 
(Rutter, 1978; Wing, 1976; Volkmar, 1987). In older children, 
the abnormalities are reflected in a basic failure to form 
normal social relationships. This is seen in their lack of 
response to others people’s emotions, rare use of appropriate 
greetings, no peer friendships, inability to modify their 
behaviour according to social situations and inability to use
posture, gesture and facial expression to regulate social 
interactions (Rutter and Schopler, 1987). Wing and Gould 
(1979) have characterised three forms of social deviance: 
aloof, passive, and active-but-odd, which show how patterns or 
clusters of social impairments may exist in autistic 
individuals. Social difficulties persist into adulthood even 
with higher functioning autistic individuals (Szatmari et al, 
1989).
Experimental research into social understanding provides 
evidence of a wide range of deficits in this field. Autistic 
children show a striking lack of ability in conceptual role- 
taking (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985; Dawson and 
Fernald, 1987), imitation of abstract gestures (Bartak, Rutter 
and Cox, 1975), and comprehension of emotions (Hobson, 1986a, 
1985b). These experimental studies have consistently shown 
that the. deficits lie in the realm of social cognition and in 
particular, awareness of other people’s thoughts, beliefs and 
feelings.
In summary, these studies document a chronic social deficit in 
autism, and point to a persistent inability to participate in 
two-way reciprocal social interaction.
'pommunication Impairment
It has long been recognised that deviant language is one of the 
hallmarks of autism. While some have viewed the deficits as 
simply a product of other aspects of the syndrome (Bettelheim, 
1967), many investigators regard language impairment as a core 
or primary symptom of autism (Paul, 1987; Rutter and Schopler, 
1987).
However, through numerous studies of autistic individuals’ 
language, it has emerged that, rather than a general language 
delay, there is a striking developmental asynchrony between 
form and function (Tager-Flusberg, 1989). In other words, the
acquisition of the phonological system, of words and their 
meanings and of grammatical forms do not prove to be 
fundamental problems specific to autism. Instead, there 
appears to be a basic deficit in the use of language for social 
communication, also described as a pragmatic deficit (Tager- 
Flusberg, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1988). The communication 
abnormalities including such deficits as a lack of pointing, 
showing or turn-taking, both before and after language 
acquisition (Ricks & Wing, 1975; Bartak, Rutter and Cox, 1975). 
Infant communication appears to be limited to functions that 
seem not to require joint attention and reference (Mundy et. 
al., 1987; Mundy & Sigman, 1989). Older autistic children show 
impaired ability to adapt to discourse roles, to follow 
politeness conventions in conversation and to distinguish given 
from new information (Baltaxe, 1977). Higher functioning 
autistic children often have a pedantic formal style of speech 
and show difficulties in judging appropriate amounts of 
information to include in an utterance (Paul and Feldman,
1984). Prosodic deficits (the use of intonational cues) are 
also frequently cited (Fay & Schuler, 1980).
The literature on pragmatic deficits in autism presents a 
consistent picture of severely impaired functioning on almost 
all aspects that have been tested. It is the social use of 
communication that is primary in the communication impairment 
in autism.
Impairment of Imaginative Activity
This third feature of Wing’s Triad refers essentially to the 
fact that autistic children frequently show impoverished 
pretend or symbolic play (Wing et al., 1977). They may be able 
to manipulate objects and show functional use of playthings, 
but true symbolic play which typically develops during the end 
of the second year of life, is noticeably absent. Instead, 
autistic children tend to engage in repetitive, stereotyped 
activities (Gould, 1982).
The immature play observed in autistic individuals can be 
understood in terms of a general deficit in symbolic thought 
and, as such, has close conceptual links with the deficits in 
social understanding and communication which seem also to 
suffer from an inability to think abstractly and 
interpretatively about situations. However, the lack of 
imaginative activity remains a distinct and primary abnormality 
in its own right.
Theoretical Accounts of Autism
Throughout the 40 years since Kanner’s original diagnostic 
observations, efforts have been made to develop comprehensive 
models of the psychological processes underlying the autistic 
disorder, and a number of very different hypotheses about the 
nature of autism have been proposed.
Bettelheim (1967) claimed that parental rejection was at the 
heart of autism, while Tinbergen and Tinbergen (1983) suggested 
that a fear of social contact was to blame. Current evidence 
does not support either of these concepts for, while 
abnormalities in rearing can lead to serious social problems, 
the nature of the social abnormalities in such cases differs 
markedly from those found in autism.
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At one time, it was thought that autism was primarily a 
language disorder (Rutter, Bartak and Newman, 1971), but, 
again, although autism does seem to be very similar to the more 
severe developmental disorders of receptive language, it is 
also markedly different in a number of ways (Rutter, 1979), 
these being the core impairments associated with autism, 
described earlier.
Autism differs in so many ways from most emotional and 
behavioural disorders of childhood that its distinctiveness is 
undisputed. More recent theoretical models have sought to 
address that distinctiveness, and provide parsimonious 
explanations of the social, pragmatic, imaginative deficits 
characteristic of autism.
It is now agreed by most investigators that biological factors 
are involved in the pathogenesis of the disorder (Coleman & 
Gillberg, 1985) and research will continue to address the issue 
of localising brain dysfunction in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1990). 
At the same time, theoretical models must attempt to specify 
and account for the psychological mechanisms that represent 
that original dysfunction. Two such models are described here 
in ..'more detail.
The Affective Theory
This theory proposes that the social and communicative deficits 
are primarily affective. A detailed version of this theory has 
come from Hobson who states that,
"on a number of levels, autism should be counted a 
disorder of affective and social relations and 
irreducibly so." (Hobson, 1989)
He proposes that in autism, there is an innate inability to 
interact emotionally with others, and that, while in normal 
infants biological prewiring allows them to be sensitive to and 
comprehend directly without inference the emotions of other 
people, autistic infants lack this "non-inferential empathy".
Hobson goes on to propose that the development of a symbolic 
capacity and of a conceptual role-taking ability are both 
directly derived from the infant’s affective relationships, and 
the theory thus claims to account for the social, pragmatic and 
symbolic deficits in autism.
However, there are a number of difficulties with this theory. 
There is, for example, evidence that emotion-recognition 
deficits are not specific to autism but found in people with 
mental handicap too (Ozonoff et. al., in press), and some 
emotional responsivity is frequently present in autism 
(Volkmar, 1987). Also, it is difficult to see (and Hobson is 
unable to specify) how a child’s sophisticated concepts of 
people’s mental states, such as their thoughts and symbolising 
ability, would derive directly from a primitive sensitivity to 
others’ emotions.
The Meta-Representation Theory and Theory of Mind
Refinements in our understanding of the precise nature of 
autistic deficits led some researchers to suggest that these 
impairments had a primarily cognitive basis. The types of 
communicative, social and imaginative deficits were those which 
seem to be linked in their reliance on the capacity to 
conceptualise other people’s mental states and to abstract and 
use symbols. Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, (1985), put forward 
a cognitive explanation for the pathogenesis of the autistic 
disorder. They suggested that the basic cognitive deficit in 
autism is the inability to conceive of others mental states and 
that this stems from a dysfunction in the capacity for meta­
representation (Leslie, 1987).
Leslie described how, from the outset of development, infants 
need to be able to perceive and store knowledge about the world 
and objects in it. This ability to represent or have concepts 
and beliefs about the physical world is termed primary 
representation. However, children go on to develop 
representations not just of objects and events, but also of 
representations. In other words, they come to gain an explicit 
concept of representation and a theoretical understanding of 
how of how the mind relates to the external world. This 
ability to represent mental representations is termed meta­
representation. As Perner (1988) describes it,
"(a child) has to build a model of the external situation 
and another, meta-representational model of the mental 
state, which is itself a model of the external 
situation." (Perner, 1988, p.151)
Meta-representational ability allows the child to attribute to 
other people mental states such as beliefs, desires and 
knowledge, that is, cognitive or volitional states, and not 
simply emotional or perceptual states. This then allows the 
child to make sense of people’s behaviour. If a child 
understands that people act not according to the situation but 
according to their mental representation of the situation, they 
can then not only predict likely behaviour, but also appreciate 
such concepts as pretence or false belief which involve strange 
or aberrant behaviour and which might otherwise be highly 
perplexing. This aspect of meta-représentâtion has been called 
a theory of mind. Premack and Woodruff first used this phrase 
and define it as follows;
"In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we 
mean that the individual imputes mental states to himself 
and to others... A system of inferences of this kind is 
properly viewed as a theory, first, because such states
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are not directly observable, and second, because the 
system can be used to make predictions, specifically, 
about the behaviour of other organisms.... Purpose or 
intention is the state we impute most widely." (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1970, p.515).
Leslie and Happe (1989) hypothesise that normal development 
rests on a ’theory-of-mind module’ (Leslie, in press) which is 
innate and is an ’engine’ for the development of later 
manifestations of theory of mind. Thus very early 
communicative behaviours such as joint-attention which is 
evident in infants around the end of the first year, appear to 
involve meta-représentâtion (Baron-Cohen, 1989a). Pretence, 
which appears around the end of the second year, can be viewed 
as a more complex meta-representational-based theory of mind 
task (Leslie, 1987), while yet more complex abilities such as 
understanding false belief emerge at about 4 years of age 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
The developmental stages of a theory of mind are still somewhat 
speculative. Perner suggests that pretence, for example, is 
better conceptualised as an instance of a midway stage between 
primary and secondary representation (Perner, 1988; Baron- 
Cohen, in press). Others have questioned the formulation of 
very early behaviours as being meta-representational (Mundy & 
Sigman, 1989). Despite these controversies, it is clear that a 
^theory of mind is firmly established by the age of about 4 
years in normal children.
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) proposed that autistic 
children lack meta-representational ability and therefore do 
not develop a theory of mind. This hypothesis would predict 
that only those skills requiring meta-representational capacity 
should be impaired in autism. Most of the core impairments 
described earlier can indeed be conceptualised in this way.
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Social skills such as role-taking and appropriate social 
interaction require the ability to appreciate other people’s 
mental states. Pragmatic skills would similarly be impaired, 
for to communicate socially, a speaker must be aware of the 
listener’s mental state, and the listener will hold certain 
beliefs about the speaker’s intentions such as the intention to 
be informative, relevant, truthful, etc. (Grice, 1975).
The theory of mind hypothesis can also explain why pretend or 
imaginative play is lacking in autism, for such play it claims, 
requires an awareness of the mental state ’pretend’ (Leslie, 
1987; Baron-Cohen, 1987). An impaired meta-representational 
capacity can, it seem, account for the impairments in Wing’s 
Triad, and is therefore a parsimonious account of the primary 
deficit in autism (Leslie and Frith, 1990). It is less clear, 
however, how it might account for some other features of autism 
such as attention disturbances and arousal self-regulation 
(Mundy and Sigman, 1989), emotional role-taking (Rutter, 1986), 
and repetitive behaviours (Boucher, 1989). Several 
investigators while accepting the importance of a cognitive 
account of autism, still believe that a primary affective 
deficit is involved at an early stage as well, and that the 
cognitive and affective systems interact in an inseparable way 
(Ungerer, 1989; Paul, 1987). Hermelin and O ’Connor (1985) 
propose such a system which they call the "logico-affective" 
state. A better understanding of the very earliest deficits in 
autistic children is required before such differences are 
resolved (Leslie, 1987).
Experimental Studies of the Theory of Mind Hypothesis
Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) tested their hypothesis 
directly, using an adaptation of Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) 
test of normal children’s understanding of false belief. These 
authors developed an ingenious paradigm to demonstrate that an 
explicit theory of mind is well within the capacity of the 
normal four-year-old. They devised a task where the child’s 
own belief is different from someone else’s belief. In order 
to succeed on the task, the child has to be aware that 
different people can have different beliefs about a situation. 
Hence, this case provides the strongest evidence for the 
capacity to conceive of mental states (Dennett, 1978).
This test, hereafter called the Sally-Anne test, is used in the 
present study and is described in detail in the next section.
It involves a story told with two dolls (Sally and Anne), 
during which an object is transferred while its owner is 
absent. The inference that has to be made is that this person 
(doll) will falsely believe the object is still in the old 
place, since that was where she put it. To pass this test of a 
theory of mind, the child must attribute a belief to the owner, 
and this level of ability is termed, "first-order belief 
attribution". Baron-Cohen et. al., (1985) gave the test to 
people with autism, as well as to a group of people with
VDown’s Syndrome, and a group of normal children. They found 
that whilst 80% of the subjects with Down’s Syndrome, and 85% 
of the normal children passed this test, only 20% of the 
subjects with autism did so, and this was so despite this group 
having a higher mental and chronological age than the two 
comparison groups. Instead, 80% of the subjects with autism 
indicated the doll would look for her object at the location to 
where it had been moved.
This study then, lent preliminary support to the hypothesis 
that in autism, there is a failure to develop a theory of mind. 
Over the past five years, this pattern of results has been 
replicated and extended using picture sequencing tasks (Baron- 
Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1986), true belief tasks (Leslie and 
Frith, 1988), appearance versus reality tasks (Baron-Cohen, 
1989b), a gift-choosing paradigm (Dawson and Fernald, 1987), 
tests of other mental states like desire and imagination 
(Baron-Cohen, in press), and tasks using real people (Perner, 
Frith, Leslie and Leekam, 1989).
This last study included a test of false belief which used a 
"deceptive appearance" paradigm, whereby the subject is misled 
into thinking a Smarties box contains sweets whereas it in fact 
contains a pencil. The subject then has to predict what 
someone else would say was in the box when shown it in the same 
deceptive way. This test is also used in the present study and 
is referred to as the Smarties Test. Essentially, Perner et. 
al., (1989) obtained similar results to Baron-Cohen et. al. 
(1985). However, they did suggest that the Smarties test might 
be slightly easier than the Sally-Anne test as subjects may be 
helped in predicting others’ response by having experienced the 
same mistake themselves. This suggestion has not yet been 
assessed by direct comparison of the tests.
1These studies all confirm the existence of a theory of mind 
deficit in autism. This deficit cannot be attributed to the
general effects of mental retardation, or of language problems
as the inclusion of high-functioning autistic subjects and /or 
the use of various matched control groups preclude this.
The Specific Developmental Delay Hypothesis
Experimental studies of theory of mind in autism present 
remarkably consistent results. Compared to matched controls, 
autistic individuals have a specific and severe deficit in this 
area of ability.
However, the impairment is by no means absolute. Several 
studies show that a small percentage (ranging from 20 to 35%)
of high functioning autistic children pass the theory of mind
tests. In Baron-Cohen et. al’s (1985) study using the Sally- 
Anne test for example, 20% of subjects with autism were able to 
make a first-order belief attribution. Leslie and Frith (1988) 
and Prior, Dahlstrom & Squires (1989) also reported a minority 
of autistic individuals who were able to pass first-order false 
belief tasks.
One hypothesis that has been advanced to account for the sub­
group of individuals who pass is that there may be a delay in 
the development of a theory of mind. The specific developmental 
delay hypothesis derives its name first from the evidence that 
autistic children’s impaired theory of mind is not related to 
general developmental delay, and secondly, from the possibility 
that some older autistic children may eventually develop a 
theory of mind at the lowest level, many years after it would 
normally be present.
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Baron-Cohen (1989c) investigated this hypothesis further by 
looking at whether those autistic children who passed a first- 
order belief attribution test (the Sally-Anne test) were, 
nevertheless, unable to use a more advanced theory of mind.
Normal 6 - 7  year old children are able to make what are termed 
"second-order belief attributions" of the form, ’Mary thinks 
that John thinks the ice-cream van is in the park’ (Perner and 
Wimmer, 1985). Perner and Wimmer’s paradigm was used by 
Baron-Cohen (1989c) to investigate this ability in autistic 
children, this test being especially useful in distinguishing 
unambiguously whether a subject is making first or second-order 
belief attributions. The test involves a story, illustrated 
with a model village and toy people, about two children’s 
beliefs regarding the whereabouts of an ice-cream van. This 
was the third test that was is used in the present study and is 
described in the next section in detail. It is hereafter 
referred to as the Ice-Cream Van Test.
Baron-Cohen (1989) found that none of his sample of high 
functioning autistic individuals were able to make second-order 
attributions. In contrast, non-autistic control (Down’s 
Syndrome) children with a lower mental age were able to 
attribute beliefs at this more advanced level. These results, 
therefore, supported his prediction that these autistic 
children were specifically delayed in the acquisition of a more 
complex theory of mind.
Baron-Cohen (in press), investigated this model of a delay 
further in a series of experiments which tested understanding 
of five different mental states (i.e. not just belief), in a 
group of people with autism. Their ability to understand 
mental states of increasing complexity followed a clear 
developmental sequence with imagination being easier than 
pretence which in turn was easier than belief. This study 
provides further evidence for the delay hypothesis.
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Factors in the development of theory of mind:
Investigators have analysed the role of background variables, 
most notably MA and CA, in the performance of autistic subjects 
on belief tasks, in an attempt to identify possible 
contributory factors for the development of a theory of mind.
With respect to CA, Baron-Cohen (1989c), Leslie and Frith
(1988), Prior et al. (1989) and Eisenmajer & Prior (1990), all 
found that subjects who passed first-order belief tests were 
not significantly older than those who did not. However, these 
studies did reveal a general tendency for the "passers" to be 
the older children of the group. Baron-Cohen (1989c) has 
suggested that CA is a necessary factor but is not a sufficient 
condition to account for those subjects with autism who pass.
In these studies cited above, no child below the age of 8 years 
7 months was able to pass a false belief task.
The evidence regarding MA is similar to that for CA. Although 
non-verbal MA does not appear to be linked to theory of mind 
ability, the same studies mentioned above found that verbal MA 
was an important factor for success on the belief tasks. While 
Baron-Cohen (1989c), Leslie and Frith (1988) and Prior et. al.
(1989) did not find a significant difference in verbal MA 
between "passers" and "failers", they did show a trend of 
higher verbal MA being necessary for passing. Eisenmajer and 
Prior's (1990) study was the first to report a significantly 
higher verbal MA in those subjects who passed the false belief 
task. However, as with CA, verbal MA is not sufficient to 
account for passing, in that all the studies describe children 
of relatively high verbal MA who were unable to pass the tasks.
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Limits of theory of mind development in autism:
The majority of autistic children are unable to make first 
order belief attributions. The developmental delay hypothesis 
allows for the possibility that these individuals might 
progress in some way to enable them to succeed later on. The 
only published study so far to look at advanced theory of mind 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989c), found that no subjects were able to make 
second-order belief attributions, even those with relatively 
high verbal MA and CA. This raises the question of whether 
there exists a ceiling level of ability beyond which no 
individual with autism will develop. It is too early to draw 
this conclusion as there have not been enough studies of 
second-order belief attribution, and there is also a lack of 
research into the theory of mind in autistic adults. However, 
Harris (1989) has postulated that the clinical picture will 
best be explained through the notion of a delay superimposed on 
neurological damage. Thus, even once started, progress will be 
slower than in normal children, with an increasingly marked gap 
with age.
In addition, Bowler (in press), in a study of second-order 
beliefs in individuals with Asperger Syndrome, found that 73% 
of this group did pass the Ice-Cream Van test. The subjects 
had much higher non-verbal and verbal MA ’s and were adults with 
an average CA of 26.67. If, as some researchers suggest (Wing 
1981), Asperger Syndrome shares the same underlying dysfunction 
as autism, this study provides new evidence for the development 
of advanced theory of mind in the most able autistic subjects. 
How this finding will be accommodated in the theory of a meta- 
representational deficit in autism remains unclear.
IAims of the Study
The majority of theory of mind studies have been of a cross- 
sectional design. As many researchers have noted, questions 
about the development of a theory of mind in autism cannot be 
properly answered without longitudinal studies (Baron-Cohen, 
1989c; Eisenmajer & Prior, 1990; Harris, 1989).
The present study aims to address this problem through a seven 
year follow-up of the autistic children originally tested in 
the study by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985). In this 
study, twenty autistic children between the ages of 6.1 and 
16.5 years formed the test sample. They were assessed in 1983 
for verbal and non-verbal MA, and for ability to pass the 
Sally-Anne test. Only 20% (four) of the subjects could make 
the first-order belief attribution and none of these four were 
able to pass the Ice-Cream Van test of second-order belief 
attribution when tested (in 1987) in a separate study (Baron- 
Cohen, 1989c).
The purpose of the follow-up was to map the changes in the MA 
and theory of mind ability over seven years through re­
administration of the same tests used in 1983. Also, it was 
decided to collect further information about theory of mind 
ability by using the Smarties test. On the basis of the recent 
research reviewed above, several points of particular interest 
were investigated in this study.
(  " O f o
1. The specific developmental delay hypothesis allows for 
changes in theory of mind ability within individuals, and 
so one might predict that some autistic children 
previously failing the Sally-Anne task might later be able 
to pass. It is in principle possible that those who 
passed the Sally-Anne test may have developed 
sufficiently to pass the Ice-Cream Van test.
2. The use of the Smarties test, whilst not able to show 
change over time, could provide interesting reliability 
data on first-order belief attribution ability. It is 
tentatively predicted that those passing the Sally-Anne 
test should also pass the Smarties test, whilst, if the 
latter is easier as has been suggested, some subjects may 
be able to pass this but fail the Sally-Anne test.
3. The relationship between MA and CA and theory of mind 
ability was also investigated. Research indicates that a 
minimum CA, and relatively high verbal MA are necessary to 
pass even first order belief attribution tests, and it was 
expected that the current study would concur with this
4.’It was felt that information about the abilities of 
teenage and adult autistic individuals would be a useful 
addition to research in this area. Longitudinal studies 
of cognitive and social development in autism suggest only 
limited development in most areas of functioning, 
particularly social understanding (DeMeyer et al., 1973). 
Also, while a very few individuals show a marked improve­
ment in adolescence (Kanner, et al., 1972; Szatmari et 
al., 1989), a substantial number may sadly be expected to 
deteriorate at or after puberty (Gillberg & Schaumann,
1981; Waterhouse & Fein, 1984).
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Subjects
Of the twenty autistic children who participated in the 1983 
study, seven were untraceable. The subjects who were finally 
recruited into the present study were ten boys and three
girls who had been diagnosed as autistic according to
established diagnostic criteria (Rutter, 1978).
The group were assessed for receptive verbal mental age (MA) 
using the same tests as in 1983. These were the British 
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) Long Form (Dunn, Dunn,
Whetton & Pintilie, 1982), and non-verbal MA using the Leiter 
International Performance Scale (Arthur, 1952). Details of 
thpse subjects are presented in Table 1, together with their 
CAs and MAs obtained in the original study in 1983.
It is worth noting here that the cognitive tests used in 1983 
were re-administered in the present study for ease of 
comparisons of performance across time. The BPVS and the 
Leiter Scale are both for use up to age eighteen, and seven 
of the subjects were older than this ceiling age. However, 
as their non-verbal and verbal MAs were expected to lie well 
below their CA, it was still considered appropriate to apply
these tests to all subjects.
TABLE 1: Chronological Age (CA) and Mental Age (MA) 
of subjects in the experiment
STUDY n CA Verbal MA* Non-VerbalMA+
1983 13 MEAN
S.D.
RANGE
11.3 
2.8 
6.5 - 15.8
5.1 
1.7 
2.8 - 7.4
8.8 
1.6 
5.3 - 10.6
1990 13 MEAN
S.D.
RANGE
18.3 
3.3 
13.1 - 23.1
6.8 
3.9 
2.8 - 15.^
9.9 
2.8 
5.8 - 15.1
*BPVS; + Leiter
Details of the seven subjects in the orginal study who were 
not included in the present experiment are summarised in
Table 2 •
TABLE 2; CAs and MAs of untraced subjects (1983)
n CA Verbal MA* Non-Verbal MA+
7 MEAN
S.D.
RANGE
12.6
3.6 
6.1 - 16.5
5.9 
1.0 
5.1 - 7.3
10.0 
2.0 
6.6 - 15.7
*BPVS; + Leiter
The subjects who were not traced did not differ significantly 
in CA (t = 0.90, 13 df), Verbal MA (t = 1.5, 18df), or Non- 
Verbal MA (t = 1.2, 18 df), from those included in the 
present study (p 0.05).
All but one of the subjects were attending some form of 
training centre or special school. Testing was carried out 
at these centres except in one case, where the testing was 
done at home.
Since the focus of the present study was on cognitive and 
social development within a group of autistic individuals, no 
control groups were included. It is clear from Table 1 that 
despite a seven year change in CA, Ma only increased by, on 
average, one and a half years. This gives a preliminary idea 
of how much change over time might be possible.
Nevertheless, mean MAs were over six years which is the age 
level at which normal children would pass the Ice-Cream Test.
Design
Each subject was tested on one occasion only. The tests were 
administered in the following order for all subjects: BPVS; 
Smarties Test; Sally-Anne Test Trial 1; Leiter Scale; Sally- 
Anne Test Trial 2.
The Ice-cream Van Test (two trials) was administered only if 
the subject passed one or more trials of the Smarties or 
Sally-Anne tests.
The Sally-Anne Test and the Ice Cream Van Test are exact 
replications of the tests administered in 1983. The Smarties 
Test was not used originally but was included in the design 
of this study to provide extra information on theory of mind 
ability.
Test Descriptions 
SMARTIES TEST
The experimenter produced a Smarties box from her bag and 
asked the subject "What’s in here?". All the subjects 
answered with "Smarties" or "sweets". The experimenter 
opened the box, showing the subject that there was a pencil 
only inside, and stated, "No, it’s a pencil". She put the 
pencil back into the box, closed the box, and asked two 
prompt questions:
Reality Prompt: "What’s in here?"
Own-Response Prompt: "When I first asked you, what did you 
say?".
Then the subject was told that his teacher, or careworker, 
(who was named) would be coming in later to fetch him and 
was told "S/he hasn’t seen this box. When s/he comes in. 
I ’ll show her/him this box just like this and ask: "(Name). 
What’s in here?".
Prediction Test: "What will (Name) say?".
Reality Question: "Is that what’s really in the box?". (If
answer is, "No"): "What is really in the box?".
Own-Response Question: "Do you remember when I took the box
out of my bag (experimenter re-enacts that episode) and 
asked you what was in it, what did you say?".
At the end of the scenario, the subject’s responses to the 
prompt questions, prediction test, and control questions 
were noted down. A pass on this test was scored if the 
subject answered both the prediction test and the control 
questions correctly.
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SALLY-ANNE TEST
Materials : Two dolls which differed in hair colour and
clothing were used. Both were approximately 25 centimetres 
in length. Two plastic containers (boxes) were also used, 
differing in colour and size. This differs slightly from the 
original scenario which used a basket and a box. A marble 
was chosen as the object to be hidden.
Procedure : The procedure is illustrated in Figure 1. The
two dolls, Sally and Anne, were introduced to the subject, 
who was then required to name each doll (Naming Question).
If the subject failed to remember, s/he was reminded until 
able to do so correctly.
Sally first placed a marble in her box. Then she left the 
scene, and the marble was transferred by Anne and hidden in 
her box. Then, when Sally returned, the experimenter asked 
the Belief Question: "Where will Sally look for her 
marble?". If the subject pointed to the previous location 
of the marble, then s/he passed the Belief Question by 
appreciating the doll’s now false belief. A pass was only 
scored if two control questions are answered correctly: 
"Where is the marble really?" (Reality Question), and "Where 
was the marble in the beginning?" (Memory Question).
A second trial of the Sally-Anne Test was carried out using 
a new location of the marble. In Trial 2, the experimenter 
took the marble and placed it in her pocket while Sally was 
away, so that now there were three different locations that 
the subject could point at (the two boxes and the pocket).
16%
To ensure that subjects did not unwittingly give a correct 
answer by favouring a position or giving an echolalic 
response, the order of the questions were such that no two 
correct responses using the same word followed one another. 
On Trial 1, the correct answers were: Sally’s box, Anne’s
box, Sally’s box. On Trial 2, they were: Sally’s box,
pocket, Sally’s box.
For half the subjects, Sally was positioned to the subject’s 
left, and for the other subjects, Sally was positioned to 
the right. This allowed an additional control for position 
preferences.
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FIGURE 1 : Scenario of a simple test of a theory of mind
(Reproduced from Cognition, 21, 37 - 46)
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ICE-CREAM VAN TEST
Materials : The test employed a toy village which comprised 
two houses, a church, a fence to separate the park and the 
road, four ’playpeople’ (about 3" high) and an ice-cream 
van. In addition, there was a row of trees, so that it was 
not possible for the story characters to ’see’ the church or 
John’s house from the park (or vice versa). The buildings 
were about 5" high. The whole village fitted onto a table- 
top 2 ’ square; this is shown schematically in the first 
picture of Figure 2. The subsequent six pictures in Figure 
2 depict the experimental scenario. All the materials were 
commercially available in a children’s toy-shop.
Procedure : The experimenter laid out the toy village on the
table in front of the subject. The experimenter then told 
the following story, moving the characters (dolls) and the 
ice-cream van accordingly:
This is John and this is Mary, they live in the village.
Naming question: Which is John I Mary?
Here they are in the park. Along comes the ice-cream 
man. John would like to buy an ice-cream but he has 
left his money at home. He is very sad, "Don’t worry" 
says the ice-cream man, "you can go home and get your 
money and buy some ice-cream later. I ’ll be here in the 
park all afternoon... "Oh, good" says John, "I’ll be 
back in the afternoon to buy an ice-cream".
Prompt question (1): Where did the ice-cream man say to 
John he would he all afternoon?
So John goes home. He lives in this house. Now, the 
ice-cream man says, "I am going to drive my van to the 
church to see if I can sell my ice-creams outside 
there".
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Prompt question (2): Where did the ice-cream man say he 
was going?
Prompt question (3): Did John hear that?
The ice-cream man drives over to the church. On his way 
he passes John’s house. John sees him and says, "Where 
are you going?". The ice-cream man says, "I’m going to 
sell some ice-cream outside the church". So off he 
drives to the church then John follows to buy an ice­
cream. The John follows to buy an ice-cream.
Prompt question (4): Where did the ice-cream man tell 
John he was going?
Prompt question (5) Does Mary know that the ice-cream 
man has talked to John?
Now Mary goes home. She lives in this house. Then she 
goes to John’s house. She knocks on the door and says, 
"Is John in?". "No" says his mother, "he’s gone out to 
buy an ice-cream".
Belief question: Where does Mary think John has gone to 
buy an ice-cream?
Justification question: Why?
..Reality question: Where did John really go to buy his
ice-cream?
Memory question: Where was the ice-cream man in the . 
beginning?
This story is shown in schematic form in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2: Scenario of test of second-order belief
attribution.
Reproduced from J.Child Psychol.Psychiat. 30(2), 285-297,1989)
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IAt the end of the story, the subject’s responses to the five 
prompt questions, the belief question and the three control 
questions (the justification, reality and memory questions) 
were noted down. Then the whole experiment was repeated 
(Trial 2), this time reversing the locations. The three 
control questions were necessary to ensure that the subject 
had both knowledge of the real location of the object and an 
accurate memory of its previous location, as well as 
providing evidence of which level belief attribution the 
subject was- making. In the version of the story given 
above, a pass on the belief question was scored if the child 
pointed to or said "the park".
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RESU LTS
SMARTIES TEST
Two (15%) of the thirteen subjects passed the Smarties Test. Two 
subjects answered the control questions correctly but failed on 
the Prediction Test. The remaining subjects failed on one or 
more of the control questions and/or the Prediction Test.
SALLY-ANNE TEST
Only one subject (8%) passed both trials of this test, while two 
subjects (15%) passed on just one of the trials. The remaining 
subjects failed on one or more of the control questions and/or 
the Belief question.
ICE-CREAM VAN TEST
The Ice-Cream Van Test was administered to those four subjects 
who passed one or more of the first-order belief attribution 
tasks {Smarties, Sally-Anne I, Sally-Anne II). None passed this 
test, with two subjects failing on the Belief question only and 
two failing on control questions in addition to the Belief 
question.
The pattern of performance on the theory of mind tests is 
summarised in Table 3. The one subject who passed both the 
Smarties and the Sally-Anne tests passed both trials in the 
latter, and hence, was the only subject to consistently pass on 
all first-order tests.
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TABLE 3; Performance on first-order belief attribution tests
SALLY-ANNE TEST 
PASS FAIL
(I and/or II)
SMARTIES TEST
PASS 1 1
FAIL 2 9
CA & MA VARIABLES
The means and standard deviations of "Passers" and "Failers" of the 
first-order belief attribution tests on CA and MA variables are shown 
in Table 4. Here, a "Passer" is defined as a subject who passes at 
least one trial of the Smarties and Sally-Anne tests. On this 
criterion, four subjects were "Passers" and nine were "Failers".
TABLE 4 : Means and standard deviations of CA and MA variables for 
"Passers" and "Failers".
VARIABLE PASSERS FAILERS
CA Mean 17.7 18.6
S.D. 3.2 3.4
Verbal Ma Mean 11.2 4.8
S.D. 3.4 1.9
Non-verbal MA Mean 10.7 9.5
S.D. 1.7 3.2
The minimum CA in the group of "Passers" was 13 years 3 months, while 
the minimum Verbal MA was 8 years 1 month, and Non-Verbal MA was 8 
years 6 months.
"Passers" and "Failers" were compared on CA and MA. No significant 
differences between "Passers" and "Failers" were found on CA (t =
0.42, df 11) or Non-Verbal MA (t = 0,72, df 11). Both p ^  .0.05. 
However, the two groups did differ significantly on Verbal MA (t = 
4.37, df 11, p ^ 0.002).
FOLLOW-UP RESULTS: Theory of Mind Tests
In an analysis of the changes over time in theory of mind test 
performance, only the Sally-Anne Test is considered. This is because
the Smarties Test was not used in the 1983 study, and no subject
passed the Ice-cream Van Test in 1983 or 1990.
Of the thirteen subjects re-tested in the present study, four had
originally passed both trials of the Sally-Anne Test in 1983. The 
remaining nine subjects had failed on both trials.
Of the four subjects who passed in 1983, only one was able to pass 
both trials on the re-testing; one subject passed just one trial and 
the remaining two original passers failed on both trials in 1990.
In contrast, there was one subject in the present study who did pass 
the trial of the Sally-Anne Test who had previously failed in 1983. 
These results are summarised in Table 5.
TABLE 5: "Passers" and "Failers" on the Sally-Anne Test in
1983 and 1990.
1990
1983
PASS FAIL
PASS 2 2
FAIL 1 8
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Using McNemar tests for correlated proportions, performance on 
the Sally-Anne Test in 1983 was compared to that in 1990. No 
significant differences were found in the proportions passing 
when using either the original 1983 criterion of a pass (both 
trials passed), (z = 1.73, p > 0.05), or the more lenient 
criterion of a pass on at least one of the trials (z = -0.58, 
p > 0.05).
FOLLOW-UP RESULTS: CA and MA variables
Between 1983 and 1990, 69% of subjects showed an increase, and 
31% a decrease in Verbal MA. Similarly, 69% of subjects showed 
an increase,- and 31% a decrease, in Non-Verbal MA. No 
significant difference was found between subjects tested in 1983 
and 1990 on mean Non-Verbal MA (t = 1.91, df 12). However, 
there was a significant increase in mean Verbal MA (t = 2.22, 
df 12).
The relationship between change in ability of subjects to pass 
the Sally-Anne Test between 1983 and 1990, and MA variables was 
investigated using Pearson r correlations. No significant 
correlation was found for Verbal MA (r = 0.45, df 11, p > 0.05) 
or Non-Verbal MA (r = 0.17, df 11, p > 0.05).
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DISCUSSION
The present experiment confirms findings from other studies that 
only a small minority of autistic individuals are able to pass 
tests of a theory of mind. In this study, four subjects (31%) 
passed a first-order belief attribution task.
However, the present study goes beyond current cross-sectional 
research to provide longitudinal data on theory of mind ability 
in autism. When the group’s performance on belief tasks in 1983 
is compared with that in 1990, it is clear that there has been 
no obvious development in their ability to pass such tasks, even 
after seven years. This is evident in comparisons of rates of 
"Passers" and "Failers" in the two studies, which showed no 
significant differences overall in either direction.
An analysis of individual performance reveals that for the four 
subjects who originally passed a first-order belief task (the 
Sally-Anne Test) in 1983, three deteriorated in performance on 
re-testing and one remained the same. While the majority of 
subjects failed the tests on both occasions, and therefore 
showed no change at all in ability, one subject did appear to 
have improved from failing the Sally-Anne Test in 1983 to 
passing one of the trials on re-testing.
In terms of second-order belief attribution, no subject in 1983 
or 1990 was able to pass the Ice-cream Van Test. This concurs 
with previous studies, using the same test, which also found 
that no autistic subjects passed the higher-order task.
- T O
From the results of the present study then, the general pattern 
of development was as follows. Those subjects who did not pass 
the Sally-Anne Test in 1983 did not improve in their first-order 
belief attributions. Those subjects who did pass the Sally-Anne 
Test originally, did not in the intervening period, develop in 
the ability to make second-order belief attributions.
Additional information of theory of mind ability was obtained 
from the results of the Smarties Test. It has been suggested 
that this test may be slightly easier than the Sally-Anne Test, 
though both are still tests of first-order belief attribution, 
and following a developmental perspective, one would expect that 
some autistic subjects might be able to pass the Smarties Test 
but not the Sally-Anne Test, and that those who passed the 
latter should also pass the former. These predictions were not 
supported in this study, there being no clear relation between 
ability to pass the two tests, and the findings.
The relationship between theory of mind ability and CA and MA 
variables was investigated in this study. Like other studies, 
it did not show a significant relationship between CA and 
ability to pass the theory of mind tests. However, as the 
autistic subjects in this study were on average much older than
subjects in previous studies, it was not possible to draw
conclusions about a minimum CA which might be necessary for 
passing theory of mind tests.
Whilst Non-Verbal MA was not significantly related to theory of 
mind ability, "Passers" and "Failers" were significantly 
difference on Verbal MA. The "Passers" in the 1990 study had a
relatively high mean Verbal MA of 11 years 2 months, and a
minimum of 8 years 1 month. This finding agrees with trends 
reported in many others
studies (e.g. Eisenmajer and Prior, 1990), and confirms the 
importance of Verbal MA in ability to pass theory of mind tests. 
In this study, the two subjects who passed a first-order test 
for the first time in 1990 were those who had the largest 
increases in Verbal MA over the follow-up period, further 
highlighting the link between Verbal MA and theory of mind.
In terms of changes in cognitive functioning over the seven 
years, results are similar to other studies. A mixed picture 
emerged whereby some subjects improved markedly on Non-Verbal MA 
and Verbal MA; others changed very little, and several subjects 
showed a deterioration on these variables. Overall, however, 
mean Non-Verbal MA did not change significantly, but the mean 
Verbal MA improved, with an average increase of 1 year 2 months 
over the seven year period. Thus the findings generally suggest 
only very limited development in cognitive functioning, but at 
the same time do not point to any substantial deterioration as 
some outcome studies have shown when looking at adolescent and 
young adult autistic individuals (Waterhouse and Fein, 1984).
A number of issues concerning the notion of a specific 
developmental delay and the pattern of results obtained in this 
study can now be raised, against the background of information 
on CA and MA variables discussed above. First, the pattern of 
results on the theory of mind tests raises the question of 
whether some subjects show a deterioration in their theory of 
mind. While the group as a whole
performed no worse in 1990 than in 1983, three of the four 
subjects who originally passed the Sally-Anne Test, performed 
less well on re-testing. Also, a suggestion of deterioration 
comes from the general inconsistency of performance on the 
theory of minds tests. Many subjects made errors on both 
control and belief questions, and those who passed one Sally- 
Anne Test trial did not necessarily pass the other. These 
findings are contrary to those reported in other studies where 
passing and failing tended to be on an "all or nothing" basis 
(Baron-Cohen, 1989c).
The group’s failure to develop in their theory of mind ability 
over time, and the trend towards inconsistent and possibly 
worsening performance for some subjects, cannot be accounted for 
by changes in verbal or non-verbal MA since neither or these 
variables correlated significantly with changes in performance 
on the theory of mind tasks. Moreover, the increase in mean 
Verbal MA without a corresponding increase in "Passers" is 
further evidence for the claim
by several researchers that relatively high Verbal MA may be 
necessary for theory of mind but is not sufficient. In all, the 
specificity of the theory of mind delay in autism is confirmed 
by these findings which show that a theory of mind remains very 
much independent of levels of general cognitive functioning in 
adolescence and adulthood.
Poor performance on the theory of mind tests may possibly be the 
results of anxiety, poor motivation or ’negativism’. These 
factors could account for some of the inconsistency in 
performance, but, as the cognitive tests did not appear to be 
affected (co-operation and concentration being satisfactory for 
most subjects) such an explanation is inadequate.
The '/failure to find any subject able to pass the second-order 
belief attribution test, even after seven years, provides 
further evidence for the idea that a ’ceiling’ of theory of mind 
ability in autism might exist at the level of first-order 
attributions. This would partly explain the limited development 
of theory of mind in this study (but does not, of course, 
account for the lack of improvement at levels helow this 
ceiling). However, it is in principle possible that a much 
longer follow-up might reveal improvements even up to second- 
order attributions, and further longitudinal research is 
required to assess this.
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Lastly, there are a number of methodological limitations and 
flaws in the present studies which taken together may account 
for some of the results obtained, or at least prohibit the 
drawing of firm conclusions. These limitations of the study are 
described below.
1. Reliability data on the theory of mind tests used here is 
not available. Inter-rater and re-test reliabilities are 
of particular importance in the present study.
2. Hobson and Lee (1989) have questioned the use of the BPVS 
as a test of receptive language ability. They found that 
autistic individuals had specific impairments in passing 
particular BPVS items (such as emotion-related items) and 
so its use as a benchmark of purely verbal ability may be 
inappropriate.
3. The investigations of change in all types of performance 
were limited by the absence of follow-up data on the 
original matched control groups. It is difficult, for 
example, to properly assess the significance of the 
changes in MA without controls for comparison.
4. It is suggested that the Smarties Test may not be as 
simple as it appears. The own-response question could be
. interpreted as a Belief task in its own right as it probes 
awareness of the subject’s own mental state. This form of 
questioning has been used explicitly to test belief, 
(Baron-Cohen, in press) and may well confound the results 
of the Smarties Test. Further investigations of the 
pattern of responses in Smarties Tests studies are 
required to clarify this.
r-n-
CONCLU SIO N S AND RECOM M END A TIO N S
The results of this study are consistent with the hypothesis 
that autistic individuals, while not altogether lacking a theory 
of mind, are specifically delayed in acquiring one. The study 
also provides information concerning theory of mind and 
cognitive functioning in autistic adolescents and young adults 
extending the essentially child -oriented research in this area.
The longitudinal data show that development of a theory of mind 
is severely limited and that the pattern of this development is 
not clearly related to general cognitive development, although a 
high Verbal MA appears to be an important factor. The 
possibility of a ’ceiling’ at the level of first-order belief 
attribution is supported by this study.
It is clear from this research that the type of delay in autism 
is not one of a simple chronological delay such that, although 
autistic children might start to develop a theory of mind much 
later than normal children, they then move in the same direction 
and with the same rate of progress as normal children. The lag 
in their understanding of mental states in adolescent autistic 
individuals is clearly not fixed - with increasing age, the gap 
becomes more marked as shown in this study. As Harris (1989) 
has argued, it seems more likely that the impairment- in a theory 
of mind stems from a developmental delay superimposed on initial 
permanent neurological damage. This would explain the 
increasing gap between normal and autistic individuals, and the 
present study supports this extension of the specific 
developmental delay hypothesis.
\ -TD
Our understanding of theory of mind impairment in autism is 
rapidly changing as new research continues to appear. From the 
initial discovery of a primary deficit in the ability to 
conceive of mental states, a number of increasingly 
sophisticated models of that impairment have been proposed. The 
notion of a specific developmental delay has been confirmed by 
several studies, but the precise nature of the delay and its 
relationship to normal development remains unclear. The present 
study is the first to investigate the natural history of a 
theory of mind in autism through longitudinal research. While 
the results suggest a gloomy prognosis with regard to long-term 
development, more comprehensive and methodologically refined 
research is required before firm predictions can be made about 
the course of development which a theory of mind is likely to 
take in autism. With this point in mind, a number of 
recommendations for future research are presented:-
1. More research is needed into the reliability of current 
theory of mind tasks, for while their internal and face 
validity appear to be quite high, studies have not 
addressed the issues of reliability over time or between 
different experimenters.
2. More longitudinal research is required to follow the
■; development of a theory of mind over longer periods of 
time and for a variety of age ranges. In addition, 
follow-up of the original control groups, absent in the 
present study, would provide important comparative data.
3. Follow-up studies of meta-representational abilities other 
than understanding belief are required to properly 
evaluate the delay hypothesis. Longitudinal studies of 
early abilities such as joint attention and pretence, and 
their relationship to consequent performance on theory of 
mind tasks will provide important evidence for or against 
the existence of a developmental sequence in a theory of 
mind.
4. Investigation of factors beyond verbal and non-verbal MA 
is needed to obtain a clearer understanding of the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a theory of mind 
to develop. Measures of social competence, or pragmatic 
skills, for example, and their relationship to the 
development of theory of mind ability have been 
investigated cross-sectionally but not yet longitudinally.
5. The clinical implications of the research on theory of 
mind need to be investigated. Can the development of a 
theory of mind be modified or hastened by appropriate 
intervention? Might, for instance, an emphasis on 
pragmatics or social-communicative skills early in life 
encourage improvement in meta-representational ability?
The prognosis for autistic individuals with or without 
intervention remains inconclusive and as yet under­
researched; it is important therefore to continue 
generating systematic data on what can be expected of 
autistic children when they ’grow up’ as this sort of 
information will be vital to both parents and clinicians 
-forking with autistic people. A clearer understanding of 
the development of theory of mind, will provide a basis on 
which to advise and support parents and professionals in 
the most appropriate ways.
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